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ABSTRACT 
It has been frequently stated that the Mughal monarchy ran into a 
deep crisis after the death of the last great emperor, Aurangzeb in 1707. 
The crisis was thought to have found its expression in the succession of 
ever 'inferior', weak emperors who disgraced the public esteem of the 
ruling house. The lack of an indisputable order of succession not only 
split the power of the dynastic family and divided the Mughal nobility 
among themselves, but the frequent struggles for the throne in the early 
eighteenth century plunged the entire society into war causing permanent 
political conflict and long-term devastation of the Imperial finances and 
the economy as a whole. 
This work proposes that the egotistical claims to power of 'unfit' 
candidates and the unsound motives of their 'greedy' and 'evil-minded' 
supporters subverted the idea of an unchallengeable imperial authority in 
the person of the emperor, and the loss of his authority eroded to the same 
degree the unity of the Empire. 
Indeed, the wars of succession between Aurangzeb's three sons 
lasted almost two years. Bahadur Shah's early death in 1712 was then 
instantly followed by a new war from which, after the short reign of 
Jahandar Shah, Farrukh Siyar emerged as the winner. With the help of the 
Saiyid brothers he ascended the throne in 1713 and his reign was 
accompanied by so-called Civil Wars among the various factions at court. 
After his murder in 1719, two puppet kings were put on the throne whose 
reigns lasted only a few months. Before the accession of Mohammad 
Shah in 1719, four wars of succession had been fought which, according 
to Zahiruddin Malliclc, "proved a serious drain on the financial resources 
of the government. Every war entailed great diversion of resources to 
military uses, putting a severe strain upon the already depleted treasury. 
The disaster of battle and plunder told heavily on all classes. Problems of 
post-war adjustments deepened the economic crisis which had for long 
gripped the Empire". 
It is quite clear that the wars following the death of Aurangzeb 
temporarily gave rise to intense conflicts and increased tensions within 
the realm; any short-term power vacuum a> the centre immediately 
developed into factional struggles among the nobility. 
Although the Mughal dynasty was not replaced, the position of 
the emperor at the centre was de facto altered in a way 'denaturalized' 
during the first decades of the eighteenth century, as politics at the 
Mughal court in Delhi took on a new form and significance. Growing 
factionalism increasingly undermined the supreme authority of the 
emperor, but his loss of control over court polifics was not in essence due 
to individual, personal failures but denoted a shift in the relative weight 
of his power vis-a-vis that of factions of the nobility. 
Faction building among nobles and their involvement in court 
politics were no new phenomena in the Mughal Empire. In their position 
as administrators and upholders of imperial power, the highest nobles as 
well as lower imperial officers in the localities had at all times been 
involved with politics, and individual nobles had always pursued their 
interests at the royal court in one form or another within the framework of 
the central political institution. The building of larger and more co-
ordinated groups of nobles, or factions had occurred mainly at times of 
dispute over the Mughal succession. The formation of factions around 
princely contestants for the throne had been an integral part in the process 
of power bargaining in disputes or full blown wars of succession; at no 
time in the past, however, had this threatened or seriously challenged the 
dominance of the central power. Once the successor to the throne had 
been finally decided the imperial policy of reconciliation had integrated 
the opposing sections - with the result that the groupings, in this compact 
form, rapidly dissolved. 
If we compare this pattern with the situation emerging from the 
late seventeenth century, onwards it appears that the main characteristics 
of the old kind of the faction had been its transitory nature and the major 
difference to later factions must be sought in the establishment of much 
firmer, permanent groupings within the nobility. 
The present work shall be elaborating upon the Barha Saiyids, 
who came to exercise their power in a forceful way in a period between 
1713 to 1720. This group being headed by two brothers Abdullah Khan 
and Husani Ali Khan forms the crux of the present study. 
The second chapter, deals with the background of these Barha 
Saiyids, where they came from, where they first settled and spread to 
different parts of Punjab and Western U.P. what role did they play in the 
Mughal nobility right from Akbar till Aurangzeb, their bravery in many 
battles they fought, and their role in suppressing many revolts against 
Mughal empire, especially the suppression of Mirzas in Gujrat at the time 
of Akbar, is the hallmark of the said chapter. Later on, at the time of 
Jahangir's accession, the Barhas along with Shaildfarid Bukhari played a 
decisive role. Again at the time of Khurram rebellion, the Barhas were 
used by the Mughal Emperor. The war of succession at the illness of 
Shahjahan gave the Barhas to exploit the opportunity. So we can 
conclude that the Barhas remained in the thick of things throughout the 
Mughal Empire, thereby negating the view point that the famous Saiyid 
brothers were ujDstart who came to enjoy supreme position out of 
nowhere. 
Chapter three deals with the war of succession following the 
death of Bahadur Shah in 1712 between his four sons Jahandar Shah, 
Azim-ush-Shan, Rafi-ush-Shan and Shah Jahan was dominated by the 
attempts of the Asad-Khan-Zulfiqar Khan faction to finally secure the 
post of wazir denied to them by Bahadur Shah. The strongest candidate 
for the throne, Azim-ush Shan, was militarily and politically 
Outmanoeuvred by an alliance between the three other brothers arranged by 
Zulfiqar Khan. Jahandar Shah was formally declared emperor one month 
after Bahadur Shah's death in March 1712. After the death in battle of the 
two remaining active contestants Zulfiqar Khan became wazir and 
assumed unprecedented powers and privileges formerly assigned 
exclusively to royal princes. 
Zulfiqar Khan's wizarat was marked by a distinct policy of 
conciliation towards the Rajputs and the Marathas on the one hand, and a 
refusal to reintegrate the adherents of the defeated princes on the other. 
However, his rise to power not only threatened the authority of the 
emperor, but fiarther alienated the faction around Chin Qulich Khan. 
Additional divisions occurred when smaller groups of Courtiers around 
the emperor tried to undermine the powerful position of Zulfiqar Khan. 
When the remaining claimant to the throne, Azim-ush-Shan's son 
Farrukh Siyar began his campaign against Jahandar Shah, the reigning 
emperor and his wazir were unable either to pay the long overdue wages 
of their troops or to win the full support of the old nobility. Both 
contributed to the defeat of Jahandar Shah and Zulfiqar Khan in the battle 
of January 1713, after which Farrukh Siyar occupied the throne. 
Chapter four and five deal with Farrukh Siyar's victory which 
was largely due to the support of the Saiyid brothers, who were appointed 
to the two highest offices at Court and received dramatic increases in 
their mansabs. The families of the Saiyids of Barha had been in the 
service of the Mughal Emperors since Akbar's times, but had only 
recently risen from their relatively obscure mansabdar positions to higher 
ranks and deputies to Farrukh Siyar's father. Abdullah Khan was now 
made wazir and Husain Ali became mirbakhshi, which meant that the two 
key positions at court were now in the hands of one faction. Both brothers 
received additional governorships in the provinces of Multan and Bihar, 
which they governed through deputies; their uncle became governor of 
Ajmer province, and the remaining family and clan members were 
granted mansabs. 
Zulfiqar Khan was killed and Asad Khan faction finally 
eliminated. The Saiyids tried to conciliate the remaining powerful faction 
of the old nobility around Nizam-ul Mulk, Mohammad Amin Khan and 
Abdus Samad Khan by appointing Nizam-ul-Mulk to a high mansab and 
the governorship of the Deccan. The Deccan position was furnished with 
considerable additional privileges, introducing a significant degree of 
provincial independence. Abdus Samad Khan was made governor of 
Lahore and Muhammad Amin Khan took up the position of second 
bakhshi at court. 
Emperor Farrukh Siyar reversed the conciliatory policy of his 
predecessors towards the Rajputs and entered into lengthy campaigns and 
negotiations which were eventually undermined by an alliance between 
the Rajputs and the Saiyid brothers. To counteract the growing power of 
wazir, who appointed their chosen allies to the most important posts, 
Farrukh Siyar allowed two of his own favourities, the experienced, high 
rank mansabdars Mir Jumla and BChan-I-Dauran to exercise significant 
influence and political decisions. Both courtiers, together with Farrukh 
Siyar himself, subverted the policies introduced by the Saiyids by 
manipulating administrative practices (such as delaying farmans 
regarding appointments made by ministers and circumventing ministerial 
signatures), and equipped their own families with high mansabs and 
multiple court and provincial posts. Gradually the jagirdari system 
slipped out of the imperial administration's control, as did negotiations 
with the Rajputs, the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs, who all became 
enmeshed in the dealings of the different factions within and beyond the 
imperial Court. The struggle of the emperor against his wazir and 
mirbakhshi and the resulting extension of the power of the factions 
marked the end of the supreme authority of the Mughal emperor. 
Increasingly threatened by the other factions at Court, the Saiyids 
eventually deposed Farrukh Siyar, blinded, imprisoned and finally killed 
him. Farrukh Siyar's cousin, Rafi-ud-Darjat, son of Rafi-ush-Shan, was 
put onto the throne in April 1719, following in June of the same year by 
his brother Rafi-ud-Daulah. After the death from disease of both these 
brothers, Muhammad Shah, son of Bahadur Shah's youngest son Jahan 
Shah, ascended the throne in September 1719, again under the directive 
of the Saiyids. 
The demise of the Saiyids in November 1720, who had 
meanwhile systematically extended their alliances with the Rajputs and 
sections of the Marathas, was eventually brought about by Nizam-ul 
Mu'k and Mohammad Amin Khan, with a large army, several Deccan 
governors and the leading Court nobles behind him. 
Through the reshuffling of offices follwing the defeat of the 
Saiyids, the highest positions at Court and in the most strategically 
important provinces fell under the dominance of the Nizam-ul Mulk 
faction. 
In chapter six - although Mughal empire underwent 
disintegration, the Mughal culture obtained its most fully developed 
forms and continued to exercise a tremendous influence on the 
contemporary society for a long time to come. The Muslims of India, who 
wcie assimilated into the vast cultural complex of the country, adopted 
native languages for common use in day to day life, though Persian 
remained the literary and official language till such time as it was 
dethroned by Urdu. Thus, our period of study i.e. roughly the first half of 
18* century witnessed the climex of an endless process of absorption 
assimilation and adjustment of diverse elements and tendencies that has 
gone centuries giving shape and complexion to the cultural tradition of 
India. 
Since there was a marked economic decline at the centre, coupled 
with the extarvagance of the nobles and elites, the common man was the 
worst sufferers. The sources of 18''' century are replete with the harsh 
conditions being faced by peasants and protersional class. The cities and 
towns of North India in general and Delhi, Faizabad, Lucknow, 
Murshidabad and Azimabad in particular were dens of vice on the one 
hand and of piety and religiousness on the other hand. In every city there 
were large number of khanqahs (hospices), madrasas, and mosques, as 
also brothels and gambling dens. The pimps were active in every nook 
10 
and comer. Thej-e was a great contradiction in the attitudes of the people 
in general. They flocked the khanqahs and the shrines with devotion and 
visited the brothels too with enthusiasm. 
Contrary to the claims of the opponents of Saiyids that they were 
anti-Mughal and sought to monopolize power for themselves, neither the 
policy and the practice of the Saiyids, nor an analysis of the actual party 
groupings support such an interpretation. But it suited their opponents to 
misrepresent the policy of the Saiyids and to give to the anti-Saiyid 
struggle the outer character of a struggle between the Mughals and the 
Hindustani. However, it was a monumental mistake on the Saiyids part to 
have deposed and killed Farrukh Siyar. Nevertheless, it is not denied even 
by those writers who are strongly opposed to the Saiyids that they strove 
hard to maintain law and order and that their military reputation and 
capabilities prevented a final breakdown of the administration. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER - 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Mughal Empire, which had dazzled the contemporary world 
by its extensive territories, military might and cultural achievements 
showed unmistakable signs of decay towards the begirming of the 18^  
century. The Mughal Emperors lost their power and glory and their 
empire shrank to a few square miles around Delhi towards the end of the 
century with Delhi itself being occupied by the British army in 1803. 
The unity and stability of the Empire had been shaken during the long 
and strong reign of Aurangzeb, yet in spite of his many harmful policies, 
the Mughal administration was still quite efficient and the Mughal army 
strong enough at the time of his death in 1707. Moreover, the Mughal 
dynasty still commanded respect in the country. 
A sinister development in the later Mughal politics was the rise of 
powerful nobles who played the role of 'King makers'. Wars of 
succession were fought even in the heydays of the Mughal Empire but 
then the royal princes were the principal contestants supported by 
powerful mansabdars. In the later Mughal period the ambitious nobles 
became the real contenders for political power and the royal princes 
receded in the background. The powerful nobles and leaders of different 
factions used the royal princes as pawn in their game and set up and 
removed royal princes from the throne to suit their interests. 
Bahadur Shah became the Emperor due to the untiring efforts of a 
lesser known but dedicated and loyal noble Munim Khan who was 
rewarded with the wizarat inspite of Aurangzeb's desire to retain Asad 
Khan. Thus Jahandar Shah became the emperor not by his own strength 
but because of the able generalship of Zulfiqar Khan, a leader of the 
Irani party. Similarly, it were the Saiyid brothers who raised Farrukh 
Siyar to the throne in 1713 and pulled him down in 1719 when he 
ceased to serve their interests. Three puppet emperors, Rafi-ud-Darajat, 
Rafi-ud-daula and Mohammad Shah were raised to the throne by the 
Saiyids. The fall of the Saiyid brothers in 1720 came not because they 
had lost the confidence of the Emperor but was brought about more by 
the Turani faction under the leadership of Nizam-ul Mulk and 
Mohammad Amin Khan. And worst of all, these powerful parties were 
not political parties in the modern sense having different programmes 
for the welfare of the state but were factions looking for self-
advancement, more often at the cost of the state and against the interests 
of the Mughal ruler. 
William Irvine mentions the multiplicity of parties at the Mughal 
court. Among these four were prominent - The Turanis, the Iranis, the 
Afghans and the Hindustani. The first three were descendents of 
foreigners from Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. Their number had 
greatly increased during the last twenty five years of Aurangzeb's reign 
when he waged incessant war in the Deccan. Descendants from these 
foreigners held important military and civil offices in India. Among 
these the Turanis from Trans-Oxiana and Afghans from Khurasan and 
Pars were mostly Sunnis, while the Iranis from Persia were mostly 
undeclared Shias. In opposition to the Mughal or Foreign Party was the 
Indian born or Hindsutani party. It mainly comprised Muslims bom in 
India, many of whose ancestors though originally immigrants had settled 
in India for generations. This party got the support of the Rajput and the 
Jat chiefs and powerful Hindu landlords. The Hindus who filled almost 
all the subordinate offices naturally ranged on their side. However it will 
not be correct to assume that the political parties were based entirely on 
ethnic or religious groups. As has been rightly pointed out by Satish 
Chandra that "slogans of race and religion were used by individual 
nobles only to suit their convenience and that the actual groupings cut 
across ethnic and religious divisions.' 
The Saiyids brothers, whose rise and fall constitutes the crux of 
the work, were Hindsutani Muslims and they prided themselves on 
Satish Chandra : Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-40, pp. 257-58. 
being so. They were not prepared to accept the superiority of the Turani 
party or be treated as a conquered inferior or non-privileged race. 
The Saiyids followed a tolerant religious policy, reminiscent of 
the days of Akbar. It was under their influence that Jazia was abolished 
in 1713 and after reimposition again abolished in 1719. Further, the 
Saiyids won over the confidence of the Hindus and gave them high 
posts. The appointment of RAtan Chand as Diwan is illustrative of their 
policy. They also won over the Rajputs to their side and transformed 
Raja Ajit Singh from a rebel to an ally Ajit Singh gave his daughter in 
marriage to emperor Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyids showed sympathy 
towards the jats and it was their intervention that the siege of the fort of 
Thuri was raised and churaman visited Delhi in April 1718. Above all, 
the Marathas sided with the Saiyids and Chhatrapati became a deputy of 
the Mughal Emperor. 
The present study would also be looking at this hypothetical 
question as to whether the history of India would have taken a different 
course if the enlightened religious policy of the Saiyids had been 
continued by their successors in high offices. 
Since my study is confined to the role being played by a ethnic or 
national group i.e. Saiyid Brothers, of Barha, it would not be out of 
place to discuss in a nutshell the position of different ethnic national (or 
regional) or religious groups) in the nobility of the Mughals at various 
periods. 
Some modern writers have divided the nobility into 'foreigners' 
and 'Indians' identifying the former with the Mughals and the latter with 
Hindustanis and Rajputs. But such a division seems to be of doubtful 
validity for the seventeenth century. The word Mughal was loosely used 
to denote those who had recently come to the country from Iran and 
Turan.^ However the Mughals were not the representatives of any 
foreign power which had its economic and political interests outside the 
country. Once they joined the emperor's service, they made India their 
home, and hardly kept any contact with the land of their birth. One of 
the conditions of service was that they should bring their wives and 
children to the country. Since service generally lasted till death, and 
even after to progenies there was no question of returning to the country 
of their birth after retirement. Large numbers of the so-called Iranis and 
Turanis had lived in the country for one generation or more. They were 
thus wholly different from the English civil servant in India. Culturally 
too, the Mughal nobles did not form any distinctive group. Like the 
other immigrants at the Mughal court, the rapidly adopted the language 
and the manners and customs prevalent at the court and also introduced 
Satish Chandra, p. 15. 
and influenced their own ways. They married in the country and 
assimilated the culture which had been gradually developed at the 
Mughal Court and was widely prevalent among the upper and to some 
extent even among the lower classes all over northern India. 
By the second half of the 17* century, the only group among the 
Indian Muslims which retained the tribal clan structure to any 
considerable degree were the Afghans. However, there was nothing like 
an Afghan party at the court infact they were in the group of Indian 
Muslims. Culturally, too, the Afghans did not form a separate group, 
hardly any differences remaining between them and others on this score. 
The Rajpts who formed a regional as well as a tribal clan group 
had shown themselves even less capable than the Afghans of 
overcoming their tribal clan disunity. Nor did they have the advantage of 
numbers. But their traditional position as rulers and leaders of Hindu 
society gave them a social status which Akbar was quick to recognize. 
The Bundelas like the Rajputs, too were a tribal clan cum regional 
group. But for various historical reasons they could not attain a position 
comparable to that of the Rajputs till well into the 18* century."* 
As the empire expanded towards the Deccan, many Marathas 
{Deccanis) also entered the royal service. The problem of assigning the 
3 . Ibid., p. 16. 
4 . Satish Chandra, pp. 18-19, 
Marathas a position which would accord with their aspirations and 
importance and which would not at the same time, upset the internal 
balance in the nobility or unduly strain the resources of the empire, 
proved a difficult one, and became a factor in the organization and 
growth of a movement in Maharashtra aimed at regional independence. 
Religions and sectarian differences also affected the nobles. Thus, 
among the Muslims there were Shiahs and Sunnis. Sectarian controversy 
and bitterness between the two sometimes ran fairly high. Shiahs were 
often identified with Iranis, there being a widespread belief that most of 
the Irani nobles were secretly or undeclared Shiah.^ 
The nobility of the Mughals, although suffered from a number of 
internal weaknesses, was on a broad view, a remarkable institution 
which welded into a homogenous and harmonious whole, men 
belonging to different regions and tribes, speaking different languages 
and professing different religious and with differing cultural traditions. 
During the later part of the seventeenth and in the early part of the 
18" century, stresses were placed on the nobility which combined with 
its internal weaknesses, led to growing factionalism in the nobility and 
disrupted the empire.'' 
5 . Ahkam-i Alamgiri, p. 70 (ed. by J.N. Sarkar) 
6 . Satish Chandra, p. 19. 
However, a principal characteristic of the history of the Mughal 
Empire in the 18"" century was party or group politics. Its nature was, 
however, different from that of the personal groups centering round a 
particular person under the early Mughals in India. During the time of 
the Great Mughals, personal considerations sometimes led ambitious 
and rebellious princes and nobles like Kamran, the Mirza, Mirza Hakim, 
Khusrau, Mahabat Khan and others to form a group or coterie with their 
supporters. But usually such attempts were nipped in the bud and did not 
envelop the entire court. In the time of Jahangir, however, the waters of 
the court were seriously troubled on account of the machinations of Nur 
Jahan Junta in the Khurram Sahiryar rivalry. Under Shahjahan, again, 
the see-saw of Court politics pulsated with the dominance of Aurangzeb 
or Dara in imperial counsels particularly with regard to Golkonda and 
Bijapur. But in such moves the nobility as such played a secondary role, 
because the emperors were too strong. 
Towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign, two groups of nobles, 
Irani and Turani were already raising their heads and seeking to come to 
the forefront of in Mughal Court. The Barha Saiyids were there, of 
course, but Aurangzeb inspite of their military skills had a poor opinion 
about them. After his death the controlling and unifying machinery went 
out of order with the practical abeyance of monarchy. So the importance 
of parties or groups grew out of all proportions. It now came to be 
moulded more by the character of the nobles than by that of the rulers. 
In fact the emperors were largely responsible for this state of affairs 
because they were weak. Candidates were put on the throne by the self-
centred nobles who wanted that the Emperor should reign and they 
should rule. They could neither govern themselves nor did they possess 
the power to judge the right persons who could become worthy and 
honest officers and ministers. 
As has been mentioned earlier, this party politics can hardly be 
compared with the party government in a purely democratic state. 
Unlike modem political parties there was no common principle of work 
or firm party obligations in the Mughal court parties. It was the natural 
instinct of self-preservation which tempted the nobles to form such 
groups and keep the governmental machinery under themselves, and 
strengthen their own respective groups with the provincial governor, 
military commander and obedient feudal nobles and courtiers. What 
gave strength and cohesion to these groups was the family bond while 
ethnic identity added to the common interests of the group as 
symbolized by a recognized leader. What held the members of each 
group together were the traditional emotional attachment to certain 
cultural and political institutions.^ 
Zahiruddin Mallick, The Reign of Mohammad Shah, 1977, pp. 72-73. 
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It is, therefore, necessary to have a knowledge of the character 
and composition of the pohtical parties and their role in shaping the 
destinies of the state. 
Broadly speaking the nobles of the later Mughal court were 
divided down to 1720 into three principal groups -
(i) The Hindustani party included those bom in India or had settled 
for long here, e.g. many Afghan nobles, the Saiyids of Barha, as 
well as Khan-i-Dauran whose family came from Badakshan. The 
nobles of this group largely depended on the support of their 
Hindu friends. The Afghans were not prominent in Indian politics 
down to 1748, notwithstanding their numerical strength in the 
army. 
(ii) The so-called 'foreign' nobles, collectively called 'Mughals' were 
subdivided into two groups according to the country of their 
origin. One of them, the Turanis came from Turan or 
Transoxiana, and other parts of central Asia. They were of 
Turkish origin and were mostly sunnis. They enjoyed much 
influence and power as fellow countrymen of the ruling race, the 
Mughals, and formed a large proportion of the army. The Turani 
leaders were highly distinguished both as generals and civil 
administrators. 
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(iii) The other foreign group was of the Irani nobles, coming mostly 
from Persian and Khurasan and they were mainly Shias. The 
Iranis excelled in civil administration, especially in revenue and 
secretariat work. But being Shias they were in a minority and 
their influence in the state was less except when their leaders were 
in power. 
At first sight it would appear that race and religion constituted the 
basis of rivalry. But this division was not wholly exclusive. Even in one 
group there were members of the other groups. Hence this 
differentiation was not entirely based on religion or racial differences. 
The leading figures in the Irani group were Alamgiri nobles, Asad 
Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan, holding the ranks, 7000 and 6,000 
respectively by the end of 1707. They were also highly influential. 
Zulfiqar was also a successful general. He was supported by Daud Khan 
Panni, Rao Dalpat Rao Budh Singh of Bundi, Rao Ram Singh Hara of 
Kota, all distinguished soldiers. This Irani group was very powerful and 
influential but it was not a racial group. Both Asad and Zulfiqar were 
Persians born in India. It was 'a family-cum-personal' group bound by 
family ties and personal relations of supporters. There was no clearly 
defined political programme of this group, except that Zulfiqar was 
interested in wizarat of Deccan even in Shahu and in negotiating with 
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the Marathas. Again he was favourably disposed towards the Hindu and 
his close association with the Bundela and Hada Rajputs was very 
significant. The group operated with a fair degree of cohesion which 
gave its effectiveness. After the fall of this Irani family in 1712, no other 
Irani noble rose to such high rank till the end of Mohammad Shah's 
reign in 1748. 
The famous Turani group which rose to prominence at the end of 
the seventeenth century and continued to hold power in varying degree 
till the middle of the 18'*^  century was headed by Ghazi-ud-din Khan 
Firoz Jung.^ Like the group of Asad Khan mentioned earlier this was 
also a family group, well knitted together by ties of kinship and 
marriage and by common allegiance to the Mughal crown. But it was 
larger stronger more exclusive and consequently more cohesive. Other 
members of this family were Chin Qulich Khan^, Mohd. Amin Khan'°, 
Abdus Samad Khan However a serious setback of the Turanis was that 
the relation between Firuz Jang and Chin Qulich Khan was strained and 
Firuz Jung was blind. During the war of succession in the first two 
decades of eighteenth century (1707-20) the indifferent attitude of this 
8 . For details of his biography, Maasir-ul Umara, II, 872-879. 
9 . Maasir ui Umara, 111, 837-48. 
10. Ibid., 1, 346-350. 
i 1 . Ibid, in, 69-74, He was the brother-in law of Amir Khan. 
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group, put them out of power, and paved the way for the rise of Zulfiqar 
Khan Abdullah Khan. 
There was longstanding rivalry between the Irani and the Turani 
groups for power and position at the court. Both Zulfiqar and Chin 
Qilich Khan were ambitious to seize supreme power. At first the Irani 
group was superior not only in power and influence but also in prestige. 
The combined mansabs of the first few Irani nobles totaled 
24,500/24,000 while those of the Turani group only 20,000/15,600. This 
rivalry between the Iranis and the Turanis did not, however, stand in the 
way of their combining against the Hindsutanis. But after the fall of the 
latter, the former two confronted each other fiercely. 
During the war of succession after Aurangzeb's death, the Turanis 
held aloof from Azam and deserted Kam Bakhsh. They remained in the 
background in the time of Bahadur Shah. They also deserted Rafi-us 
Shan in the civil war against Jahandar in 1712. In the contest between 
Jahandar and Farrukh Siyar, too they were bribed by the latter and 
remained passive at Samugarh. The Saiyid brothers gave important posts 
to the Turanis. Mohammad Amin Khan was appointed second Mir 
Bakhshi and was given the title of Itimad-ud-daula Nusrat Jung; his son, 
Qamaruddin Khan became paymaster of the ahadis;Chm Qilch IGian 
Bahadur entitled Nizam-ul Mulk was appointed viceroy of the Deccan 
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with headquarters at Aurangabad and with his deputies in the six 
provinces thereof. 
During the period 1707-13, covering the reigns of Bahadur Shah 
and Jahandar Shah, the Irani party was strong with Asad Khan Vakil-i-
Mutlaq and Zulfiqar Khan as first Mir Bakhshi and then Wazir (1712-
13). Zulfiqar initially joined Azam during the struggle with Bahadur 
Shah but deserted him due to his personal defects. He was favourably 
disposed towards the Marathas securing the release of Shahu in 1707 
and also towards the Hindus. He was instrumental in the accession of 
Jahandar. As Wazir he tried to monopolise power in his own hands. But 
owing to the differences with Kokaltash, a foster brother of Jahandar, he 
did not exert himself against Farruldi Siyar in 1713, leading to the fall of 
Jahandar Shah. 
From the accession of Farrukh Siyar in 1713 to the first year of 
Muhammad Shah's reign (1720) the Hindustani party remained in 
power under the Saiyid brothers. Without attempting to monopolise 
power the Hindsutani Saiyids sought the cooperation of the Alamgiri 
nobles. But their pro-Hindu, pro-Maratha policy lack of administrative 
experience and their friction with the emperor led to a reaction against 
them on the ground of their policy being anfi-Islamic and anti-
15 
monarchical. Hence, they lost their ascendancy in 1720 as a result of the 
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combination of the Iranis and the Turanis. 
While explaining the phenomenon of the decadence of Mughal 
power, Historians generally lay stress on the social and moral 
degeneration of the privileged few who grew indolent, self-satisfied and 
indifferent in their duties. For instance Ahsan Ijad'^ the author of the 
Shahnama-i Deccan criticizes the character of the nobility and attempts 
to interrelate its decline with the break-up of political power. He bums 
with indignation at the corrupt and luxurious life of Aurangzeb's 
successors, factional rivalries among the nobles, and their cowardly 
behaviour in dealing with the enemies of the Mughal government. 
The age being one of political decline and economic distress there 
runs a thread of gloom through the entire contemporary historical 
writings. The contemporary writers, who saw the Empire passing into 
the turmoil of strife, and it vast structure ultimately breaking down 
before waves of insurgency and foreign invasions, did not hesitate to 
condemn the unwise policies of the Emperor and their inefficient 
conduct of administration. They denounced the kings for their impolitic 
and inexpedient acts in regard to military operations and administration; 
12. J.N. Sarkar, pp. 28-29. 
13 . Ahsan Ijad is also the author of Farrukh Siyarnama, which deals exclusively with the political 
history of Farrukh Siyar. 
16 
even matters relating to their private life were subjected to severe 
criticism.''^ Bahadur Shah was blamed for his extreme munificence in 
lavishing gifts and privileges of office and power on undeserving 
persons.'^ Jahandar Shah was depicted as a drunken profligate while 
Farrukh Siyar was called a prisoner of indecision. . Muhammad Shah 
was accused for his indolence and intemperance which made him 
incapable of holding the self-seeking nobles under control. A number 
of Ibrat Namahs (Kamraj's, Mirza Mohammad's and Qasim Lahori's) 
were written in this period showing the political anarchy of this period. 
Nevertheless, any act of insubordination on the part of the nobles 
was unbearable to the historians. They gave fiiU vent to their indignation 
at the local leaders who made a bid to secure shares, compatible with 
their might in profits the empire could offer.'^ In the struggle for 
supremacy between the centre and the provinces the historians are 
divided into two groups; some display enthusiastic partiality towards the 
Imperial Centre, while others lend their support to the local chieftains 
and provincial governors. Historians like Qasim Aurangabadi, Mansa 
Ram, author of Maasir-i-Nizami, Yusuf Mohamma Khan, author of 
14 . Zahiruddin Mallick's article in Mohibbul Hasan's edited Historians of Medieval India, p. 176. 
15 . Khafi Khan, vol. II, 601-2, 627-27; Ibratnama, Kamraj, f. 36a. 
16 . Nuruddin Faruqui, Jahandarnama, Aligarh Rotograph, ff. 36-38. 
17 . Mirza Mohammad, Ibratnama, Patna Ms 95-96. 
18 . Yahya Khan, Tazkirat-ul Muluk, Aligarh Rotogrpah, f. 132b. 
19. Mirat-i-Waridat 644-45. 
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Tarikh-i-Fathiyah, and others who compiled their works in Deccan, 
supported the Nizam-ul Mulk in his conflict with the centre. But writers, 
like Ashub, Rustam Ali, Shafi Warid, Mirza Muhammad held the 
Imperialist point of view. It appears however, that their loyalty was to 
the Mughal crown and not to one who wore it. 
In an atmosphere filled with faction feuds, historians felt 
constrained to take sides and advocate the cause of their group leaders 
and patrons. 
The prolonged conflict between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid 
brothers kept the Imperial Court in a state of almost continues alarm and 
unrest while recording these momentous events the historians of 18* 
century seem to be sharply divided in their attitude to the selection of 
facts and their interpretations. A set of writers bitterly criticized the 
Saiyid brothers for their misdeeds; others on the contrary, lay the entire 
responsibility for all the evils of the government on the shoulders of 
Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyid brothers are referred to in disparaging terms 
for their acts of insubordination, inordinate ambition for power and their 
indifference to the actual discharge of administrative duties.^ *^  In like 
manner, Farrukh Siyar is accused of his feeble and fickle policies in 
dealing with the all powerful ministers.^' 
20 . Ahwal ul Khawaqin, f. 77a. 
21 . Mirza Muhammad, Ibratnama, ff. 102-3. 
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Khafi Khan explicitly states that Farrukh Siyar committed a serius 
mistake in conferring the highest civil and military posts on Saiyid 
Abdullah and Hussain Ali who were untrained and inexperienced in 
administrative matters.^^ On the other hand, Qasim Lahori, who calls 
himself a slave of the Sadaat, manifests enthusiastic partiality towards 
the Saiyids and holds the emperor responsible for driving the Saiyids to 
desperation by his breach of faith and intrigues against them. Mirza 
Mohammad '^* and Shafi Warid^^ allege that nobles like Mir Jumla, a 
Mughal and Khan-I Dauran an Indian bom Muslim, having become 
jealous of the rise of the Saiyid's to power, resolved to preserve their 
privileges by means of back stage intrigues. These nobles instigated the 
Emperor against the Wazir and the Mir Bakhshi and thus formented 
strife at the court. 
Yahya Khan, the Mir Munshi of Farrukh Siyar, adds other factors 
which contributed to the widening of the rift between the king and his 
ministers. He writes that, apart from the dispute over appointments to 
the posts of Wizarat Sadarat and Diwan, Farrukh Siyar expressly 
disapproved of the introduction ofljaradari and abolition of the jiziya^'^. 
Muhammad Ashub surveys the whole situation from a sectarian point of 
22 
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Khafi Khan, 738. 
Tarikh-i-Saltanat-i-Farrukh Siyar ff. lb, 2a, 66b. 
Ibratnama, f. 30. 
Mirat-i Waridat, 505. 
Tazicirat ul Muluk ff. 122, 124. 
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view. He ascribes the cause of the conflict to an outstanding hostiUty 
between the Mughals and the Sadat of Barha. According to him, the 
Saiyids monopolized all higher public employment, and the Mughals, 
the backbone of the Empire, faced unemployment and economic 
distress. 
Rustam Ali Khan author of the Tarikh-i Hindi, a highly 
sumamrised and condensed work, glorifies the spectacular feats of 
gallantry performed by Husain Ali Khan. His acts of generosity and 
liberal patronage to saints and men of letters are also praised. But 
Ashub prefers to ignore these achievements and virtues of Husaini Ali 
Khan. He takes pains to bring forth the vices of his character. Worthy 
of note is the fact that nearly all historians fail to reveal the underlying 
pattern of Husain All's conciliatory policy towards Marathas, Rajputs 
and Jats. They betray a spirit of prejudice against the Saiyids and 
misrepresent their methods of dealing with the zamindars and the 
regional leaders. True, their system of alliances with the local potentates 
was envisaged to isolate Farrukh Siyar, but this indirectly contributed to 
make the royal authority paramount in areas where disorders on a wide 
scale prevailed. '^^  
27 . Tarikh-i Sahadat-i-Farruicii Siyar was Julus-i Muhammad Shah, ff. 70a, 43. 
28 . Tarikh-i Hindi, 772. 
29 . Tarikh-i Sahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah, ff. 38, 42-43. 
30. Zahiruddin Mallick's article Persian Historiogrpahy in 18th century in Mohibul Hasan ed. 
Historians of Medieval India, Delhi, pp. 160-61. 
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The disgraceful deposition of Farrukh Siyar and his cruel 
treatment raised a storm of anger against the Saiyids. Not only the 
discontented nobles felt indignant at the wrongs done to the king, but the 
•5 1 
humble ranks of the society were also stirred to wrath. 
The victorious ministers dishonoured the Mughal throne filled 
public posts with their relations and adherents and inflicted severities on 
the person of the fallen monarch. Even those historians who had 
hitherto, justified the stand of the Saiyids suddenly changed their 
attitude and used harsh language in condemning them for these wicked 
acts. This is particularly true of Mirza Qasim Lahori and Muhammad 
Qasim Aurangabadi . 
In contradictions to their earlier observations with regard to the 
irresolute and weak-kneed policy of Farrukh Siyar these writers now 
censure the methods followed by the Saiyid brothers. Another 
significant issue on which the narrators of these events differ from one 
another, is the bitter struggle for supremacy between the Saiyids and the 
Muhgals. For an understanding of the origin, scope and nature of the 
clash of interests between the two groups of the ruling party, it is 
necessary to explain the historian's group alignments, his associations 
31 . Shahnama-i-Munawwar Klam, f. 32b. 
32 . Tarikh-i-Saltanat-i-Farrukh Siyar, ff. 76-77, 80. 
33 . Ahwal-ul Khawaqin, 88a, 145b, ff. 152. 
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and source of inspiration which influenced his views. Most of the works 
were written either under the patronage of Muhammad Shah or the 
Nizam ul Mulk, the acknowledged leader of the Mughals. For instance 
Khafi Khan completed his work in the reign of Muhammad Shah and 
served for a long time under the Nizam-ul Mulk. Muhammad Bakhsh 
Ashub was a Mughal and he represents the Mughal view point in 
interpreting the scramble for power Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi, 
Ahsan Ijad Yusuf Muhammad Khan, Munim Khan Aurangabadi, Mansa 
Ram and others compiled their chronicles when the Nizam ul Mulk was 
at the zenith of his power. 
These writers, as employees of the government in the Deccan, 
were bound by strong ties of personal loyalty to the Nizam-ul Mulk who 
patronized and encouraged them. The Saiyids have few historians to 
advocate their case. Rustam Ali Khan and Ghulam Husain Tabatabai'''* 
might be included in this list of the Saiyids supporters. Reflecting on 
these divergent opinions, Khafi Khan writes: 'in the times of Farrukh 
Siyar men have shown a partiality or animosity to one side or the other 
exceeding all bounds. They have looked to their own profit and loss, 
turned the reins of their imagination accordingly. The virtues of one side 
34 . Ghulam Hussain Tabatabai, Siyar-ul Mutakhkhirin (text) Calcutta II, 1836, 21-22, 30, 37-39. 
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they have turned into faults, while they have shut their eyes to the faults 
of the others'.^' 
Khafi Khan, in spite of his tall claims to honesty and frankness in 
recording events, could not conceal his sympathies for the Nizam-ul 
Mulk. He tries to gloss over the faults of his patron and finds faults with 
his enemies. He holds that the Nizamul Mulk was averse to the idea of 
calling Saiyid brothers as namak-ba haram and haram namak. But the 
Nizam ul Mulk himself used these abusive terms for the two brothers in 
each and every arzdasht and letter he sent to the Emperor and to his 
friends and subordinates. Reflecting on rumours that Saiyid Abdullah 
Khan was poisoned to death at the instigation of the Nizam ul Mulk, 
Khafi Khan tried to defend the position of his patron. Without going 
deep into the matter and investigating the truth, he concluded that God 
alone knew the reality. 
35 . Khafi Khan, 726. 
36 . Ibid., 940. 
37 . Munshat-I Musavi Khan, ff. 48, 51. 
Chapter 2 
(BarUa Saiyids in Mug Hal 
!Nb6iCity 
CHAPTER-2 
BARHA SAIYIDS IN THE MUGHAL NOBILITY 
When Akbar took over the reins of government personally and 
was faced with opposition in his nobility he seems to have turned to the 
Rajputs and the Indian Muslims to counter the old nobility.' The rise of 
the Barha Saiyids, who were admitted in large numbers after the 
overthrow of Bairam Khan should be seen in this context. 
The Barha Saiyids were one of the largest and most influential 
group among Indian Muslim (Sheikhzadas) in the Mughal nobility. 
They were admitted in the Mughal service in the reign of Akbar and 
within a very short period by sheer dint of their military ability and 
prowess in the battle field they came to enjoy an important place at the 
court. 
During the reign of Jahangir and Shahjahan, they considerably 
improved their position both in terms of mambs and offices that they 
were offered specially during Shahjahan's reign. 
A brief history of the family along with the list of Barha 
mansabdars of Akbar was prepared by Blochmann. References about 
Iqtidar Alam Khan; The Nobihty of Akbar and the Development of his Religious PoHcy', 
JRAS, 1968,29-30. 
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them have been made in all most all important contemporary and near 
contemporary sources. 
According to their traditions, Abul Farah, the ancestor of Barha 
Saiyids left Medina because of the persecution of the contemporary 
rulers and came to Wasit in Iraq and then migrated to Ghaznin. 
Traditionally, it is claimed that from Ghazni his four sons arrived in to 
India in the army of Shihabuddin Ghauri. These four sons Saiyid Abul 
Fazl, Saiyid Abul Fuzail, Saiyid Daud, Saiyid Najmuddin settled in 
Tihanpur, Chatbanauri, Jajner and Kundli villages in the Punjab. The 
families retained these names when they migrated to localities within the 
present Muzaffamagar District of Uttar Pradesh and are still known by 
these names. 
Several views are given about the derivation of their name 
Barha. One view is based on their preference to live outside {Bahir) the 
city of Delhi. Another opinion is that it is taken from 'Abrar' i.e., the 
Pure Saiyid". Still another view is that since they were shias and 
followers of twelve Imams, they called themselves 'Barhas'."^ Jahangir 
in his memoirs writes that, "they call twelve bara in Hindi. As in the 
2 . References of Barha Saiyids could be found in tlie following works - Akbarnama, Tuzuk-i-
Jahangiri, Zakhiratnl Khawanin. Ain-I Akbari. I (tr). Notes on Barha Saiyids. Statistical 
Discriptive and Historical Account of North West Provinces of India, vol. Ill, Muzaffamagar 
district; District Gazetteers ofJJnited Provinces, Muzaffamagar District. 
3 . Nevill, p. 160. 
4 . Ibid., p. 161. 
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Duab there are twelve villages near each other which are the native 
country of these Saiyids, they have become known as Saiyids of 
Barha".' 
In the course of their stay in the region, they developed 
considerable influence over local zamindars. It appears that before 
joining Mughal service, some of the Saiyids were in the service of 
Afghans and had enjoyed some position with them. However, it had not 
been possible to trace the position of Barha Saiyids before Mughals. 
According to local traditions they worked as menial servants in the army 
ofHamayun.^ 
From the Ain also we could not gather whether they possessed 
zamindari rights in the villages, as in its listing of zamindar castes in 
sarkar of Sahamapur, it enters Saiyids in some parganas, but the 
Saiyids of Barha are not recorded as zamindars anywhere. 
There was a controversy during the reign of Akbar and Jahangir 
regarding their geneology. Once, in the court of Akbar, some nobles 
questioned Saiyid Mahmud Barha about his ancestry, Saiyid Mahmud 
jumped in a fire nearby saying that since he was a true Saiyid, the fire 
5, Tnzuk-iJahangiri,p.266. 
6 . Nevill, p. 162. 
7 . Ain-i Akbari, II (tr.) see account of twelve subas. 
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would not hurt him.^ Jahangir himself notes that some people make 
remarks about their lineage but their bravery is convincing proof of their 
being Saiyid.^ Saiyid Mahmud Barha of the Kundliwal House was the 
first Barha Saiyid to have joined Mughal service. Before entering the 
Mughal service, he was in the employment of Sikander Afghan. He 
deserted Sikander during the siege of Mankot and came over to the 
Mughals. It is said he joined the personal service of Bairam Khan.'^ 
When Bairam Khan sent an advance guard under the command of Khan-
i-zaman, Saiyid Mahmud was also despatched with him." After the 
victory at Panipat in 1556, he was dispatched alongwith Shah Qali 
Mahram against Haji Khan in the expedition against Ajmer in 1556. 
The famous episode that after annexation of Ajmer, one of the 
Commander said that it was the Iqbal (fortune) of the king that the 
victory was achieved. Syed Mehmud took out his sword in presence of 
Emperor and exclaimed No your Majesty Iqbal was not there. I was 
there, and instrumental in victory. His sons Syed Hashim, Syed Qasim 
were given jagir in haweli Ajmer'^ In 1558 he was dispatched 
alongwith Adham Khan against the rebellions Bahaduriya tribes of 
8 . Zakhirat ul Khawanin, vol. I, p. 189. 
9 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 362-364. 
10 . Mimtakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, p. 18, Maasir ulUmara, vol. II, pp. 375-377. 
11 . Akbarnama, vol. I1I< p. 33. 
12 . Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 46.46. Maasir ulUmara, vol. II, pp. 375-377. 
13 . Abdul Bar! Mani, Asanidus Sanadid, pp. 11-13. 
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Hatkant. He was also deputed for the conquest of the fort Jaitaram in 
Jodhpur.*"* Later on when the Emperor was aUenated from Bairam Khan, 
he joined imperial service and received ajagir in Delhi." It appears that 
Saiyid Mahmud joined the Mughal service as a political gamble, 
because he found the position of the Afghans to be very precarious. But 
except him no other Barha Saiyid is noticed in our sources till after the 
overthrow of Bairam Khan. 
However, when the reins of government came into the hands of 
the Emperor and he was faced with opposition in his nobility, he seems 
to have introduced two new elements of Indian origin viz. the Rajputs 
and the Indian Muslims to counter the old nobility. 
In the siege of Chittor which was personally supervised by the 
emperor, the Saiyids of Barha fought bravely and Saiyid Jamaluddin, 
son of Saiyid Ahmad Khan Barha was killed when a mine exploded.'^ 
In the Gujarat campaign, Saiyid Mahmud Barha, Saiyid Ahmad 
Khan, Saiyid Qasim and Saiyyid Hashim were dispatched to accompany 
the advance guard of Khan Kalan. 
After the conquest of Gujarat, an army was sent under Man 
Singh, Saiyid Mahmud and others for the conquest of Surat, which was 
14 . Akbamama, vol. II, p. 78. Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, p. 78. 
15. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 375-377. 
16 . Akbarnama, vol. II, p. 317; Ma'asir-ul Umara, vol. II, p. 379. 
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under the occupation of the Mirzas. Akbar, too joined, the campaign and 
in a fierce battle at Sarnal, Ibrahim Husani Mirza was defeated and put 
to flight.'^ After the victory at Sarnal the Emperor alongwith Saiyid 
Mahmud and other Barha Saiyids marched to conquer Surat. While the 
operations were in progress, the Mirzas tried to create commotion near 
Pattan. Ibrahim Hasan attempted to surprise Agra. Akbar sent Saiyid 
Mahmud, Shah Quli Mahram and Bhagwan Das to intercept the rebels.'^ 
After the defeat of Mirzas, Khan-i Alam along with Saiyid 
Qasim Barha was deputed to pursue Muhammad Husain Mirza who had 
fled to Deccan.^° After the completion of the conquest of Gujarat, Saiyid 
Mahmud returned to the court along with Akbar, but Saiyid Ahmad, 
Saiyid Qasim and Saiyid Hashim were left in Gujrat. 
Soon after Akbar's departure, Gujrat was again invaded by the 
rebels and Mirza Aziz Koka was besieged. On hearing this, Akbar 
personally marched towards Ahmadabad. A strong advance guard was 
formed under Man Singh, Bhagwant Das, Saiyid Mahmud and other 
Braha Saiyids. In the battle fought against Muhammad Husain Mirza, 
the Barha Saiyids were in the centre under the command of Mirza Khan. 
17 . Akbarnama, vol. II, ep. 11-16; Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. P. 141. 
18 . Akbarnama, vol. II, p. 19. 
19. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 23. 
20 . Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 147-149; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 378-79. 
21 . Akhbarnama, vol. II, pp. 41-43. Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 164-190. 
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The centre was responsible for the great victory, and in the battle Saiyid 
Mahmud and Rai Singh distinguished themselves. 
In the same year after the reconquest of Guajrat, Saiyid 
Mahmud along with Amroha Saiyids, were sent against the rebel 
Madhukar. Saiyid Mahmud behaved courageously and brought the 
country to order. Shortly afterwards Saiyid Mahmud died.^ '^  
In 1576 Man Singh was sent against Rana Pratap of Mewar. He 
was accompanied by Saiyid Ahmad, Saiyid Qasim, Saiyid Hashim, 
Saiyid Raja and a number of other Barha Saiyids. Some of the Barha 
Saiyids under the command of Saiyid Hashim numbering eighty were in 
the vanguard, and Saiyid Ahmad commanded the right wing. There was 
severe fighting and Saiyids reputedly threw the valour of Rajputs into 
the shade. Badauni who had personally witnessed the fighting remarks, 
"that if Saiyids would have not held ground the affair would have turned 
disgraceful.^ "^ 
Later on in 1577 another army under the command of Shahbaz 
Khan Kamboh was sent against Rana Pratap, Man Singh, Raja Bhagwan 
Das, Saiyid Raju, Saiyid Qasim and Saiyid Hashim were ordered to 
accompany him.^ ^ 
22 . Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp. 47-49. 
23 . Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp. 143-44 
24 . Abamama, vol. Ill, pp. 166-167, 174-176; Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 228, 230-234; 
Maasir ul Umara, vol. Ill, p. 403-404. 
25 . Abamama, vol. Ill, pp. 318-19; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 409-410. 
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In 1580, Saiyid Hashim and Saiyid Qasim were ordered to 
march against Chandrasen, son of Maldeo who had rebelled. After a 
fight they expelled him from the imperial territory. 
It appears that until 1584, Saiyid Hashim and Saiyid Qasim 
remained at Ajmer serving in the imperial armies. They were also 
granted yag/r in the suba^^ However, in 1580 they were appointed with 
Abdur Rahim Mirza Khan to Gujrat who was called upon to chastise 
Mzuaffar Gujrati.^^ The vanguard of the army was commanded by the 
Barha Saiyids. In the battle fought at Sarkhij Saiyid Hashm was killed 
and Saiyid Qasim was severely wounded. Mirza Khan achieved a great 
victory but Muzaffar escaped. 
During the year 1587 and 1588 the Saiyids of Barha under 
Saiyid Qasim and Nizamuddin fought many battles against Muzaffar, 
and the Jam the ruler of lesser Kutch, and achieved much success. 
In 1590, Gujrat was assigned to Mirza Aziz Koka. The Saiyids 
remained there during his tenure of office and fought in every battle 
against Muzaffar, their place being as usual in the vanguard. Apart from 
Saiyid Qasim, Saiyid Bayazid, Saiyid Salim, Saiyid Bahadur and Saiyid 
Mustapha are also referred to during this period.''^ 
26 . Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 409-410. 
27 . Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp. 409-410, 413-414; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 409-410. 
28 . Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p. 425; Mintakhab ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 331-32; Maasir-ul Umara, vol. 
11, p. 409-410. 
29 . Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp. 452-454; Maasirul Umara, vol. I, 409-410. 
30 . Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p. 608-609 and 633-634. 
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In the year 1591-92 where Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan was 
dispatched for the conquest of Thatta, the Barha Saiyids also 
accompanied. When in 1591, Murad was appointed governor of Malwa, 
T 1 
Saiyid Raju was placed under him. After some time Murad was 
deputed to the Deccan. Saiyid Raju, Saiyid Qasim and other Barha 
Saiyids escorted the prince under Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan. 
After the death of Murad, command of the Deccan forces was 
given to Daniyal in 1599, in the same year Saiyid Qasim was killed.'" In 
1600, Shaikh Farid Bukhari along with a big army which included a 
contingent of Barha Saiyids was sent to besiege Asirgarh. '^* 
After 1600, no reference about Barha nobles is available until 
the last days of Akbar. It appears that during this period Shaikh Farid 
Bukhari was their principal mentor. 
During the last days of Akbar a conspiracy was hetched by Aziz 
Koka and Man Singh to arrest Salim and enthrone his son IGiusrau. But 
Shaikh Farid Bukhari collected his Barha soldiers and went to offer 
allegiance to Prince Salim. The great support rendered by the Barha 
was generously awarded by Jahangir after his accession Saiyid Ali 
3 1 . Ibid., vol. II, pp. 402-403. 
32 . Akbamama, vol. Ill, pp. 698-699; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 400-403. 
33 . Akbamama, vol. Ill, p. 767. 
34 . Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 797-798. 
35 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 13-14; Ma'asir-ul Umara, vol. 11, pp. 410-411. 
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Asghar who was in personal service of the Prince was promoted to the 
rank of 3000 and was given the title of Saif Khan. 
In 1605, Prince Khusrau rebelled. An army under the command 
of Shaikh Farid along with a contingent of Barha Saiyids under Saif 
Khan and Saiyid Jalal was sent against him. The battle was unusually 
severe and the Barha and Bukhara Saiyids had to bear the brunt of the 
fight. The Barhas, as usual, were in the vanguard and at one stage about 
50 or 60 of them had to face some 1500 Badakhshis. Later, in 1609 Saif 
Khan was assigned the faujdari of Hissar and received a further 
promotion to the rank of 2500/1350." 
In 1610, certain Barha nobles such as Adam Barha and Saiyid 
Ali both from Gujrat were favoured. Next year Saiyid Adam was killed 
while fighting against the Afghan chief, Usman in Bengal. 
In 1613, prince Khurram was sent against Rana of Mewar. It 
appears that Saif Khan was also deputed with him, because at his 
request the mansab of Saif Khan was increased to 3000/1500. 
Hizabr Khan Barha was also deputed to the same expedition. In 
1615, Saif Khan Barha, Saiyid Ali Barha and Abdullah Barha were 
raised to the rank of 3,000/1000, 1500/1000, and 700/450 respectively. 
36 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p. 30; Maasir-ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 410-411. 
37 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 86-87. 
38 . Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, 86-87, 166, 209-210. Saiyid Ali was promoted to the rank 1500/700. 
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In the following year (1616) Saiyid Qasim, son of Saiyid Dilawar, was 
also promoted to the rank of 800/450.-'^  
In 1616 news of the death of Saif Khan was conveyed to the 
Emperor. He had died in the Deccan, which suggests that he was 
transferred to the Deccan from Ajmer along with Prince Khurram when 
the latter was appointed viceroy of the Deccan. His two sons, Ali 
Muhammad and Bahadur were given ranks of 600/400 and 400/200 
respectively and his nephew Saiyid Ali Barha was also promoted to the 
rank of 1000/600.'*° 
In 1617 Saiyid Abdullah came from the Deccan with the news 
of the peace reached with the Deccanis. He was given a jagir worth 
2,000,000 dams in return for communicating this joyful news to the 
emperor, and received the title of Saif Khan.'*' 
While the Emperor was in Gujrat in 1618, he promoted certain 
Barha nobles who were serving in that province. Saiyid Hizabr Khan 
was promoted to the rank of 1000/400, Saiyid Bayazid and others were 
also rewarded in the like manner. In the same year Safi Barha and his 
brethren were killed in the Kangra campaign against Surajmal."*^ 
39 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 188-189. 
40 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 159, 163; Maasirul Umara, vol. II, pp. 410-411. 
4 1 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, 1888-89. 
42 . Afzal Husain, Nobility under akbar and jahangir, pp. 112-113. 
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In 1622, Khurram was ordered to march to Qandhar with all his 
troops. But the prince who had developed ulterior motives proposed to 
remain in Mandu till the rainy season. The message of Khurram was not 
appreciated by the Emperor because of the growing pressure of Persians. 
Therefore he ordered the prince to send immediately all great amirs, the 
Barha and Bukhari Saiyids to court."*^  It is not known whether he 
complied with the roders, but certain Barha nobles were with him when 
he openly rebelled. Saiyid Muzaffar Khan and Saiyid Shujaat Khan, 
who were in the personal servers of the prince, are referred to in all our 
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sources. 
But at the same time many of the Barha nobles remained loyal 
to the Emperor. When the Imperial armies were deputed to fight the 
rebels, in the battle of Bilochpur, the Barha Saiyids were placed under 
the command of Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung. Although Abdullah Khan 
desrted in the midst of the battle, the Barhas remained firm and loyal 
and many of them were killed in the battle. After the battle, Saiyid 
Bahwa was promoted to the rank of 2000/1500.'*^ 
When an army was appointed to pursue the rebels under Parvez 
and Mahabat Khan along with others, Hizabr Khan was also sent with 
them. ' After that we have very little information regarding activities of 
43 . ZakhiratuI Khawanin, vol. Ill, pp. 10-12 and pp. 13-15. 
44 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 357-358; Maasir-i Jahangiri, vol. I, pp. 493-494. 
45 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 360-361, Maasir-i Jahangiri, vol. II, pp. 415-416. 
46 . ZakhiratuI Khawanin, vol. Ill, pp. 10-12; Maasir-ul Umara, vol.1, p. 758, II, pp. 423-424. 
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Barhas. However, in the rebel camp Shuja'at Khan and Muzaffar Khan 
accompanied all along in his marches. When the prince proceeded 
towards Bengal, Muzaffar Khan fought a battle with Ibrahim Khan 
Fateh Jang and defeated him, the Saiyid remained loyal to Khurram 
throughout."^^ But Shujaat Khan left the prince after Shahjahan's defeat 
at the battle of Tons and when he came to know that the princes wished 
to proceed to Iran he went home. 
Khurram after being defeated fled towards the Deccan. As Bhim 
was killed at Bilochpur, he made over the Suba of Gujrat to Abdullah 
Khan, who, in turn appointed his servant Wafadar to take charge. The 
officers of Gujrat under Mirza Safi and Diler Khan Barha expelled 
Wafadar. When Abdullah Khan came to know of it, he rushed to defend 
Ahmedabad, but he was also defeated by Safi (later Saif Khan/^ and 
Diler Khan Barha. For his meritorious service Diler Khan was promoted 
to the rank of 2000/1200.^ *^ It was at this stage that Jahangir remarked on 
their bravery and quoted Aziz Koka as saying that the 'Saiyids of Barha 
were the averters of calamity for the Mughal dominion', and added that 
such was in reality the case.^' 
47 . Zakhiratul Khawanin, vol. Ill, pp. 13-15, Maasir ul Umara, vol. I, p. 758; II, pp. 423-424. 
48 . Maasir ul Zumara, I, 758, II, 423-4. 
49 . He was an Irani officer. 
50 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, 362-4, 366. 
5 1 . Ibid., 269. 
36 
The progress of events suggests that the Barhas had some 
sympathy for Khruram. When Jahangir died, Diler Khan who was in 
Gujrat was the first to come forward and rendered homage to Shah 
Jahan. Hizabr Khan was with Asaf Khan at the time of Jahangir's death, 
and fought against Shahryar. It appears that Shahjahan also had great 
regard for them. After his accession no less than seven persons of the 
Barha families were promoted. Saiyid Shujaat Khan who had deserted 
him was recalled from his home town and granted a mansab of 
4,000/400,2000 du aspa Sih aspa!'^ 
From the above discussion we can safely say that the Barha 
Saiyids exercised influence on the Mughal nobility in a significant way. 
Hence their role in the war of succession during the illness of Shahjahan 
in 1658 and at the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 and subsequently, can be 
put in proper perspective. During the illness of Shahjahan and the 
ensuing war of succession, Barha Saiyids were divided into four camps. 
Saiyid Sher Khan Barha, Saiyid Salabat Khan Barha, Saiyid Salar 
Barah, Saiyid Masud Barha, Saiyid Najabat Khan Barha. Saiyid 
Munawwar Barha, and Saiyid Nahar Khan Barha were in Dara's camp. 
Saiyid Sultan Barha and Saiyid Qasim Barha were holding the charge of 
Banaras and Allaahbad forts on behalf of Dara respectively.^^ 
52. AfzalHusain, pp. 114-115. 
53 . Alamgimama, vol. I, pp. 65-126 and 207; Amal-I Saleh, vol. Ill, pp. 459-464. 
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Aurangzeb's camp consisted of Saiyid Sherzaman, Saiyid 
Muzaffar Khan, son of Shujaat Khan, and Saiyid Zafar^ "* and Saiyid 
Feroz Barha. Saiyid Mansur Barha, Saiyid Hasan Barha s/o Saiyid Sher 
Khan Barha were serving under Murad Bakshi.^^ Saiyid Alam Barha 
was with Shuja.^  
Prince Shuja crowned himself and assumed the title of 
Nasiruddin Timur III, without wasting any time he marched out at the 
head of a large army which included a corps of Barha Saiyids under 
en 
Saiyid Alam Barha. At Bahadurpur (five miles away from 
Banaras) he was defeated by the Imperial army commanded by Jai 
Singh and Diler Khan Rohela under the overall command of Dara's son, 
Sulaiman Shikoh. In the meantime, Jaswant Singh had suffered a defeat 
at Dharmat. As situation was critical, orders came from the court to 
come to term with Shuja and hasten back to Court as early as possible. 
Therefore, Orissa Bengal and Mongheyr was given to Shuja. 
In February, 1658 the forces of Murad Baksh joined Aurangzeb 
near Ujjain. The imperial forces sent under the command of Jaswant 
Singh to contain the combined forces of Murad Baksh and Aurangzeb 
failed to pursue the princes to return to their respective assignment. 
54 . Alamgirnama, vol. 1, p. 49; Muntakhab-ul Lubab, vol. II, pp. 40-45. 
55 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, p. 139. 
56. Ibid., vol. I, p. 239. 
57 . Maasir-ul Umara, vol. II, p. 456. 
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Ultimately a battle was fought at Dharmat in April, 1958. On the side of 
Aurangzeb Saiyid Sherzaman and Saiyid Mansur served under 
CO 
Muhammad Sultan who was incharge of artillery and Saiyid Sher 
Khan with his barha retainers^^ accompanied the imperial army. Jaswant 
Singh was defeated because of lack of coordination in the Imperial 
army. Aurangzeb and Murad Baksh achieved as important victory and 
rewarded to those officers who had shown loyalty and valour. Sayyid 
Sherzaman was given the title of Muzaffar Khan. 
After the battle of Dharmat, Aurangzeb marched towards Agra 
and in the battle fought at Samugarh in May 1658, Saiyid Muzaffar 
Khan, Saiyid Hasan, Saiyid Mansur and other Barha Saiyid were in the 
vanguard of combined army led by Aurangzeb.^' On the other hand, 
Saiyid Sher Khan Saiyid Munawar, Saiyid Zafar, Saiyid Nahar Khan, 
Saiyid Ismail Barha, Saiyid Fazil Barha, and Saiyid Shaikhan were in 
the imperial army under the command of Dara Shikoh. A fierce battle 
took place in which the imperial army under Dara was decisively 
defeated and Dara fled from the battle field. Saiyid Nahar Khan, Saiyid 
Ismail and Saiyid Fazil Barha were wounded in the battle field and 
58 . Alamgimama, vol. I, pp. 47-63. 
59. Ibid., vol. I, p. 65. 
60 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 65. 
6! . Ibid., vol. I, pp. 92-93. 
62. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 96-107. 
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Saiyid Shaikhan Barha was killed." After the defeat of Dara at 
Samugarh, Saiyid Sher Khan and Saiyid Munawwar deserted Dara and 
joined Aurangzeb.^ "* About the same time Aurangzeb sent Khan-i 
Dauran to replace Saiyid Qasim Barha^^ who was holding the fort of 
Allahabad on behalf of Dara. Aurangzeb had directed Khan-i Dauran 
that if Saiyid Qasim handed over the fort without offering any 
resistance, he was to be conciliated and sent immediately to the Court. 
After the imprisonment of Murad Baksh in 1658 Saiyid Feroz 
Barha, Saiyid Mansur Barha who were with Murad Baksh also came 
over to Aurangzeb and entered his service. They were confirmed in their 
previous ranks.^^ 
Free from the danger of Murad Baksh and strengthened by a 
large addition to his army Aurangzeb set out in pursuit of Dara. At Dorai 
(Ajmer) Dara was completely routed by Aurangzeb's army and in haste 
ran away to Delhi leaving all his beg and baggage. But Dara was so 
frightened that he left Delhi without waiting for Sulaiman Shikoh and 
proceeded towards Lahore. Aurangzeb captured Delhi without fighting 
and again started in his pursuit. In the meantime Dara reached Lahore, 
but when he came to know that Aurangzeb had crossed Bias, he fled to 
63 . Ibid., vol. I, pp. 104-107. 
64. Ibid., vol. I, p. 115. 
65 . Muntakhab-ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 35. 
66 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 139-140, Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 39. 
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Multan. Aurangzeb now pushed forward and reached Multan only to 
know that Dara had gone to Bhakker. Now Aurangzeb was convinced 
that Dara position was hopeless, he returned to Agra. In this wholg 
campaign Saiyid Munawar, Saiyid Masud and Saiyid Mansur along with 
their Barha retainers accompanied Aurangzeb.^^ Sulaiman Shikoh, son 
of Dara Shikoh, being deserted by many officers, was also wandering in 
search of a shelter. He was left with barely two hundred adherents 
including Saiyid Qasim Barha. 
Shuja was the last serving contender to the throne of Delhi. 
Although he had been defeated at Bahadurpur by Jai Singh but because 
of the defeat of Dara at Samugarh situation changed and Shuja was able 
to re-etablish himself. Now after re-equipping his army he marched 
forward to be challenged by Aurangzeb at Khajwa near Allahabad. As 
mentioned above Saiyid Qasim Barha, qiledar of Allahabad and Abdul 
Jaiil Barha qiledar of Chunar had also joined him on the instruction of 
Dara.^ *^^  
The battle of Khajwa took place on December 1658. It is quite 
to note that advance guard of both the armies comprised of noted Barha 
Saiyids who exhibited their traditional valour and fought with great 
67 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 203-209. 
68. Ibid., vol. I, p. 170. 
69 . Ibid., vol. Im, pp. 239-240; Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 46. 
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determination/" However, Aurangzeb's army defeated Shuja who fled 
towards Jahangimagar (Bengal). 
On reaching there Shuja began to collect both men and artillery. 
Prince Muhammad Sultan along with Muzaffar Khan Saiyid Zafar and 
others were deputed in pursuit of Shuja. Prince Shuja fought two or 
three severe battle and was defeated every time. Saiyid Alam Barha 
along with other Barha Saiyids remained firm in loyalty and created all 
kinds of hurdles against Muhammad Sultan's army. Ultiamtely, Shuja 
fled towards Aracan along with Saiyid Alam Barha and ten other Barha 
Saiyids.^^ 
From the above discussion it becomes quite clear that at the 
beginning of the war of succession very few Barha Saiyids were in the 
camp of Aurangzeb. But it was not because Aurangzeb was hostile to 
them or Barha were not inclined towards the other princes. Actually the 
contending princes were commanding nobles who were posted with 
them by the Mughal emperor. It was just a matter of chance that only 
few Barha Saiyids were posted in the Deccan with Aurangzeb. 
However, when Sahahjahan ordered him to suspend the campaign 
70 . Saiyid Mansur, Saiyid Masud, Saiyid Sher Khan, Saiyed Zabardast, Saiyid ali Akbar Barha, 
Yadgar Husain, Karamullah Barha, Saiyid Shams Barha, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan Barha, Saiyid 
Najabal Khan Barha were put under the command of Muhammad Sultan and Saiyid Alam 
Barha. Saiyid Qasim, Saiyid Jalil were in the vanguard of Shuja army. See Alamgimama, vol. 
I, pp. 235-236, Muntaichab ul Lubab, vol. 11, pp. 48-55. 
71 . Alamgimama, vol. 1, pp. 541-550. 
72 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 561; Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. 11, p. 110. 
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against Adil Shah and send back immediately commanders to the Court, 
some Barha Saiyids preferred to remain with Aurangzeb. The Barha 
Saiyids fought braverly in battles of Bahadurpur (Jan. 1658), Dharmat 
(April, 1658), Samugarh (May 1658) and Khajwa (Dec. 1658), on both 
sides Aurangzeb gladly admitted Barha Saiyids in his service once he 
got better of his brothers, because he was eager to expand his support 
base. They were not only confirmed in their previous ranks but 
promoted to higher ranks and some of them were rewarded with drums 
of honour and horses. Their services were utilized in important military 
campaigns. The Barhas after going over to Aurangzeb, on their part 
served him with loyalty and distinction. 
A case in point may be taken as that of Saiyid Abdullah Khan 
popularly known as Saiyid Mian, father of Saiyid brothers. Despite 
being on the side of Dara during the war of succession, his courage and 
conviction for Dara's cause was acknowledged by Aurangzeb, who gave 
him mansab and attached him with Ruhullah Khan the chief bakshi and 
later on with prince Muazzam in Deccan. He was sent on many 
assignments, the important being the siege of Golconda, and last but not 
least was the Subahdari of Bijapur and then of Ajmer, where he died. 
Here mention is being made that generally the Sadat-i-Barha got 
their appointments in subah and city of Ajmer from where they served 
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the imperialists in campaign against local chieftains and even went upto 
Gujarat for the imperial cause. Their jagir, too were Ajmer. Perhaps 
keeping in view their ancestry and religious sanctity of Ajmer due to the 
dargah of Khwaja Sahib. They were given such kind of privileges which 
is evident that in the eighteenth century the famous Saiyid of Barha had 
a very close link with Ajmer. 
Chapter 3 
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CHAPTER-3 
STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE AND THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF NOBILITY 
A struggle for the throne was in the tradition of the Chaghtai 
Turks in India ever since the time of Humayun. Sometimes it was a 
fratricidal war, sometimes it partook of the nature of a rebellion of a son 
against the father. Whatever the form, the nobles played an important, 
sometimes a decisive role in such civil wars. 
Aurangzeb's death on 3 March 1707* at Amadnagar in Deccan 
signaled the outbreak of a fratricidal war among his three surviving 
sons. Prince Muazzam, Muhammad Azam and Kam Bakhsh. The eldest 
brother got the better of the two and defeated and killed Muhammd 
Azam at Jajau, 18 June 1707 and Kam Bakhsh (near Hyderabad, 13 
January 1709).^ Muazzam assumed the title of Bahadur Shah I. An 
elderly man (over 63 years of age) the new emperor was not fitted for 
the role of an active leader. "He was the last emperor", writes Sidney 
Owen, "of whom anything favourable can be said. He was free from 
some of the worst defects or vices of his successors, whom he did excel 
in several respect. Unlike all of them he was accustomed to an active 
1 . Bhmsen, Nuskha-i-Dilkusha,f, 161a. 
2 . For details, Khafi Khan II, 576-578; Kamraj, Azam-ul Harb, 227-230. 
3 . William Irvine, Later Mughals I, 58-64. 
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camp life. He freely exercised his own discretion in public affairs, 
selecting his own JVazir, a fairly able and experienced man of business 
and other ministers and governor. He frequently moved out of Delhi to 
conduct military campaigns himself, which very few of his successors 
actually did. Khafi Khan has praised his generosity good nature and 
sense of forgiveness. He could not say 'no' to anybody. In fact he was 
extremely soft by nature. His character was a complete contrast to that 
of his father but it somewhat resembled Dara's. 
Whether it was the outcome of statesmanship or weakness, the 
new emperor favoured a pacific policy. The Maratha sarkar, Shahu who 
had been in Mughal captivity since 1689 was released and allowed to 
return to Maharashtra. Peace was made with the Rajput chiefs 
confirming them in their states. However, Bahadur Shah was forced to 
take action against the Sikhs whose new leader Banda Bahadur had 
become a terror for government and the Muslims in the Punjab. Banda 
was defeated at Lohgarh and the Mughal forces reoccupied Sirhind in 
January 1711; however the Sikhs were neither conciliated nor crushed. 
It was during the reign of Bahadur Shah that the Wazir became 
the most powerftil minister and the most important man in the State. 
Munim Khan who held that office had great influence over the royal 
mind and his counsels had more weight with him than that of other 
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ministers. His powers and functions contended beyond the jurisdiction 
of the revenue department, he took active part in all the campaigns 
fought in this period. He overshadowed the Wakil-i-Mutlaq, Asad Khan 
and drove him into the background. 
Though Bahadur Shah gave the impression of being a weak and 
feeble king, he kept the nobles under restraint and did not allow the reins 
of government to slip from his grasp. With courage and foresight he 
successfully resisted the plans of Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan to 
concentrate all executive powers in their own family.^ Bahadur Shah, by 
utilizing the services of the princes, maintained the dignity and strength 
of the monarchy and shielded it from encroachment by ambitious 
ministers. Under him the monarchy faced no crisis; it commanded 
respect and inspired awe as in the past. With his death on 27 February 
1712 at Lahore, however, began the long and bitter struggle for the 
Wizarat which became the keynote of Mughal History in subsequent 
years. 
His death was immediately followed by a new war of succession 
among the princes even before his body was buried.^ 
4 . Khafi Khan, II, 602. 
5 . Khafi Khan, H, 677-78. 
6 . When the war of succession was over, his dead body was brought to Delhi and buried in the 
courtyard of the Alamgir mosque ner the tomb of Khwaja Qutubuddin Kaki. Later Mughals, 
Irvine, 1,135. 
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Muizzuddin (Jahandar Shah), the eldest was negligent and slack, 
and had neither money nor troops. The second son, Azim us Shan, the 
ablest amongst Aurangzeb's grandson outshone his rivals in ability, 
influence and power. He was the favourite and influential counsellor of 
his father. As a governor of Bengal (1697-1706) he became the 
wealthiest and strongest. The third son, Rafi-us-Shan was jealous of 
him. The youngest, Jahan shah, was, an invalid. Thus Azim us Shan was 
'the destined victor' in the impending Civil war. 
It came as a matter of course. The problem of succession was 
ultimately connected with the problem of the Wizarat. Zulfiqar Khan, 
the Mir Bakhshi who was regularly but unsuccessfully pressing his 
claim for wizarat after the death of Munim Khan in 1711, again aspired 
to become Wazir. To realize his own ambition he interfered in the 
struggle for succession and adopted new tactics. First, in order to check 
Azim-us-Shan whom he regarded as his chief obstacle, Zulfiqar tried to 
form an anti-Azim-us-Shan league of the three other princes. It was 
really a struggle between 'the most powerful prince and the mot 
powerful noble'. In this respect the civil war after Bahadur Shah's death 
was different from previous civil wars. But being uncertain of the issue, 
Zulfiqar approached Azim-us-Shan for a settlement. The latter not only 
refused but asked Zulfiqar to submit to himself. Thereupon Zulfiqar 
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drew up a scheme of partition of the empire excluding Azimus Shan. 
Jahan Shah was to get the entire Deccan: Rafi-us-Shan was to be given 
Multan, Thattah, Bhakkar, Kabul and Kashmir i.e., northwestern India: 
Jahandar Shah would get the rest of India and become its emperor, coins 
were to be issued in Jahandar's name and the Khutbah was to be read in 
his name. Zulfiqar would remain the common Wazir, stay at the Court 
with Jahandar Shah, and exercise the functions through deputies. In 
other words there was to be decentralization within the empire. The 
eldest brother would represent and symbolise the unity of the empire 
with the Wazir as its hub or pivot. The emperor would reign, the Wazir 
would rule. This was wholly a novel feature. But everything depended 
on the success of the war. The issue really hinged on who would 
succeed, Azim-us-Shan or Zulfiqar? In a sense Azimus Shan destroyed 
his bright chances by miscalculation. Like Azam he despised his rivals 
and met the same fate. 
Zulfiqar Khan seized the initiative, cut off Azim us-shan from 
Lahore and capturing money and artillery stored up there, attacked him 
on the bank of the Ravi by a numerically superior army and artillery 
even before the expected reinforcements from Turani noble Chin Qilich 
Khan could come. The defeat of the most powerftil aspirant was entirely 
7. Cf. J.N. Sarkar, pp. 13-16. 
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due to the vigour and policy of Zulfiqar, the mastermind of the league. 
After the defeat and death of Azimus Shan, however, the three brothers 
quarreled over the division of the spoils. Zulfiqar Khan favoured the 
weak and pleasure loving Jahandar as that would give him a free hand. 
The support of Zulfiqar was the most decisive factor in the victory of 
Jahandar over the other two brothers who were ultimately defeated (end 
of March 1712), Jahandar Shah ascended the throne on 29 March 1712.^  
The emperor appointed Zulfiqar Khan, to whose zealous efforts he owed 
his crown, as the Wazir, and retained his father, Asad Khan in the office 
of Wakil-i-Mutlaq? During his eleven months rule, Jahandar Shah 
showed complete indifference to the affairs of the State and 
administrative business. The general supervision and control over the 
administration was exercised by the Wazir and the Mir Bakshi. In the 
words of a contemporary writer: "The Emperor's prestige was 
undermined and awe for him vanished from the hearts of the people".'° 
The impression created on the minds of the people was that the king 
reigned but did not rule and that real power rested with the ministers." 
8 . For details of this war of succession: Khafi Khan, II, 685-88. Kamraj-bin-Nain Singh, Ibrat 
Namah, ff 45-46. 
9 . The mansabs of Zulfiqar Khan and Asad Khan were increased to 10,000/10,000 and 
12,000/12,000 respectively. Zulfiqar Khan retained the governorship of Deccan and Asad 
Khan was appointed the governor of Gujrat. Miratat-i-Waridat, 446; Mirat-i-Ahmedi, I, 395. 
10 . Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghtai, f 365b; Nur-ud-Din, Jahandar Namah, f. 39a. 
11 . Khafi Khan II, 685. 
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Revolt of Farrukh Siyar Aided by Saiyid Brothers 
Jahandar Shah was rudely disturbed in his pursuit of pleasure by 
the revolt of Farrukh Siyar, the son on Azim-ush Shan.'^ Having 
enlishted the aid of the Saiyid brothers and backed by the resources of 
Chhabela Ram Nagar, Muhammad Khan Bangash, Farrukh Siyar 
marched on Delhi from Patna to fight for the Mughal throne. 
At this stage it would be pertinent to take a look at the early life 
and career of Saiyid Brothers and Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyids of Barha 
claimed to be descended from Abul Farah, of Wasit in Mesopotamia. 
Several hundred years ago, at a date which cannot be fixed exactly, Abul 
Farah and his twelve sons came from Wasit to India, setting at first in 
four villages near, Patiala, in the Sarkar of Sirhind and Subah of Dihli. 
From these villages the four branches, into which they are divided, 
derive their names. Then crossing the Jamuna they formed a settlement 
on the eastern side of the upper Duaba, half way between Meerut and 
Saharanpur, in a sandy, unproductive piece of country, possibly at that 
time very sparsely inhabited. Cut off from the country of their origin and 
marrying in the country, they formed numerous settlement and became 
thoroughly Indianized in their manners and habits in course of time.'^ 
The etymology of the name Barha is disputed: perhaps it is from the 
12 . Khafi Khan, H, 707-708, Mirza Mohammad Ibrat Namah, ff. 141-5. 
13 . See Tarikh-i-Sadat Baraha by Muzaffar Ali Khan. 
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word bara (twelve) with some allusion to the number of their villages or 
Imams. From the time of Akbar, the men of this clan of Saiyids were 
famous as military leaders, and by their bravery had acquired a 
traditional right to lead the vanguard of the Imperial troops. Until the 
reign of Farrukh-siyar they seem to have been little distinguished 
outside the profession of arms, and judging from what we know of their 
descendents in the present age, they probably had little love of learning. 
In Muzaffamagar, many is the story current of the 'Saiyid Sahib's' 
reckless improvidence and ignorance of the commonest rule of business. 
In the 18"^  century a Barha Ka ahmaq or 'Barha blocked' was a 
common saying.''* The Saiyids of Baraha first attracted attention during 
the reign of Akbar when they won the hereditary right to led the Mughal 
van in battle in battle. Their custom was to fight on foot in the Indian 
fashion. 
Though reckoned as brave fighters and doughty warriors, the 
Baraha Saiyids acquired a reputation for unreliability and ambitiousness. 
On one occasion, we find Aurangzeb writing: 'To relax the reigns of 
authority to the Saiyids of Baraha is to bring a final ruin, i.e., a bad end 
because these people on getting the least prosperity and promotion 
14. Irvine, I, 201-203. 
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boast". There is none like me, stray from the path of right conduct, 
cherish high handedness and cause impediment'. 
The two Saiyid brothers, who now come into such prominence, 
were not the mere upstarts. Besides the prestige of Saiyid lineage, of 
descent from the famous Barha branch of that race, and the personal 
renown acquired by their own valour, they were the sons of a man who 
had held in Alamgir's reign first the Subahdari of Bijapur in the Dakhin 
and then that of Ajmer, appointments given in that reign either to 
princes of the blood or to the very foremost men in the state. Their 
father, Saiyid Abdullah Khan, known as Saiyid Mian, had risen in the 
services of RuhuUah Khan, the chief bakshi of Aurangzeb.'^ During the 
course of Rathor rebellion in the closing years of seventeenth century 
Syed Miyan put forward some of his own demands, when he was asked 
to hold the Office ofsubedar of Ajmer (Akhbarat). 
Hasan Ali Khan (afterwards Abdullah Khan Qutbul Mulk) and 
Husain Ali Khan, two of the numerous sons of Abdullah Khan Saiyid 
Mian were now men of about forty six and forty four years of age 
respectively. Earlier, Abdullah Khan was the faujdar of Sultan Nazarpur 
(Nanderhar) in Bangalore in 1698. It was in that year that the Marathas 
under Nimaji Sindhia raided the province of Khandesh for the first time. 
15 . Ahkam-i-Alamgiri 32, 8. Hum Chune dighare Nist. 
16. Irvine, I, 202-03. 
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Abdullah Khan put up a disastrous but heroic fight against Nimaji, and 
thus won his spurs as a brave warrior.'^ Two years later in 1700; 
'Abdullah Khan displayed great energy in fighting another Maratha 
general Hanumant. He sacked Hanumant's base camp, made his 
nephew, Janoji, a prisoner and converted him to Islam. Zulfiqar Khan 
who was passing that way commended. Abdullah Khan's bravery. 
Soon after this, 'Abdullah Khan joined the service of Jahandar 
Shah who was the eldest son of Shah Alam and was the Governor of 
Multan. Husain Ali was appointed thQfaujdar of Ranthambhor and later 
1 a 
of Hindaun Bayana. 
In an expedition against a refractory Billoch Zamindar, 
Abdullah Khan was of the opinion that the honours of the day was his. 
However, Jahandar Shah thought otherwise, and assigned them to his 
then favourite, Isa Khan Mani. Abdullah Khan quitted Jahandar's 
service in disgust and repaired to Lahore.'^ 
There he remained unemployed till 1707 when, Munim Khan, 
who was on his way to Agra for the war against Azam secured for him 
the mansab of 3000. Husain Ali also joined Bahadur Shah near Delhi 
and was granted the mansab of 2000.'^ ' 
17. Khafi Khan, 457. 
18 . Maasir ul Umara, 1, 322,iii, 132. 
19 . Maasir ul Umara, i, 322, iii, 132; Khafi Khan, 456; Cf. Satish Chandra, 128-29. 
20 . Maasir-ui Umara, i, 825-6, iii, 130. 
21 . Maasir-ui Umara, i, 322, iii, 132; Khafi Khan, 456. 
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In the battle of Jajau, they served in the vanguard and fought 
vaHantly on foot, as was the Saiyid habit on an emergency. 
A third brother Nur-ud-Din AH Khan was left dead on the field, 
and Husain ali Khan was severely wounded. Though their rank was 
raised to 4,000 and the elder brother received his father's title of 
Abdullah Khan (Hasan Ali) they were not treated with such favour as 
their exceptional services seemed to reserve, either by the new emperor 
99 
or his Wazir. 
Abdullah Khan was again called upon to serve during the Sikh 
campaign. At the battle of Anantpur in 1710, he fought on foot as was 
the custom of the Baraha Saiyids, and after great slaughter, won a signal 
9 'K 
victory." At length by the favour of Prince Azim ush Shan, Abdullah 
Khan became his deputy in the province of Allahabad. Thus the two 
Saiyids were indebted to Azim ush Shan for their appointments.^'* 
A brief outline of Muhammad Farrukh Siyar's career at this 
stage would not be out of place. Bom in Aurangabad (1683), the second 
son of Azim us-Shan. He was sent to Delhi, but brought back again to 
Dakhin again in 1694. After spending three year spent with his great 
grandfather, Aurangzeb, he accompanied his father Azimush Shan first 
22 . Khafi Khan, ii, 5745; Kamwar Khan, 20; M.U.i, 3212, iii, 130. 
23 . Cf. Satish Chandra, pp. 128-29. 
24 . Satish Chandra, p. 129. 
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to Agra and then to Bengal. In the last year of his reign Alamgir recalled 
his grandson, Azim ush Shan from Bengal, giving him orders to leave 
his eldest son, Muhammad Karim, in charge of Bihar and his second son 
Farrukh Siyar, in Bengal. The young prince passed some years at Dacca, 
then the capital of the Bengal province, but in the reign of Bahadur Sah 
(1707-12), he moved to Murshidabad. He subsequently moved to Raj 
Mahal, higher up and on the other side of the Ganges. Azim ush Shan 
anticipating a struggle for the throne at an early date, called on Farrukh-
siyar to return to Court. Farrukh Siyar was on the march and not far 
from Azimabad, Patna, where he heard of Bahadur Shah's death and 
without waiting for further information, he proclaimed his father's 
•ye 
accession and had coins struck and Khutba read in his father's name. 
Thereafter, he decided to march no further. In reality he was reluctant to 
proceed to the Court for he enjoyed little favour with his father as 
compared to his brothers. According to some others, it had been 
predicted that he would be king on the death of Bahadur Shah, and so he 
delayed purposely. 
Husain Ali Khan who had gone out against some malcontents in 
the direction of Rajgir did not like this action of Farrukh Siyar.^ ^ 
Apparently he wanted to sit on the fence till the results, of the contest at 
25. Irvine, I, 198-99. 
26. MaasirulUmaral, 322-3. 
27 . Ghulam Husain Salim in Riyaz us Salatin informs us that he had been hailed asking by the 
famous sufi Saint of Burdwan, Sufi Bayazid, as early as 1697, when as prince, he had visited 
him to seek blessings for his father. 
28. Khafi Khan, 711. 
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Lahore were known. Farrukh Siyar wrote flattering letters to Husain Ali 
who was at last agreed to give his support to the Prince. This seems to 
have happened before the result of the contest at Lahore was known. 
When news arrived of the defeat and death of Azim-ush Shan, Husain 
Ali wanted to drawback. The prince himself wanted to commit suicide 
in despair. But Farrukh Siyar's mother threw herself on the support of 
Husain Ali, appealed to his sense of generosity and his old relations with 
Azim-ush Shan, and fired his imagination by promises of high office. 
'Whatever the result you will be the gainer', she is reported to have told 
him. 'If defeated your name will stand recorded as where till the day of 
judgements; if successful, the whole Hindustan will be at your feet, 
above you none but the Emperor.^^ Ultimately Husain Ali agreed to join 
Farrukh Siyar, partly because he was afraid he was already too deeply 
committed, and partly due to his dislike of Jahandar shah and his disgust 
at the absolute authority enjoyed by Zulfiqar Khan at his Court.^' 
Round about this time it was decided that the two most 
important posts, that of Wazir and first bakhshi would go to Syed 
Abdullah and Husain Ali Khan respectively. Then coins were struck and 
29. Khafi Khan, 710-11. 
30 . Cf. Satish Chandra, 130-31. 
3 1 . Warid,236. 
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the Khutba ordered to be read in Farrukh Siyar's name and letters 
dispatched to the elder brother, by both the prince and Husain Ali Khan. 
Abdullah Khan was at first horrified by Husain's rashness in 
committing himself to an apparently hopeless enterprise, but events 
happened in such a manner that he found that he had little choice but to 
join them. 
He was himself facing some embarrassment. His soldiers' pay 
was in arrears and in the course of a punitive expedition they had 
mutinied and he was compelled to retreat to Allahabad where he shut 
himself in the fort. About this time Shuja-ud-Din Khan, son-in-law of 
Murshid Quli Khan was passing through Allahabad with the Bengal 
tribute. Abdullah Khan saw in this a possible means of escape from his 
predicament. A little while earlier, the news of the death of Bahadur 
shah had also been received and no one knew which prince would 
finally succeed. So he sent officers to the camp of Shujauddin advising 
him that in view of the disturbed situation prevailing in Allahabad 
(mainly because of the presence of the large number of deserters from 
his unpaid troops) it was not safe to camp in the open and that it would 
be desirable to bring the treasure into fort where it would be secure from 
marauders. It would also be advisable for Shuja Khan to avoid the 
outcome of the ongoing fratricidal struggle at Lahore before proceeding 
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further. Shuja found the advise sensible and complied, thus placing 
32 himself and his treasure, at the mercy of Abdullah Khan. 
Shortly after, news of the success of Jahandar Shah was 
received. Abdullah Khan dispatched a congratulatory letter to the 
victorious prince declaring his loyalty and desiring to know how he 
could be of service to him. He must have been nervous, the question 
was, would he, a known protege of the late Azim ush Shan be allowed to 
continue at Allahabad. 
Soon news came that he had been replaced by one Raji 
Muhammad Khan whose family was based in nearby Manakpur. The 
new governor in turn nominated a relative of his, one Syed Abdul 
Ghaffar, as his deputy who raised a force of about 7,000 men and 
marched towards Allahabad to assume charge. On being apprised of his 
supersession Abdullah Khan decided to throw in his lot with Farrukh 
Siyar. With the Bengal treasure in the fort he was on strong ground and 
had the means of raising an army. A letter from the prince authorizing 
him to appropriate funds for this purpose from the tribute came handy, 
and he started preparations to resist the advancing amir. 
Abdullah Khan dispatched a force of hurriedly raised levies to 
oppose him. Three of his younger brothers, his Diwan, and Bakhshi 
32 . Warid, Mirat-i-Waridat, p. 138b, Irvine, i, 207; Khafi Khan, 711, 715. 
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went with the force and they gave battle to Abdul Ghaffar near Sarai 
Alam Chand, about 15 miles from Allahabad. Most of the troops of the 
Saiyids, being fresh recruits were scattered by Abdul Ghaffar but the 
three Saiyids and the hardcore of their followers from Barah made a 
very determined attack in which Abdul Ghaffar's brother was killed 
along with Nur-ud-Din, one of the Saiyid brothers. A rumour spread in 
the imperial force that Abdul Ghaffar himself had been killed and 
despite the best efforts of the latter to convince the troops that this was 
not so, panic spread. A dust storm added to the confusion and the 
Saiyid's carried the day, Abdul Ghaffar's army soon ceasing to exist. He 
retreated with the remnants to Shahzadpur when the news of the disaster 
reached Delhi the emperor tried to conciliate Abdullah Khan. Fresh 
patents were sent from Delhi appointing him Governor of Allahabad. 
Compliments and titles were showered upon him, while the 
letter to Abdul Ghaffar was so worded that it might well have been 
written to a rebel rather than to an officer who had been faithfully, if 
unsuccessfully, trying to execute his mandate. The letter highlights the 
peculiar methodology of imperial diplomacy which would become more 
and more marked in its declining years. The underlying principle was, 
'if you can't fight them, join them?' We shall see many examples of the 
33 . Irvine i, p. 209. 
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emperor and his wazir coopting rebel and defiant governors by 
conferring on them provinces and parganas previously seized. 
Meanwhile, Famikh Siyar had been able to attract some other notables 
to his cause. Chief among them were Ahmad Beg, a man long attached 
to the family and bearing the titles of Ghazi ud-Din Khan Ghalib Jang 
and Sidisht Narain, chief of Ujjainya rajas of Bhojpur. It was Ahmed 
Beg's persuasion which was responsible for bringing over Sidisht 
Narayan and his adhesion was a very notable coup for he brought with 
him 10,000 cavalry and 3,000 musketeers. Khwaja Asim and some other 
fugilives from the wreck of Azim ush Shan's army also joined the prince 
and finally Saif Shikan Khan, the naib nazim of Orissa, also came over, 
as did various other disgruntled officers from Awadh and Rohilkhand. 
Money remained a problem inspite of the Bengal treasure, with 
the help of Husain Ali a forced loan was raised from the merchants and 
bankers of Patna. More strong arm methods were used and the goods of 
the Dutch company which had a factory at Patna were also seized, the 
factory having recently died. One Surat Singh Khatri, a revenue official 
under the governor of Kabul, Nasir Khan, which had accumulated great 
wealth happened unfortunately to be in Patna at the time with a large 
caravan of coined bullion which he was transporting under heavy guard. 
34 . G.S. Cheema, 93-95. 
35 . Ibid., 95-96. 
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The treasure was loaded in so or 60 carts and was escorted by 500 
musketeers. Taking advantage of their slackness, the carts were seized 
by Farrukh Siyar's officers and the money distributed among the 
soldiers. 
On November 1712, Farrukh Siyar reached Jhusi and received 
Abdullah Khan in audience. The previous assurances given to the two 
brothers were reaffirmed though it is not clear whether they were 
formally invested with the office of Wazir and mirbakshi at this time or 
not.^ ^ 
The decisive battle of Agra took place in 10 January 1713 
immediately to the West of the city. It had rained in the morning so the 
armies could not engage till the afternoon. The battle was a confused 
melee in which the only notable who distinguished on the imperialist 
side was Kokltash Husain Ali Khan was wounded early in a charge led 
by Abdus Samad Khan Abdullah Khan was also at one point isolated 
with only a few hundred supporters, and Farrukh Siyar's men seemed to 
be losing heart. If Zulfiqar had thrown in his ftill weight at that moment, 
Jahandar would have won the battle, but for some strange reason with 
25,000 fresh troops, he, and not until the tables were turned against the 
36. Irvine, pp. 210-12. 
37 . Irvine (I, p. 213) asserts, apparently on the authority of Ahsan Ijad, that formal engagements 
were entered into with the Saiyid brothers at this juncture making over the post of Wazir and 
mirbakshi to the Saiyids. 
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brave Kokaltash did he throw his men into the struggle. And as for the 
Turanian leader, Chin Qilich and Mohammad Amin, true to their word, 
they remained spectators. After the flight of Jahandar Shah fi-om the 
field of battle and the formal proclamation of Farrukh Siyar, Abdullah 
Khan was made the wazir and Hussain Ali the mirbakhshi with the 
ranks of 7,000/7,000. They were also granted the governorships of 
Multan and Bihar respectively, and allowed to govern them through 
deputies. Saiyid Najm-ud-Din Ali Khan and a number of their younger 
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brothers and other kinsmen were also admitted to mansabs. The 
maternal uncle of Abdullah Khan, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan Baraha, was 
made the Governor of Ajmer. 
But apart from these posts, the Saiyids claimed no special 
position for themselves or their kinsmen. Indeed, far from seeking to 
establish a monopoly of power for themselves, they were keen to 
conciliate and to win over the nobles of the time of Aurangzeb and 
Bahadur Shah. 
To cut the story short, the ministry of Zulfiqar Khan ended with 
the fall of Jahandar Shah. His brief reign was significant in two ways. 
First, it showed that the only alternative to a strong king was a strong 
Wazir. But there were difficulties before Zulfiqar. Neither the king nor 
38. SatishChandra, p. 134-35. 
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the fVazir was powerful. Second, Aurangzeb's policies which had 
largely been maintained by Bahadur Shah, were rapidly given up, 
namely, abolition of Jizyah, concessions to Rajputs and attempts were 
made to secure the cooperation of the Marathas. But all these liberal 
moves of Zulfiqar ultimately failed with the fall of Zulfiqar. 
In the next chapters and conclusion of this thesis we will be 
discussing how the new power players, i.e., Saiyid brothers having taken 
a leaf out of the book of Zulfiqar Khan, in terms of liberal policy, failed 
at the onslaught of Irani and Turani factions. 
Chapter 4 
Struggkfor (Power -
Tarruk^ Siyar's ^Rfi^n: 
MugfiaC Court (PoRtics 
CHAPTER-4 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER - FARRUKH SIYAR'S 
REIGN: MUGHAL COURT POLITICS 
The history of the year's from 1713 to 1721 consists of a series of 
crises caused by a struggle for power between the two brothers who 
occupied the posts of fVazir and chief Bakhshi and the Emperor Farrukh 
Siyar with the culmination, being the deposition of Farrukh Siyar. 
The two Saiyid brothers were indebted to Azim-ush Shan for their 
appointments. They enjoyed a reputation for bravery, but were considered 
haughty and ambitious. Their career had in no sense been remarkable and 
it is probable that they would have died as obscure nobles had it not been 
for the circumstances created by the civil war and the rebellions of 
Farrukh Siyar. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter the ill-will between the 
emperor and the Sayid brothers had the roots in their stint in Bihar. 
The first sign of strain developed when Farrukh Siyar on way to 
the court made an halt at Patna much to the dislike of Husain Ali Khan 
from Patna, he sent an arzdasht pleading the approach of the rainy season 
and the advanced pregnancy of his wife for his inability to march further. 
I . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, p. 86. 
2 . Ibid., p. 89. 
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In reality he was reluctant to proceed to the court for he enjoyed little 
favour with his father as compared to his brothers. According to some 
others, it had been predicted that he would be king on the death of 
Bahadur Shah, and so he delayed purposely."* When on 15 March 1712, 
news reached of the death of Bahadur Shah, Farrukh Siyar at once 
proclaimed his father Azim-us-Shan, as king and struck coins and had 
Khutba read in his name. Husain Ali who had gone out against some 
malcontents in the direction of Rajgir, did not like this.^ Apparently, he 
wanted to sit on the fence till the results of the contest at Lahore were 
known. He came back to Patna and wanted to arrest Farrukh Siyar who 
had only a small following with him. But he was prevented from doing so 
by Ahmad Beg who was Farrukh Siyar's chief lieutenant besides Farrukh 
Siyar writing flattering letters to the governor who was at last persuaded 
to give his support to the prince.^ But the mutual suspicion and ill will 
between Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali did not end with the latter's 
adherence to his cause. Husain Ali, we are told, was afraid of the 
notorious low-down cunning and deceitfijl nature of Farrukh Siyar.^ The 
3 . Ma'asirul Umaraii, 322-23. 
4 . Ghulam Husain, Riyaz-us Salatin (242-43). 
5 . Nur-ud-din, 40. Khafi Khan, f. 711. 
6 . Khafi Khan 710-711, Mirza Mohammad, (80). 
7 . Mirza Mohammad, 14a. 
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reports of the English factor at Patna gave a graphic account of the height 
o 
to which the mutual suspicion and ill will reached. 
The ill-will between Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali kept growing 
till there were differences of opinion between them on practically every 
point. In addition to this there were altercations and misunderstanding 
among their followers. 
It is difficult to say whether the differences between Farrukh Siyar 
and Husain Ali were essentially personal or extended to the sphere of 
policy. While in Bihar, Farrukh Siyar, at the instance of Saiyyid Husain 
Ali, issued a proclamation abolishing thQJizyah.^ This was an important 
move on Husain All's part with far-reaching implications. But there is no 
evidence that Farrukh Siyar was, at that stage, opposed to the move. 
We have already seen that the relations between the Saiyid brothers 
and Farrukh Siyar were far from cordial from the very beginning. After 
the accession of Farurkh Siyar, these relations steadily deteriorated till an 
open breach was precipitated towards the end of the year 1714. 
From the outset, the struggle was essentially for power. The Saiyid 
wanted not merely the appearance but the substance for power, while 
Farrukh Siyar, though lacking in any real ability, had the ambition of 
8. Wilsonii, 50-6, 81,86, Ijad, 51a. 
9 . Jizyah in the post Aurangzeb period, Satish Chandra I.H.C. 1946, 320-7. 
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exercising personal authority of a monarch. Concretely, the Saiyids 
desired that 'no business should be transacted or mansabs given on 
promotions and appointments made without their advise and 
consultation.'" Farrukh Siyar felt that this claim went much beyond the 
traditional powers and functions of the wazir thereby reducing the 
emperor to the position of a figure head." Thus, the real issue was two 
divergent concepts of the wizarat. Like Zulfiqar Khan earlier, the Saiyid 
brothers felt that the interests of the empire were bound up with the 
concentration of effective power in their own hands, and hence they 
wanted to make the wazir the real hub of affairs, while the king merely 
reigned. They clearly felt that they had secured the crown for Farrukh 
Siyar by the strength of their arms, and hence considered their claims for 
the Supreme power to be indisputable. Farrukh Siyar on the other hand 
stuck to the concept of the wazir being merely the chief adviser of the 
king and head of the revenue department, but not having any power of 
independent initiative. This divergence in outlook manifested itself from 
the very beginning. The ill-will and mutual discord between the king 
and his ministers was further accentuated by the activities of some of the 
personal favourites of the king, who thought that their opportunity lay in 
fomenting the discord between the two sides. 
10 . Khafi Khan, p. 379. Maasir ul Umara (i, p. 328). 
11 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 142. 
12 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 143. 
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Two of the leading favourites of the king were Khan-i Dauran and 
Mir Jumla. Mir Jumlah was a native of Turan and had been the Qazi of 
Dacca and later of Patna in the time of Aurangzeb. He had gradually won 
the confidence of Azim-ush-Shan who was then the Governor of Bihar 
and Bengal.'^ Khan-i Dauran (Khwajah Asim) had also been in the 
employ of Azim-ush-Shan.''* After the battle of Agra, Mir Jumla and 
Khan-i Dauran were promoted to much higher position than their services 
to the empire demanded. Mir Jumla, being extremely ambitious could not 
tolerate the sovereign power under the control of the two brothers turned 
envious. In addition to this Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran resented their 
supersession by the Saiyid Brothers whom they regarded as comparative 
new comers and upstarts. Hence, they tried to induce the emperor by all 
means in their power to oust their rivals.'^ Farrukh Siyar, who was 
already suspicious of the Saiyids dreaded their power and influence, lent 
a ready ear to these persuasions. 
Thus, Farrukh Siyar, Khan-i Dauran and Mir Jumla ranged 
themselves sin opposition to the Saiyid brothers, and upheld the principle 
of the personal rule of the monarch. As opposed to this, the Saiyids were 
firmly of the opinion that the task of running the administration should be 
13, Ibid., p. 144. 
14 . Maasir-ul Umara i. p. 819, Ashub, 253. 
15. Khafi Khan, 732, J. 
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left in the hands of the Wazir and the Mir Bakhshi. This became the 
central issue in party politics during Farrukh Siyar's reign, all other issues 
being linked with it. 
Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran gradually gained a complete 
ascendancy over the mind of Farrukh Siyar. 
In spite of these differences and the growing ill-will, there was no 
open breach between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyids till, emboldened by 
the secret support of the Emperor, the favourites started interfering in the 
administration. Farrukh Siyar authorized Mir Jumla to sign all papers on 
his behalf, and repeatedly declared: "The word and signature of Mir 
Jumla are my word and signature'.'^ This was contrary to all the 
established rules of procedure and also effected the prestige and authority 
of the Wazir Abdullah Khan and deprived him of the perquisites of 
appointment which were a well-known and substantial source of 
20 
mcome. 
Mir Jumla was encouraged in his conduct by Abdullah Khan's 
disinclination to attend to the details of administration. He was primarily 
a soldier and preferred to leave all the affairs of state and ministerial 
16 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, p. 145. 
17. Khafi Khan, p. 730. 
18 . Ibid, 740. Maasir ul Umara iii 476. 
19. Ibid, 739. 
20. [bid., 739, Khush-hal, 102. 
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duties in the hands of his diwan. Rattan Chand. Rattan chand was 
haughty and overbearing and, according to one writer, 'had a mouth as 
insatiable as the nethermost hell for swallowing gold and silver. Apart 
from above mentioned things, Farrukh Siyar had valid reason for 
complaint against the Saiyid Brothers, practice of revenue farming 
{Ijarah) becoming universal getting alarming proportion being one the 
reasons. Even khalisah lands were formed out. Whenever an amil was 
appointed. Rattan Chand would take from him a contract or lease in 
writing and realize the money from his banker. Farrukh Siyar rightly 
considered this practice to be ruinous one, and had issued standing orders 
forbidding ijarah?'^ Mir Jumla took advantage of all these factors and 
impressed upon Farrukh Siyar that the Saiyids were unfit for high office 
and that there would be no peace and prosperity in the empire as long as 
they had a hand in the administration. 
Hoping to overawe the Saiyids and make them from their offices 
voluntarily, Farrukh Siyar began to increase the military power of his 
favourites, i.e. Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran. 
21 . K.K. 739, Siyar-ul Mutakhirin, 396, Qasim. 78. Elliot and Dowson (vii, 447) Calls Ratan Chand 
a grain merchant. 
22 . Qasim. 87. 
23 . Khafi Khan, 773, Mirat ii.l41, Siyar-ul Mulakhirni 407 Jagir lands were sometimes formed out 
even in the reign of Aurangzeb. The practice seems to have become universal in the time of 
Jahandar Shah and was apparently continued by Ratan Chand. 
24 . Akhbarat, d.23 Rajab, Yr. 4, 25 July 1715. 
25 . Khafi Khan, 739, Qasim 78-79. 
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The was the situation which Husain Ali confronted on his return 
form Marwar. Where he subdued Ajit Singh a long standing rebel of the 
empire by compelling him to send Dola of his daughter in marriage to 
Farrukh Siyar. 
After due deliberations, Husain Ali came to the conclusion that it 
would not be possible for them to maintain their position at the court 
unless they gained control of one of the most important subahs, and could 
utilize their resources. Accordingly, he demanded and secured for himself 
the viceroyally of the Deccan in the place of Nizam-ul Mulk^^ which he 
wanted to exercise through Daud Khan Panni, following the practice of 
Mir Jumla who had made a similar pact with Murshid Quli Khan, the 
Deputy Governor of Bihar. However, on the advice of Mir Jumlah, 
Farrukh Siyar turned down Husain All's request and ordered that he 
should proceed to the Deccan personally. Things were now fastly 
coming to a head, when Husain Ali refused to proceed to Deccan leaving 
his brother Abdullah Khan at the mercy of Mir Jumla and Khan-i 
Dauran. Meanwhile the emperor objected to Husain All's private 
agreement with Ajit Singh and delayed issuing afarman confirming the 
26 . Akhbarat, 11, Ramzan Yr 3.20 September, 1714, Kamwar, 20. 
27 . Akhbarat, 3, Jamada I, Yr. 2, 28 May 1713. 
28 . Khafi Khan, 739. Maasir ul Umara i.328. 
29 . Khafi Khan, 739. 
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appointment of the latter as the Governor of Gujarat. Shortly after the 
departure of Husain Ali for Marwar he sent secret letters to Ajit Singh 
promising him favours if he would defeat and kill mir bakshi the result of 
this back-hand intrigue was somewhat unexpected for Farrukh Siyar. 
Husain Ali came to know of the Emperor's plot against him because Ajit 
singh communicated their contents to Husain Ali in order to induce him 
to make peace. 
In the meantime the Saiyyids discovered a plot to murder them and 
responded in a aggressive manner by demanding that Husain Ali would 
come to pay his respects to the emperor only after the departure of Mir 
Jumla whom the Saiyids considered the evil genius of the emperor. At the 
time of his visit all the arrangements in the fort were to be in the hands of 
the employee of the Saiyids.'^' 
On 20 May 1715, Husain Ali left for the Deccan, carrying with 
them the authority to appoint and dismiss all jagirdars and office holders 
in the Deccan and to transfer the commandants of the forts. It was even 
rumoured that Farrukh Siyar had been compelled to hand over the royal 
seal to Husain Ali so that the latter may not have to depend on his formal 
30 The agreement had been made in April and in June Ajit Singh had left for Thatta But he was not 
appointed to Gujrat, till the dispute with the Saiyids was over. 
31 . Khafi Khan, 741, Warid, 284.Qasim (p. 87). 
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assent for appointments.^^ Thus ended the first trial of strength between 
the Saiyid brothers and Farrukh Siyar. The outcome was, to all outward 
appearances, a great triumph for the Saiyids. The emperor not only failed 
to dislodge them from their offices, but had to accept the humiliating 
condition of handing over the charge of the fort to their men before they 
would come to pay their respect to him. Thus the ministers dictated and 
imposed their own conditions on the monarch who tacitly accepted the 
special position of the Saiyids. Nevertheless, the struggle revealed the 
weakness of their position to the Saiyids, and forced them to accept a 
compromise".^^ However the compromise made by Husain Ali was out of 
necessity of creating a strong territorial base for themselves. But it was 
impossible to create such a base unless one of the brothers took charge of 
it personally. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Husain Ali dropped his 
original demand for permission to govern the Deccan through a deputy, 
and agreed to proceed to it himself '^* 
The Saiyids doubtless, hoped for some respite from intrigues after 
Mir Jumlah's departure, but he remained a constant source of danger to 
them. Nor did the agreement produce even a temporary abatement in the 
emperor's hostility towards them. As a matter of fact, as soon as Husain 
32 . Cf. Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 151. 
33 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 152. 
34 . Cf. William Irvine I, p. 300. 
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All's back was turned. Farrukh Slyar sent secret instructions to Daud 
Khan Panni transferring him from Gujarat to Burhanpur and ordering him 
to resist Husain Ali.^ ^ Although in the ensuing battle fought on 6 
September 1715 in which Daud Khan was defeated and killed, Husain Ali 
got hold of secret letters sent to Daud Khan by the Emperor as a fresh 
proof of the duplicity of their royal master. 
In addition to the continued hostility of the emperor and his 
friends, the Saiyids had to reckon with the powerfiil group of M. Amin 
Khan, Nizam-ul Mulk and Abdus Samad Khan. 
Qasim Lahori in Ibratnama mentions that the Turanis had all along 
been eager to remove the Saiyids from the court but wanted to employ 
stratagem {hikmat-i-amli) rather than courage and bravery. 
With Husain All's departure, Abdullah Khan was left alone to face 
a treacherous master and a hostile court, though the city was free from 
conspiracies for sometime. But towards the end of 1717, with the rise of a 
new royal favourite Mohammad Murad Kashmiri, plots and counterplots 
again became the order of the day. 
Murad was a minor chamberlain but in January 1718 he was 
appointed superintendent of the harkaras or scouts and he soon became a 
35 . Cf. Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 153. 
36 . Qasim Lahori (pp. 79, 86). 
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close confident of the emperor, with influence over his mind and 
apparently also his heart. He undermined and discredited Samsam ud-
Daulah insinuating that he was in league with the Wazir, which was why 
all plans and conspiracies had failed in the past. Now fresh plots began to 
be hatched, and Murad was the prime mover. 
Honours were showered on him, from third Mir Tuzuk he was 
moved to the second position and was in addition given the charge of 
Superintendent of the pages or khawas. According to Yahya he was at 
one time promoted daily on one day his rank was 5.000 zat, the next day 
it was raised to 6,000 and on the third day it was raised to 7.000. 
With Murad dominating the emperor the wheals of intrigue started 
grinding again. Plots and conspiracies were hatched but never executed, 
for Murad like the rest of the emperor's favourites, was eloquent in 
respects but indecisive in action. Then on another it was planned to seize 
Qutb-ul Mulk on the occasion of Id prayers. But the plot was leaked the 
night before, the Wazir filled the entire Idgah with thousands of his 
followers. 
Yet again, Farrukh Siyar summoned Maharaja Ajit Singh his 
father-in-law. It was assumed by him and Murad that Ajit Singh would 
support his son-in-law to the hilt against the Wazir. But the chief of the 
37 . G.S. Cheema, The Forgotten Mughals, New Delhi 2002, pp. 122-23. 
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Rathors had no faith in the emperor. He had been forced to give him his 
daughter and there could be no love lost between them. When Qulb learnt 
that Ajit was on his way, he got in touch and convinced him about he 
emperor's fickleness. When he arrived he refused to be drawn into any 
conspiracy and made it plain that he would not act without the wazir's 
counsel. 
Efforts were made to win over Nizam-ul Mulk (Chin Qilich Khan). 
But this cautious nobleman was in no hurry to commit himself to a rash 
adventure. He had already suffered and the sarkar of Moradabad was 
nothing when compared to the six subas of the Deccan. The negotiations 
fell through but the Nizam was in for another rude shock. He was recalled 
from Moradabad which was the elevated to the rank oidi suba and handed 
over to a royal favourite as another of his absentee charges. So instead of 
gaining friend, the emperor had made an enemy in this Mughal amir. 
By this time Samsam-ud-Daulah had also abandoned the emperor 
and made his peace with Qutb-ul-Mulk. This became evident on the 
occasion of the failure of yet another plot to seize the minister during an 
audience.^^ Then to cap it all. In January 1716, Mir Jumla entered Delhi 
surreptitiously in a state of great financial distress, with 7,000 Mughal 
troops clamouring for their salaries which had not been paid for the last 
38. Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
39. Irvine, 1, pp. 354-55. 
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the zamindars of Bihar who were notoriously turbulent besides woefully 
mismanaging his finances and committing every sort of excess and 
oppression upon the people, he was removed from the governorship of 
Bihar and was replaced by Sarbuland Khan. Soon afterwards, he was also 
deprived of the absentee governorship of Bengal.'^ " Thus, the affair took a 
turn quite different from what Mir Jumlah had expected. In despair, he 
applied to his old enemy, Abdullah Khan. At the latter's he was appointed 
the Qazi of Lahore and ordered to leave without an audience. Seven or 
eight months later, his mansab and titles were also restored at the instance 
of Abdullah Khan.'*' 
The result of these developments was that a dangerous rival was 
removed from the path of Abdullah Khan who now felt more secure, 
while the position of Farrukh Siyer was correspondingly weakened.'*^ 
Meanwhile, the struggle for power between Farrukh Siyar and the 
Saiyyid brothers was assuming a deeper significance. 
Early in 1717, InayatuUah Khan Kashmiri, who had gone to 
Makkah towards the beginning of the reign after the execution of his son, 
SaduUah Khan, returned to the court. Farrukh Siyar was now of the 
40. Shiv Das Lacknavi (p. 9), Akhbarat, 5 November 1715, M.M. 46b. Khafi Khan, 770 is not 
correct in stating that Mir Jumla was dismissed from Bihar after he came to the court. 
4 1 . William Irvine I, 332. 
42 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 158. 
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opinion that it was a mistake to have rooted out the old Alamgiri nobles 
who were experienced administrators and who could have acted as a 
counterpoise to the Saiyids. Hence at the behest of the some of his 
advisors, Farrukh Siyar proposed to appoint him as the diwan-i tan wa 
khalisah. He was also made the (absentee) Governor of Kashmir, and 
granted the rank of 4,000 in April 1717.'*^  In view of Abdullah Khan's 
authority in revenue matters, Inayatullah Khan refused to accept the post 
of the Diwan-i tan without an understanding with the wazir. After 
sometime an agreement was arrived at with the help of Ikhlas Khan by 
which Inayatullah undertook not to make any proposals or 
recommendations to the emperor in revenue matters without the advise 
and consultation of Abdullah Khan/'* For sometime, things went 
smoothly. But soon disagreement arose. First of all Inayatullah who was 
an admirer of Aurangzeb produced a letter from the Sharif of Makkah 
stating that the levying of Jlzyah was obligatory (wajib) according to the 
Shara. ^ Abdullah Khan showed displeasure at the re-imposition of the 
jizyah. Thus the pact with Inayatullah Khan broke down. After this, we 
43 . Khafi Khan, 774, M.M. 70a. 
44 . Cf. Satish Chandra, 164-65. 
45 . Letters explaining the measure to Jai Singh, Farrukh Siyar wrote, 'It is a matter of faith. I am 
helpless (to intervene)'. Khafi Khan 772, M.M. 70a. 
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are told, "the Hindus became hostile to InayatuUah Khan, and determined 
to oppose him m every way. 
By his resistance to InayatuUah's measures, 'Abdullah Khan rallied 
to his side the subordinate officials and appealed to the Hindu sentiment 
generally. From this time onwards, the Saiyids came to be regarded as the 
champions of the Hindus and Hindustani. However, it would not be 
correct to interpret the struggle at the court as primarily one between the 
Hindustani and the Mughals, as contemporary and later writers often 
represent it to be. 
While all these above mentioned events were taking place at the 
Court, Deccan being ruled by Husain Ali was also playing a crucial role 
in the polity of Mughal India. 
The day Husain Ali replaced Nizam-ul Mulk as the Viceroy of the 
Deccan, he followed the earlier policy of Nizam refusing to pay chauth 
and Sardeshmukhi of the Deccan to Shahu. The result was that the 
Marathas appeared everywhere and plundered and desolated Mughal 
places. The Imperial commanders failed to cope with the situation.'*^ 
Matters were rendered more difficult for Husain Ali by the underhand 
opposition of Farrukh Siyar who wrote letters to Shahu and to all the 
46 . Khafi Khan, 775. 
47 . Khafi Khan ii, 777-78. 
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zaminars and diwan in Kamatak to oppose the viceroy. The result was 
that Husain AH's authority in Bijapur, Hyderabad and the two Kamataks 
was almost reduced to a cypher. 
Consequently on the advise of Saiyid Anwar Khan and through the 
instrumentality of Shakaraji Malhar, Husain Ali opened negotiations with 
the Marathas. This was done sometime in the middle of 1717.^ ° Reports 
of these negotiations reached the Emperor, but he was powerless to 
circumvent them. Ultimately, in February 1718, Husain Ali reached an 
agreement with Shahu granting him the Swarajya of Shivaji with certain 
reservations,^' and the right of collecting the chauth and Sardeshmukhi of 
the six Subahs of Deccan through his own collectors. The recent Maratha 
conquests in the Deccan, Berar, Gondwana and the Kamatak were 
confirmed. Shahiu was to pay attribute of 10 lakhs and maintain a force 
of 15,000 Cavalry for keeping peace and order and for use by the Deccan 
Viceroy. No taxes were to be claimed except the established ones and it 
was specifically stipulated that rahdari (toll tax) was not to be charged. 
For the Sardeshmukhi only Shahu undertook to pay the Peshkash 
customary upon a hereditary grant. 
48 . Khafi Khan 780, Elliot and Dowson viii, 260, Masir ul Umara I 328. 
49 Ibid., 780, 787-88. 
50 Ibid, 784. 
51 In lieu of Khandesh, he was to get the adjoining districts of Pandharpur and Trimbak (DufFi, 
363). 
52 Jagdish Narayana Sarkar, A study of Eighteenth Century India Vol. I Calcutta, 1976. pp. 80-81. 
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Clearly Husain Ali won over the Marathas. But the emperor did not 
ratify this pact. Besides, 'Several well wishers of the State urged that it 
was not proper to admit the vile enemy' to be over-bearing partners in 
matters of revenue and govemment.^^ Hence the proposal was rejected. 
There can be little doubt that the terms of the agreement with the 
Marathas were against the best interests of the empire. The recognition of 
the right of chauth and Sardeshmukhi was inevitable but their collection 
through Maratha officers created an imperium in impervo. But all this 
was largely due to Farrukh siyar's own actions, which drove the Saiyids 
to the Marathas. '^* 
The conclusion of the pact between Husain Ali and the Marathas 
brought the affairs of Farrukh Siyar to a crisis. The Saiyids had now 
secured that superiority for which they had been menoenuring since the 
first breach with Farrukh Siyar three years ago. Anticipating their next 
move, Farrukh Siyar had posted M. Amin Khan to Malwa as early as 
November 1717. The ostensible purpose of this appointment was to drive 
out the Marathas who had been harrying that province for the past 
several years.^^ 
53 Khafi Khan - 786, Maasir-ut Umara(i) 329-30. 
54 J.N. Sarkar, p. 81. 
55 Maasir ul Umara, 1, 330. 
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M. Amin Khan wrote to Jai Singh asking for his co-operation in the 
chastisement of the 'oppressors'. But his real motive was to check Husain 
Ali, should he march north. Farrukh Siyar also made a number of other 
appointments to Husain All's Northern province (Burhanpur), with the 
intention of weakening the Saiyid hold on that province. In the Deccan, it 
was widely rumoured that Farrukh Siyar had decided upon war against 
the Saiyid.^ 
In despair Farrukh Siyar now tried to get the support of some old 
anti-Saiyid nobles. The total estimated strength of the emperor was 70-
80,000 horse, as against Abdullah 15-30,000. But because of his own 
shortsightedness the expected combination of his father-in-law, Ajit 
Singh, Nizam ul Mulk and Sarbuland Khan did not materialize Farrukh 
Siyar now selected a new favourite Md. Murad Kashmiri, an old Alamgiri 
noble' to be wazir. Murad Kashmiri, a braggart, ingratiated himself into 
the emperor's favours and secretly proposed plans for destroying the 
Saiyids. With blind confidence Farrukh Siyar promoted him as 
superintendent of the Imperial harem (entitled, Itiqad Khan, May 1718). 
But the Kashmiri knowing his limitations and lacking, courage, shirked in 
execution of the plot and suggested Sarbuland Khan to be its principal 
instrument. His rise alienated Khan-i-Dauran and the old nobles who 
56 Khafi Khan, 773, 787, 790, Siyarul Muta Khaerin, 409-10, Maasir-ul-Umara ii, 36. 
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were no more prepared to take orders from M. Murad than from Mir 
Jumla earlier.^^ 
One by one Farrukh Siyar alienated old nobles like, Khan-i-Dauran 
the Nizam deprived of the faujdari of Moradabad; Sarbuland Khan, 
deprived of his Bihar governorship; Md. Amin Khan, dismissed for 
failure to check Husain Ali in Malwa; and Ajit Singh, dismissed from 
Gujarat on the ground of 'oppression' Abdullah now wisely won over 
these discontented nobles to his side by promoting some of them to 
important posts. Clearly all the anti-Saiyid plots proved to be immature 
C O 
and ended in nothing but talk. 
By the end of 1718, the emperor became completely isolated, only Jai 
Singh and a few others were by his side. From their vantage position the 
Saiyids could dictate terms to him. Three courses were open to them: 
(a) to depose the emperor and assume royalty themselves; 
(b) to depose Farrukh Siyar and choose a new Timurid prince who 
could be relied upon to rule according to their wishes; and third 
(c) to retain the Emperor but deprive him of all controlling power. 
57 Kamwar, 428, Shiv DAs pp. 40-41, See also Irvine i. pp. 340-45. 
58 J.N. Sarkar, pp. 80-82. 
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The first course was never seriously considered and was perhaps 
considered unworkable.^^ 
The choice lay between the second and the third course. 'Abdullah 
Khan' who was a bit shrewd politician, as is evident from his deft 
handling of the situation during his brother's absence, favoured the last 
course. He wanted as a contemporary writer puts it 'to treat Farrukh Siyar 
as Mahabat Khan had treated Jahangir'^ ° i.e. to keep him a virtual prisoner 
in his hands. 
The emperor recalled Mir Jumla from Lahore in September 1718. 
This violated the former agreement and gave a valid excuse to Husain Ai 
to move north wards without permission with a Maratha army. At 
Burhanpur he was joined by a Maratha army of 10,000 horse under 
Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, the combined forces of Husain Ali and the 
Marathas numbering about 25,000 horse and 10,000 foot. The ostensible 
pretext for coming to the court without permission was that a (fictitious) 
son of Prince Akbar had been handed over by Shahu and it was necessary 
to escort him to Delhi.^' 
59 . According to a Barha tradition (Tarikh-i Sadat-i Baraha, Muzaffar Ali Khan Jansath Ms., pp. 
300, 314) one Jalal Khan of Muzaffarnagar or his son Diyanat Khan proposed that one of the 
two brothsrs should ascsnd the throne Irvine {\?M^) however, considers Ms story to be of 
doubtful veracity. 
60 . Khush Lai Rai, Nadir-us Zamani, 416. 
61 . Iqbalnamah, Probably by Shiv Das 49-50, Khafi Khan, 793, 795. Irvine (i) pp. 357-58. 
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Husain Ali who was of a haughty and impatient temperament had 
already made up his mind about the deposition of Farrukh Siyar. This 
decision was known in his innermost circle by the time he reached near 
Delhi. He entered Delhi with drums beating like an mdependent 
sovereign, defying Imperial etiquette, and repeatedly said that he no 
longer reckoned himself among the servants of the monarch, adding 'I 
will maintain the honour of my race and care neither for the loss of my 
mamab nor for royal censure. Husain All's troops destroyed the crops 
and looted the bazaars like a hostile army. In particularly the country of 
Jai Singh was thoroughly ravaged. These facts were brought to the notice 
of Farrukh Siyar but he could do nothing about them. 
In fact Raja Jai Singh advised the emperor to place himself at the 
head of his troops and fall upon the impertinent rebel. He assured him 
that he and other loyal Umara would support him with all their strength 
and was confident that many of the nobles in the Syed's camp would also 
return to their proper allegiance once they saw that His Majesty meant 
business. But it was all to no effect.^ '* But something was still required to 
precipitate action. Qutb-ul Muk tried to break the stalemate by 
demanding that the emperor dismiss Jai Singh, a known enemy of their 
62 . Khafi Khan, 825. 
63 . Shiv Das, 58, Khafi Khan, 804, Maasir-ul Umara, I, 330. 
64 . G.S. Cheema, The forgotten Mughals, p. 130. 
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family and order him to depart for his country. He also demanded the two 
offices of the mir atish and superintendent of the diwan khana for his 
nominees, and permission to take what precautions they considered 
necessary for their own security. 
At first the emperor tried to play for time but two days later he 
succumbed and gave into all their demands. By a note written in the 
emepror's own hand, Jai Singh and Rao Budh Singh of Bundi were asked 
to leave for their estates and informed that the following day was 
particularly auspicious for departures. The eunuch who delivered the note 
also brought the customary khillat of departure and he let them know that 
a formal audience would not be necessary! Raging with furry, Jai Singh 
complied and pitched his tents at Sarai Sahil, outside the city.^ ^ 
The departure of Jai Singh was followed by the defeat of his 
protege, Budh Singh, at the hands of Bhim Singh who had allied himself 
with the Saiyyids. On 22 February, 1719 Husain Ali had an interview 
with the emperor after posting his men at all strategic points in the fort. 
But the differences between the two sides could not be bridged. The 
Saiyids were impatient at the delay in the handing over of actual charge 
of the various offices to their nominees, and suspected that Farrukh Siyar 
65 . Cf. G.S. Cheema, p. 131, Irvine, i.p, 376. 
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was only playing for time in order that he might resort to some new 
trick.'' 
Hence, they refused the compromise. On 26 January 1719 
Abdullah had an stormy interview with Farrukh Siyar during which the 
latter refused to make any further concessions, openly abused the wazir 
and retired into the haram. Abdullah Khan thereupon turned out the royal 
favourite. Itiqad Khan, and all the royal guards from the fort and took 
possession of it. 
In the fort, ever since daybreak Abdulah Khan had been sending 
messengers to persuade the emperor to come forth and take his seat on 
the throne. Apparently he had not yet decided to replace him; on the other 
hand, his authorization was needed before his partisans could be arrested. 
But the craven emperor refused to come out. 
Meanwhile, wild rumours of the death of Abdullah Khan and 
Husain Ali at the hands of Ajit Singh and M. Amin and other spread in 
the town, and several nobles took courage to come out in defence of the 
monarch. The Maratha troops of Husain Ali clashed with the Mughal 
troops of M. Amin Khan.^ ^ Though militarily ineffective, this 
66 . Cf. Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, pp. 178-79. 
67. Khafi Khan 807, Mirza Mohammad, Ibaratnama, 239, Shiv Das, 59, Qasim, 14506, Irvine i, 
377-78. 
68 . Cf. G.S. Cheema, The Forgotten Mughals, p. 134. 
69 . Khafi Khan 812-13, M irza Mohammad Ibratnama, 262-3. 
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demonstration of popular attachment to the House of Timur confronted 
the Saiyids with the danger of a sudden landslide against them, and 
impressed upon them the urgent necessity of making a decision quickly, 
specially as Jai Singh was hovering 40 miles from Delhi with 20,000 
horsemen.'' '^ 
Meanwhile Abdullah Khan had sent messages to his brother that 
since all the offices of the Imperial government and the palace were now 
in the control of their friends and adherents there was no need to dethrone 
Farrukh Siyar, but Mohammad Amin Khan urged Husain to think 
otherwise. Khan-i Dauran now with the Saiyids, also sent a note urging 
the viceroy to place some other prince on the throne without delay. 
Subsequently the Amirul Umara sent a message urging his brother to 
forget the recalcitrant emperor and replace him. 
Maharaja Ajit Singh was also pressing for action. Finally in a 
hurried conference, it was decided to raise 'Bidar Dil, son of Bidar Bakht, 
to the throne, as he was reputed to be the most intelligent of the Princes. 
But when the Wazir and Raja Ajit Singh sent their attendants to fetch the 
prince the women refused to open the doors and started wailing and 
crying. In vain the emissions shouted that they had been sent to fetch 
Bidar Dil to make him emperor, but the women had convinced 
70 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 179. 
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themselves that the Saiyids were about to begin a general massacre of all 
the Salatin prior to assuming the throne themselves, and refused to 
unbolt.^' 
Ultimately the door was broken in, but Bidar Dil, locked in a closet 
could not be found. In desperation they turned towards the apartments of 
the sons of Rafi-ush-Shan and from among them they seized Rafi-ud-
Darjat and dragged him out. 
Then with the Wazir holding him by one hand, and Raja Ajit Singh 
by the other, the prince was led to the throne and requested to take his 
seat. The wazir leading, all the nobles in turn made their taslimats and 
presented nazars, while the musicians in the naubat khana were ordered 
to announce the new reign. 
With the enthronement of Rafi-ud Darjat an accomplished fact, 
casting aside all delicacy, Najmud-Din AH Khan was sent with about 400 
to hunt out Farrukh Siyar. The room in which the craven Farrukh Siyar 
was hiding was soon broken in. He came out at last holding a naked 
sword. His mother, wife daughters and maid servants, tried to shield him 
but they were pushed aside. Easily overpowered, he was dragged out with 
every mark of indignity. His turban was knocked down while his captors 
71 . G.S. Cheema, The Forgotten Mughals, pp. 134-35. 
72 . Ghulam Husain Tabatabai, i; p. 136, Irvine, i, p. 389. 
90 
taunted and abused him. Thus he was produced before the Wazir in torn 
and disordered clothes, sans turban and in barefeet. It is said that 
Abdullah Khan himself opened his writing box and took out a needle 
which he used for applying coUyrium. Handing it to one of the men he 
ordered that the ex-emperor be thrown down and blinded, a command 
which was obeyed instantly. Thereafter, he was taken away to the room 
above the Tirpoliya, the same where his predecessor had been imprisoned 
and subsequently strangled. Shortly afterwards on 29 April 1719, 
Farrukh Siyar was murdered and buried in the crypt of Hamayun's tomb. 
Contradictory opinions have been expressed on the conduct of the 
Saiyids towards the emperor. On the one hand the Saiyids and Shiahs 
defended their action as the only course left. On the other hand, the rivals 
of the Saiyids denounced their conduct as being disloyal. None of these 
views can be fully accepted. It was unjustifiable or wrong to remove a 
worthless emperor who had proved treacherous and deceitful in different 
ways and set a new precedent in dealing with the undesirable. For seven 
years the state passed through a period of instability. Farrukh Siyar was 
strong neither for evil nor for good and as Irvine says 'it is impossible 
either to admire or regret him'. But the Saiyids were ministers and 'their 
way of doing what had almost become a necessity was unduly harsh'. 
73 . Irvine, i.p.390; Elliot and Dowson, viii p. 488. 
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utterly regardless of the personal dignity of the monarch. In those days, 
blinding a deposed king was a normal practice and the Saiyids just 
followed the prevailing custom. For this they can not be blamed 
specifically but 'the severity of the subsequent confinement was 
excessive and killing him in captivity was 'an extremity entirely uncalled 
for. According to one writer, Shah Nawaz Khan, the Saiyids were forced 
to do this in order to save their own lives and honours. But the same 
historian also says that it would have been nobler for them to have given 
up the struggle and retire to a distant place leaving the service and go 
onto Mecca. But it is not always open for men to rise superior to their 
passions. The Saiyids fell a victim to their own passions. In future they 
themselves met a violent fate. On the other hand it may be said that 
execution of Farrukh Siyar was unnecessarily cruel and it was a logical 
corollary to his deposition. The Saiyids could never feel secure for their 
lives and honour so long as he was alive and the main problem for them 
was to decide whether they could realize their object without deposition. 
Abdullah Khan felt that they could do so as long as the important offices 
were controlled by them. The primary responsibility for the deposition 
was Husain All's. The deposition created a fear in minds of many nobles 
about the intention of the Saiyids. It alienated their own supporters who 
were not prepared for such an extreme step. Before the execution the 
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Saiyids might have gained some praise for their bravery in fighting 'their 
ungrateful master. But after the deposition, the Saiyids came to be 
regarded as tyrants and treacherous to the salt {Namakharam) of the 
emperor. 
All contemporary writers condemned the deposition as a 
disgraceful act. Considering the weakness of their actual position, it was 
political blunder on their part. Abdullah Khan himself regretted the 
deposition and blamed his brother for this. In destroying Farrukh Siyar, 
the Saiyids destroyed their effective protection against the old nobles. 
The rival Turani group now came forward to champion the cause of the 
outraged monarchy and royal family. They used the public revulsion 
against the Saiyids. The Saiyids had now to solve many problems of the 
empire but it became extremely difficult for them to do so. 
Chapter 5 
iJie Tail oft/ie Saiyids 
CHAPTER-5 
THE FALL OF THE SAIYIDS 
The Saiyid brothers had made Farrukh Siyar's life a torture before 
they put it to a ghastly end on 28 April 1719. The grim deed provoked a 
strong and spontaneous reaction all over the capital and its repercussions 
were soon evident in Agra and other places.' The cruel treatment meted 
out to Farrukh Siyar in the prison stirred the minds of the people and 
proved the starting point of reaction against the Saiyids. The 
demonstration of anger by a section of public in Delhi was the first overt 
sign of opposition to their authority. The chroniclers who had previously 
justified the stand of the Saiyids now began to sympathise with the 
luckless Emperor. Even Mir Qasim, author of Tarikh-i Sutanat-i Farrukh 
Siyar, wavers in his devotion to the Saiyids. Khafi Khan again and again 
condemns the Saiyids on this score.^ 
Hatred of the Saiyids grew in volume and was directed equally 
powerfully against their partisans who had outraged public opinion by 
their conduct. For instance, Ajit Singh was generally condemned for his 
1 . Hadi Kamwar Khan states that at least 15,000 to 20,000 people followed the bier of Farrukh 
Siyar. They wept and wailed; they tore their garments and threw dust on their heads. The women 
Shrieked and threw stones on the servants of the Saiyids. {Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chagtaif364 b). 
But Khafi Khan and Ghulam Husain write that only two or three thousand beggars formed the 
funeral procession. Muntakhab-ul Lubab II, 820; Siyar-ul Mutaakhkhirin II, 425. 
2 . Mirat-i Waridat, 540; Shah-Namah-i Minawar-ul Kalam, Muntakhab ul Lubab, II, 901, 902.905. 
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betrayal of Farrukh Siyar and came to be called the killer of his son-in-
law (Damad Kush) wherever he went curses and abuses were heaped 
upon him.^  The citizens of Delhi violently demonstrated their anger 
against the Marathas.'* They viewed the policy of friendship with 
Churaman Jat, a former rebel and enemy of the public peace, as highly 
reprehensible. Ratan Chand who exercised a powerful influence at the 
court through his control of the departments headed by the Saiyids, was 
despised not only by the officers and clerks whom he treated abominably 
but also by the nobles who felt their dignity compromised by being 
obliged to present themselves at his residence when he used to hold 
office.^  
The first serious expression of this resentment and revulsion of 
feeling was the revolt of Shayista Khan, maternal uncle of Farrukh Siyar, 
who gathered a force in Delhi to avenge the fate of his nephew. But his 
mansion was stormed and he was made prisoner.^ Other nobles like 
Ruhullah Khan III, Tahawwur Khan Turani and Salabat Khan unable to 
fight with the Saiyids left Delhi and joined Jai Singh who became the 
7 8 
spearhead of opposition. At Agra, Mitra Sen , a physician by profession 
Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar, f.83 Tabatabai, i.p.l38, Irvine, i,p.408. 
MuntakhabulLubabll, 811. 
Muntakhab-ul Lubab, Khafi Khan, II, 843. 
Ramraj ibratNamah f.69a. 
Cf. Zahiruddin Mallick, The Reign of Mohammad Shah, p. 35, Khafi Khan, II, 832. 
For details of his life, Khafi Khan's Muntakhab-ul Lubab II, 825-26. 
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set up Neku Siyar, a son of Prince Akbar living as prisoner in the Agra 
Fort as emperor in 18 May 1719. Samandar Khan the new commandant, 
was refused entry in the fort and the garrison prepared for defence. Mitra 
Sen tried to seek the help of the hostile nobles and local zamindars. There 
was talk of making a common front at Agra by Raja Jai Singh, Chhabela 
Ram Nagar and Nizam-ul Mulk such an overwhelming combination was 
expected to bring about the fall of the Saiyids. 
Husain Ali Khan marched from Delhi on 23 June 1719 and after 
his arrival at Agra operations were launched vigorously against the 
insurgents. However, the rebellion failed to spread beyond Agra and did 
not receive any support from the high grandees. Even Nizam-ul Mulk, 
who passed Agra en route to Malwa, gave no help.^ Only Raja Jai Singh 
moved up to Toda Tank, a place 80 kos from Agra; beyond which he was 
not prepared to risk and advance.'° Mitr Sen appealed to the Saiyid 
brothers and other prominent nobles to accept Neku Siyar as the emperor 
and Abdullah Khan was said to be in favour of accepting the suggestion. 
But Husain Ali considering it a personal affront, declined and resorted to 
stern measures. 
Inspite of the conciliatory policy adopted by the Saiyids, two 
centres of resistance and overt challenge to their authority were rapidly 
9 . Khafi Khan, 827-8, Shiva Das, 79-80. 
10. Khafi Khan, 11, 827, 826. 
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formed; the first at Agra having been suppressed, Allahabad rebellion 
drew Saiyid's attention, which was due to the personal apprehensions of 
Chhabela Ram, an old servant of Farrukh Siyar and the Governor of 
Allahabad. He suspected the intentions of the Saiyids towards him and his 
suspicions were strengthened when the Saiyids attempted to displace him 
from Allahabad, and sent a force under Shah Ali Khan with instructions 
to seize the fort. In reality, the Saiyids had no desire to destroy Chhabela 
Ram, but they considered his possession of such a strong fort as 
Allahabad dangerous, especially as it commanded the route from which 
the vital Bengal treasures came to Delhi." They were even prepared to 
grant Awadh to Chhabela Ram in exchange for the Subahdari of 
Allahabad, but the latter refused to place any trust in their word and rose 
in open revolt. Soon afterwards Chhabela Ram died. But the rebellion 
was continued by his nephew, Girdhar Bahadur. 
These two rebellions occupied all the energies of the two brothers 
during the first fourteen months of their domination. It took three months 
of siege before hunger and treachery brought about the surrender of Agra 
(12 August 1719). Another nine months were spent before he agreed to 
11 . The Bengal treasure had been the mainstay of the Delhi government even towards the end of 
Aurangzeb's reign. At the time of Chhabela Ram's rebellion, a conveoy of 90 lakhs was waiting 
at Patna. The financial affairs of the brothers were not too good, as is evident from letters written 
at this time by Abdullah Khan to Chhabela Ram asking him to escort the treasure beyond his 
borders as the soldiers had not received their salaries for years (Baimukand Nama, 7, 27). 
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evacuate Allahabad (11 May 1720).'^ Meanwhile Girdhar Bahadur kept 
up the resistance bravely, and restored the confidence of the soldiers 
shaken by Chhabela Ram's death.'^ 
The Wazir renewed the terms of peace which he had offered to 
Chhabela Ram. As no favourable response to overtures of peace was 
forthcoming, reinforcements under the command of Haider Quli Khan 
was dispatched. The insurrection continued for nine months without 
precipitating any serious fight'"* and once again negotiations were set on 
foot through the medium of Ratan Chand in whom Girdhar Bahadur 
reposed his trust. It is significant that even then Gridhar Bahadur refused 
to place any reliance in the words of the Saiyid brothers, and stipulated 
that Ratan Chand should be the guarantor and intermediary.'^ A 
settlement was reached by which he gave up his claims over the 
possession of Allahabad and accepted the Subedari of Awadh with the 
faujdari of Gorkahpur. The Saiyids conferred on him the rank of 5,000 
and the title of Raja. He also received 30,00,000 of rupees as a gift.'^ 
Suppression of Jai Singh was the next immediate task which drew the 
12 . Cf. Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 184-85. 
13. Tarikh-i Muzaffari, p. 189. 
14 . Balmukand Namah No. 9, 10, 11, pp. 13-15. These letters are addressed to Haider Quli Khan 
and Shah Ali Khan. The substance of these letters is that Girdhar Bahadur should be forced, 
either by means of military operations or some amicable settlement, to surrender the fort. The 
Wazir informs the imperial generals that he is ready to march in that direction to reinforce them. 
15. Khafi Khan, 838. 
16 . Balmukand Namah, Letter No. 4, p. 8. 
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attention of the Saiyids. But the risks involved in an attack on his 
stronghold forbade a major military action. Husain Ali Khan sent Ajit 
Singh to pacify Jai Singh and persuade him to lay down arms. At the 
same, the Saiyids announced that a punitive expedition against the 
refractory Raja would be launched when the Emperor visited the Shrine 
of Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti at Ajmer. The announcement was 
obviously designed to bring pressure on the Raja and terrify him into 
submission. Their tactics proved successful. Besides, Jai Singh's resolve 
to keep up armed opposition was shaken by lack of support from any 
quarter. In the circumstances, compromise appeared to be a wise and 
prudent step. He retired from Toda Tank and reached Amber.'^ He 
received a sum of Rs. 20,00,000 and the faujdari of Sorath in Gujarat. 
The Mughal nobles who had sought refuge with him were allowed to stay 
in Amber. This, however, did not improve their relations, and Jai Singh 
remained in the opposite camp.' 
Back to the Court, the property and mansabs of a number of the 
personal favourites of Farrukh Siyar - such as Mohammad Murad 
Kashmiri, Amin-ud Din Sambhali, Ghazi-ud-din Ahmad Beg and the 
emperor's relation like Saadat Khan, Shaistah Khan etc. were confiscated. 
17. Cf. Zahiruddin Mallick, 36-38. 
18. Khafi Khan, II, 835, 838. 
19 . Cf. Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 36. 
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But the property of many more were spared. There was no bloody 
executions, and even some of the close favourites of the late emperor 
such as Khan-i Dauran and Mir Jumlah were left in possession of their 
mansabs and jagirs and given employment. In general, the Saiyids made 
no attempt to monopolize the high offices of state. M. Amin Khan 
continued to be the second bakhshi, another Turani, Roshan-ul-Daulah 
Zafar Khan was made the third bakhshi and even InayatuUah Khan, 
whose policies had been strongly opposed by the Saiyids, was allowed to 
continue as the Khan-i Saman and the (absentee) governor of Kashmir. 
The post of Sadr was given to Amir Khan, an old Alamgiri noble and 
then to Mir Jumlah. Apart from the two highest offices of the state and 
the viceroyalty of the deccan which the Saiyids held since 1715, and the 
offices which controlled access to the emperor, the only new posts given 
to Barahas or the personal employees and dependents of the Saiyids were 
the subahdaris of Agra and Allahabad and the faujdari of Moradabad,^' 
All political symptoms pointed a favourable direction and angered 
well for the consolidation of the Saiyid oligarchy. Perils of great 
magnitude which had threatened the power and position of the Saiyids 
had been warded off by their political wisdom and diplomatic skill. Their 
20 . Cf. Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, pp. 182-83. 
2 1 . Cf. Ibid., p. 183. 
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rivals were defeated and humbled. However, whatever was happening 
can safely be termed as the proverbial lull before the storm'. 
The coalition which had brought about the deposition of Farrukh 
Siyar has to be maintained and consolidated at any cost, which implied 
two things, first, the consolidation and extension of the alliance with the 
Marathas and Rajputs and second the solution of what might be called 
'the problem of the Alamgiri nobles'. The Jizyah was abolished at the 
request of Ajit Singh after the deposition of Farrukh Siyar. His queen, 
Ajit Singh widowed daughter was allowed to give up Islam and return 
home with all her wealth and property against the opinion of the Qazi and 
to the indignation of the Muslims. Khafi Khan described this as 
'unprecedented'.''^ 
Negotiations were made through Ajit Singh with the hostile Jai 
Singh Sawai who was appointed faujdar of Sorath in Ahmedabad. Ajit 
Singh was given charge of Ajmer and Gujrat. Thus these two Rajput 
Rajas constituted a very strong group. Inspite of Ajit Singh's pleading for 
the Saiyids, Jai Singh who married Ajit's daughter did not join them. Nor 
did he join the Nizam against them. The Sayyids could not succeed with 
22. Cf. Ibid., p. 186. 
23 . Khafi Khan, 816, Kamwar, 442, Mirat-i- Ahmadi, ii,23. 
24 . Khafi Khan, p. 833. 
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the Rajputs except in the case of Ajit Singh. The Saiyids pact with the 
Rajputs, therefore, touched only Ajit Singh. . 
Other honours were also conferred on the Raja who thus became 
one of the most powerful and influential noble in the empire. The two 
Rajput rajas together constituted a very powerful faction in the empire. 
The returning confidence felt by the Hindus is reflected in Khafi Khan's 
'complaint' that from the environs of the Capital to the banks of Narbada, 
the infidels were engaged in repairing temples and attempfing to forbid 
cow slaughter. 
The old Saiyid Maratha pact of 1718 was now strengthened by 
formal imperial grants, under the new emperor, Mohammad Shah's 
signature, of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi to the Marathas. The Marathas 
allies of Husian Ali carried these while returning to the Deccan. But their 
support, though unpopular, was one of the main sources of strength of the 
Saiyids in the Deccan. Alam Ali, Husain All's deputy had some 
connections with court of Satara through a minister and good relations 
with Shahu was maintained.^^ 
25 . Khafi Khan, 838 (Elliot (vii, p.485) has confused Sorath with Surat. 
26 . Khafi Khan, 8960. No formal order prohibiting cow slaughter was passed by the Saiyids but on 
his own responsibility Ajit Singh prohibited it in the two subahs under his charge, an action 
which Khafi Khan says 'exceeded his authority' (Khafi Khan, 936). 
27 . Cf J.N. Sarkar, pp. 89-90, See also Duff 1,368-9. 
102 
It was not only among the Rajputs and the Marathas that the 
Saiyids sought to extend their connections. They sought to bind churaman 
Jat still closer to themselves by further concessions. He was given charge 
of the royal highway from Delhi to Gwalior and took part in the siege of 
Agra, receiving favours for his services. 
Another problem was that of the old Alamgiri and Bahadur Shahi 
nobles. The Saiyids had no intention to seek monopoly of power or 
fellow a policy of religious or racial exclusiveness. As in the past they 
tried to win them over and get their cooperation in administration. They 
were given increments and also appointed to high posts or confirmed. In a 
letter to Nizam ul Mulk, 'Abdullah Khan explained his general policy in 
the following words: 'The high and mighty task of administering 
Hindustan is not one that can be accomplished single-handed, without the 
help of prominent nobles and officers of state. Under the circumstances, 
is it better that I should bring forward new (untried) men and become 
deponent on them, or that I should continue to take the help of one like 
out who has ever been a friend?' 
It was, however, difficult to implement this policy. The Saiyids 
were suspected and feared by the nobles on account of the deposition of 
28. ShivDas, 69, Kamwar,423. 
29 . Balmukund Namah, 2. The letter was written sometime in 1720 when Nizam-ul Mulk was the 
Governor of Malwa. 'Abdullah Khan used to say, 'we are three brothers of whom Nizam ul 
Mulk is the eldest and Husain Ali the youngest (Hadiqat-ul Alam by Mir Alam). 
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Farrukh Siyar. Many were jealous and dissatisfied with the supremacy of 
the two Hindustanis. Men hke the Nizam and Mohammad Amin Khan 
were ambitious to enjoy supreme power; and if it was not possible they 
wanted to go away from the court and establish independent principalities 
of their own. The Marathas, too, cherished high ambitions which 
conflicted with the attempt of the Saiyids to win them over.^" 
Moreover, the two brothers differed over personal and political 
question, viz. sharing the spoils of Victory after the capture of Agra, as 
well as political power. To some extent Ratan Chand effected a 
compromise. But the difference was deepseated.^' Husain Ali, being more 
energetic, wanted to dominate over the elder brother. But he was hasty 
and he did not want the Nizam to remain in the court. He wanted to send 
the Nizam to Malwa. But Abdullah Khan wanted him to go to Bihar. The 
over hastiness of Husain Ali (in liquidating political rivals) and his 
arrogant and tactless behaviour contrasted sharply with the wisdom and 
moderation of Abdullah and largely accounted for the failure of the 
Saiyids. Distrusting the Saiyids, the Nizam agreed to go to Malwa as a 
long term measure and refused to leave his son in the Court.^ ^ A conflict 
between the Nizam and the Saiyids was inevitable. Both the Turanis and 
30. J.N. Sarkar, pp. 90-91. 
31 . At the intervention of Ratan Ciiand, 'Abdullah Khan received 21 or 28 Lakhs, supposed to 
represent his share of the borty after deducing the expenses. 'Abdullah Khan felt cheated. Khafi 
Khan, 847, Qasim, pp. 117-18, Maasir ul Umara, i, 331. 
32 . Khafi Khan, 847-58. 
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the Iranis, looking down upon the Hindustani and Indian bom Muslims, 
supported the Monarchy and claimed monopoly of power by excluding 
the Hindustani nobles." Many did not like the alliance between the 
Saiyids and the Hindus (the Rajputs and the Marathas), the abolition of 
Jizyah and other discriminatory cesses. Many were just waiting to strike 
at the Saiyids who were considered to be checks to their own individual 
ambitions. Under these circumstances, an attempt on the part of the 
Saiyids to take a strong attitude towards Nizam-ui Mulk stood in danger 
of being interpreted by these nobles as part and parcel of a policy 
designed to root out all the old nobles. The was a risk the Saiyids could ill 
afford to take, because the alternative course was to bring forward new, 
untried men which created the danger of a breakdown of the 
administration, and an opportunity to the Rajputs, Marathas, jats etc. to 
augment their power. 
Unfortunately for the Saiyids, events so shaped themselves that 
they were drawn to take the very step they wished to avoid most, viz., the 
driving of Nizam ul-Mulk into open rebellion. 
To the misfortune of the Saiyids, Mohammad Shah by this time too 
had started thinking of throwing off the yoke of the Saiyids. He naturally 
33 . Many Hindi and Turani nobles were opposed to Husain Ali Khan due to personal grudge and 
jealously (Tarikh-i-Hindi, Rustam Ali, p. 469). 
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found many supporters among the enemies of the Saiyids, the ablest 
being the Turani Nizam.^ '^  
Although Nizam ul Mulk and the Saiyids had never actually 
crossed arms, there was no love lost between them ever since his recall 
from the vieroyalty of the Deccan in 1714, and replacement by Husain 
Ali Khan. Nizam ul Mulk and his late father, the blind Ghazi ud-Din 
Khan Feroz Jung had started their careers in the Deccan and both had 
been favourites of Aurangzeb. 
The Saiyids too had genuine complaints against the Nizam. It was 
reported that he was collecting men and war materials in Malwa in excess 
with the object of occupying the Deccan. When questioned by the 
Saiyids, Nizam ul Mulk explained his action by pointing to the necessity 
of checking the Marathas who were harrying the province with 50,000 
horse.^^ But the Saiyids suspected him because he was in concert with the 
anti Saiyid Jai Singh. The Nizam also appointed a quiladar Marhamat 
Khan dismissed by Husain Ali from the fort of Mandu.''^ Again the 
Nizam ravaged certain villages of a pargana Nilam and transferred its 
zamindars against the wishes of the Saiyids.^^ They also suspected 
Nizam-ul Mulk of having instigated the uprising of Neku Siyar.^ ^ 
34 . Cf. J.N. Sarkar, p. 92. 
35 . Shiv Das, 79-80 (Nizam's letter to Abdullah), Khafi Khan, 851. 
36. Khafi Khan, 849, 858, Tabatabai, 425. Husain Ali considered Marhamat employment a defiance 
of their authority. 
37. Khafi Khan 851. 
38. Warid, 315. 
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However, it was with the arrival of the emperor's mother Mariam 
Makani (now Nawab Qudsia) at the royal camp near Fatehpur Sikri on 14 
Oct. 1719 that matters began to assume a different complexion. The pent-
up of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs began to express 
itself in secret consultation and conspiracies among the nobles who were 
opposed to the Saiyids. The elements of opposition centred around 
Qudsia Begum, a sagacious lady, who also possessed a talent of no mean 
order for undercover intrigue. Anxious to emancipate her son she quickly 
discovered the instruments she could employ for the purpose. She set to 
work with Mohammad Amin Khan, the influential leader of the Turani 
faction and an adept in the art of intrigue and dissimulation, to prepare 
schemes for the overthrow of the Saiyids. 
Mohammad Amin Khan's hatred for the Saiyids was fierce and 
strong. He longed for an opportunity to destroy their power. He had sided 
with Husain Ali against Farrukh Siyar but had gained nothing from the 
alliance, which had only added to the power and riches of the Saiyids. He 
himself enjoyed neither influence nor confidence in the councils of the 
Saiyids. Aggressive, ambitious and unscrupulous he became alienated 
from them thereby persuding Mohammad Shah and his mother to take 
Nizam-ul Mulk also into confidence and enlist his support. Accordingly, 
39 . Zahiruddin Mallick, pp. 58-59. 
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the Emperor and Mohammad Amin Khan opened a correspondence with 
Nizam ul Mulk and explained to him in a series of letters the purpose of 
their plans against the Saiyids and informed him of the scheme being 
prepared by the Saiyids for the complete ruin of the Turani group. 
No contemporary writer has recorded the text of the letters, Nizam 
ul Mulk wrote in reply to the Emperor's letters. In the absence of definite 
evidence it is difficult to ascertain the aims and objectives which goaded 
this Turani leader to plunge head long into an armed clash with the Saiyid 
faction. Qasim Aurangabadi holds that, besides the question of his 
personal safety, Nizam ul Mulk wanted to restore Muhammad shah to 
sovereign authority and set up a new political order in which the Mughals 
could occupy the forefront of the stage. 
However, all these preceding events might not have led to an open 
breach with Nizam ul Mulk had other more urgent considerations not 
intervened, namely Husain Ali being desirous to govern the Deccan along 
with Malwa, Gujrat, Ajmer and Agra personally for two reasons (i) to 
check the vaulting ambition of Satara, and to check the expansion of 
Maratha in Malwa and Gujarat.'*^ (ii) to check the secret design of the 
Nizam to conquer the Deccan."*^  
40 . Ibid., p. 59. 
41 . Ahwal-ul Khawaqin, f. ] 94a, Khafi Khan II, 855. 
42 . Khafi Khan, 851, 857, 859; Tabatabai, 425. 
43 . Khafi Khan, 858. After his rebellion Nizam mul Mulk was joined by a contingent from Tara Bai 
at Burhanpur. 
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So the Saiyids wanted to divide the empire into two zones between 
the two brothers, the North and the South. A partition of the empire on 
these Hnes had also been suggested as a solution to the growing 
differences between the two brothers. As a first step towards such a 
division, the Saiyids wanted to remove Nizam ul Mulk from Malwa. 
Husain Ali offered Nizam ul Mulk the choice of the Governorship of 
Agra, Allahabad, Burhanpur and Multan'^ '* assuring him that he would be 
sent the sanad of whichever subah he chose. ^ 
Nizam-ul Mulk looked upon the order of transfer as a breach of 
promise. His attitude was perfectly logical. The Saiyids began to take 
precautions. By this time Nizam ul Mulk had also received special 
messages from the emperor and his mother asking him to liberate them 
from the grip of the Saiyids."^ ^ Hence, he decide to disregard the order to 
return to the Court, and unfurled the banner of revolt. He left Ujjain, 
ostensibly for the Court, but turned south, and crossed the Narmada into 
the Deccan."*^ He was joined by the governors of Berar and Khandesh. 
Old nobles, confirmed by the Saiyids, raised anti Saiyid slogans. These 
desertions reveal the political weakness of the Saiyids and their profound 
unpopularity at the time, having been termed with traitors to the salt. 
44. KhafiKJian, 851,857, 859. 
45 . Khafi Khan 850. 
46. Khafi Khan, 851. 
47 . ibid. 856. Irvine ii, 22. 
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Nizam ul Mulk exploited these sentiments and posed himself as the 
champion of the monarchy and of Islam, defender of the Irani and Turani 
nobles and their racial interests.'*^ Thus after the conquest of Burhanpur, 
Nizam ul Mulk is said to have assembled all the prominent men of the 
town and told them, 'The only object of my exertions is to free the 
emperor from the tyranny of the selfish people who have placed such 
restrictions on his liberty that he cannot even come to the Friday 
49 
prayers. 
Frightened and perplexed, the Saiyid brothers could not frame a 
common course of action. Distrusting the Mughals, particularly the 
Turanis, Husain Ali wanted to have Muhammad Amin Khan murdered. 
Abdullah Khan could not agree with this as being unwise and dishonest. 
He even wanted to conciliate the Nizam by giving him the Deccan. Ratan 
Chand and Khan-i-Dauran supported Abdullah Khan's proposal for a 
compromise, remarking that 'war would end in the death of the Saiyids.^^ 
The uncompromising Husain Ali had to give up the idea of removing 
Mohammad Amin Khan. He planned to attack the Nizam with Maratha 
troops from two sides i.e. a northern army under Dilawar Khan and a 
48 . This aspect is emphasized by almost all the contemporary writers. The alliance of the two 
brothers with Ajit Singh and Churaman jat, the dominance of Ratan Chand 'the vile infidel' in 
their affairs, the abolition of Jizyah is emphasized by all writers as causes of disgust of the old 
nobles. 
49 . Khafi Khan, 855. Hadiqat ii, 98. 
50 . Khafi Khan, 867. 
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southern army under Alam Ali, the deputy of Husain Ali in the Deccan. 
Letters were also dispatched to Shahu and to Balalji Vishwanath 
requesting them to assist Alam Ali. But the Nizam defeated the northern 
army on 19 June 1720 near Burhanpur and faced the southern army 
supported by the Marathas under the peshwa. 
The news of the disaster at Burhanpur caused consternation at 
Agra. A whole army had been lost and Amir ul Umara's family was in 
peril. At first he was all for rushing to the Deccan and taking on the 
Nizam head on, but saner counsels prevailed and it was decided to write a 
conciliatory letter to the Nizam. 
In alarm Abdullah Khan again suggested a compromise. But finally 
the Saiyids planned a double edged policy: (i) The Nizam was to be 
appointed viceroy of the Deccan and be asked to allow Alam Ali and the 
family of Mir Bakhshi to leave the Deccan. (ii) A great army was to be 
sent to the Deccan and the southern commander (Alam Ali) was to wait. 
But the Nizam could easily see through the game. He was too shrewd 
to relax and he turned the tables against the Saiyids by declaring Alam 
Ali a rebel for defying imperial authority and not handing over charge of 
51 . In fulfillment of Shahu's promise, Baji Rao joined Alam ali with 15,600-16,000 horsemen. 
Khafi Khan, 874, Hadiqat ii, 101. 
52 . Irvine ii, 35-36. 
53 . Khafi Khan, 886. Iqbalnamah 88. 
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the Deccan to him. The Nizam routed Alam Ali and his Maratha allies at 
Shaker Khera on 10 August 1720. 
These successive military defeats in the Deccan struck a shattering 
blow at the power and prestige of the Saiyid brothers. A spirit of gloom 
deepened by the invincibility of Nizam ul Mulk army spread in their 
camp. At this juncture Mohammad Amin Khan suggested that the best 
course for them would be to come to an understanding with the 
redoubtable Nizam ul Mulk; and by frankly accepting the realities of the 
situation in the Deccan they should recognize him as the governor of the 
province. If that was done he offered to send his son Qamar ud din to the 
south to fetch Husain Ali Khan's family from Daulatabad. The Saiyid 
brothers rejected the proposal; they declared their resolve to fight out the 
issue and punish Nizam ul Mulk for all his misdeeds.^ "^ 
In fact ever since Nizam ul Mulk's flight from Malwa Husain Ali 
Khan had been busy in completing plans for a campaign against him. The 
ever prudent Abdulah Khan had urged caution and delay in the hope that 
Dilawar Ali Khan and Alam Ali might defeat the enemy. But now that the 
affairs had turned out differently, Husain Ali Khan was determined to 
lead an immediate campaign to the Deccan and a huge force of 50,000 
54 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 66. 
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troops mainly composed of the Saiyids of Barha and the Afghans were 
quickly raised for the campaign. ^  
The Saiyids had all the time suspected Mohammad Amin Khan of 
having secretaly instigated Nizam ul Mulk and they considered him as 
the root cause of all the troubles, the real centre of the intrigue and as a 
traitor in the camp. Twice they attempted to vent their wrath on him but 
the fear of a general revolt by the Mughals dissuaded them from 
executing their designs.^^ They were on the horns of a dilemma. What 
were they to do with Amin? If he was left behind in Delhi he would rebel, 
but if he accompanied the army to the south he would certainly desert and 
join their enemy. Husain Ali Khan ultimately decided to keep him in the 
camp where his activities could be closely watched. In order not to arouse 
his suspicion Husain Ali Khan humoured the Mughal leader and kept up 
the appearance of good relations with him. Liberal payments of salaries 
were made to Muhammad Amin Khan soldiers. 
Mohammad Amin Khan was however too shrewd to be taken in by 
all this and although he too kept up an appearance of friendship, in his 
heart of hearts he was convinced that a blow must be struck against 
Husain Ali Khan by whatever means possible, and he was equally 
55. Tarikh-iMuzaffari, 214. 
56 . Shiv Das, f.45a. 
57 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 67. 
113 
convinced that he was not going to be spared whenever it suited Husain 
Ali Khan design. 
"The Saiyids possessed a substantial superiority in man power. 
Besides the force of 50,000 soldiers and a sizable part of artillery, they 
could call for powerful armed support from the different provinces of the 
empire. The had at their disposal vast financial resources and could keep 
their soldierly liberally paid.^ ^ The trump card which they held in their 
hands, however, was the presence of the Emperor in the army they 
commanded. They could use him with powerful effect to cause defections 
among Nizam-ul Mulk's soldiers and wean nobles mansabdars away 
from him camp to their side. Here was the key by which the doors of 
success for the Saiyids could be opened".^^ 
Meanwhile leaving Abdullah Khan in September 1720 Husain Ali 
Khan Mohd. Amin Khan and the emperor set out for the Deccan and 
proceeded by way of Ajmer because Husain Ali Khan wanted to meet 
Raja Ajit Singh and discuss twith him the details of the campaign. 
The projected separation of the two brothers would afford the 
opportunity for which Amin Khan was looking.^° Once Husain Ali Khan 
was eliminated Abdullah Khan could easily be subdued and the Saiyid 
58 . Shiv Das, f. 45b. 
59 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 68. 
60 . Ibid., p. 68. 
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faction would be liquidated. Mohammad Amin Khan contrived to bring 
into the plot some more Mughal nobles of influence like Saadat Khan and 
Haider Quli Khan who were motivated by personal as well as group 
interests. The Mughal chief made an appeal to his followers, asking for a 
volunteer ready to risk his life. Should he succeed and survive the attempt 
the Queen mother would be in his debt forever should he die in the 
attempt, he could be assured that his family and dependents would be 
looked after well. At first no one spoke but then one Mir Haider Beg 
Dughlal Kashghari stood up and offered himself saying, 'I am a Saiyid 
and so is he. If brother kills brother what does it matter?* '^ This man was 
descended from an ancient family whose ancestors has been Khans of 
Kashgar. His ancestor, Mirza Haider, had been governor of Kashmir 
under Humayun and was the author of the Tarikh-i Rashidi, a history of 
the Chughatas and Timurids. 
On 8 October 1720 the imperial camp reached a place between 
Jiund and Biund about two kos to the east of Toda Bhim, 75 miles north 
west of Agra and 60 miles east of Jaipur. By this time the conspiracy had 
matured. On the fateful day of 8 October, when Husain Ali Khan was 
returning in his Palanquin from the imperial enclosure he was approached 
by Mir Haider Beg who presented to him a written petition of complaints 
61 . Irvine, ii, p.57. 
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against Mohammad Amin Khan. The moment Husain Ali Khan became 
engrossed in reading it Haider Beg drew a dagger, plunged it into his 
body and instantly cut off his head. He was himself immediately killed by 
Nurullah, the nephew of Husain Ali Khan but NuruUah was soon put to 
the sword by some Mughal soldiers who had by now come up to the spot. 
Husain Ali Khan's head was brought to the tent of Haider Quli Khan 
where Muhammad Amin Khan was also present. Husain Ali was fifty two 
years of age when he was killed. There being no reason to continue the 
journey it was decided to return to the capital to overthrow the wazir. The 
emperor appointed Mohd. Amin as his new wazir. The bodies of Syed 
Husain Ali, Ghairat Khan and Nurullah were laid out in biers and sent for 
burial at Ajmer. 
Abdullah Khan was then on his way to Delhi. When he heard the 
news he pushed on to the capital and raised a new puppet to the throne 
under the name of Ibrahim Khan and attempted to rally his supporters. 
The Barahas stood by him to the end, as also Churaman Jat. Many 
Afghans, too, joined perhaps out of mercenary motive, though M. Khan 
Bangash, the only prominent Afghan noble at the time, went over to the 
side of M. Amir Khan and the Emperor Muhammad Shah. Some old 
62 . For details, see Irvine ii, 56-60. 
63 . Tiie only prominent Baraha who went against the Saiyids was Saiyid Nusrat Khan Bararha who 
had a personal grudge against Abdullah Khan and was a particular friend of Khan-i Dauran 
(Siyar4367). 
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nobles of Farrukh Siyar living in retirement at Delhi, such as Ghaziud-din 
Beg, M. Murad Kashmiri etc. also agreed to join Abdullah Khan. Khafi 
Khan says that 'any butcher, cook or cotton carder who presented 
himself, mounted on some wretched pony was employed and given Rs. 
80 per month.'''' But the hastily collected army of Abdullah could not stant 
against the armies of M. Amin Khan. Mohammad Khan Bangash and the 
emperor Mohammad Shah. On 13 November 1720, Abdullah Khan was 
defeated at Hasanpur near Delhi and taken prisoner.^^ He died of poison 
administered to him by the order of Mohammad Shah under pressure 
from the Mughal nobles at the age of fifty seven on 11 October 1722. He 
was buried at the side of his favourite mistress, a singer by the name of 
Kesar Mahi in a walled garden outside old Delhi. 
Ghulam Husain Tabatabai narrates a interesting story regarding a 
partisan of the Wazir who visited a learned astrologer to consult him 
about the outcome of the final struggle between him and the Turani 
amirs. Without drawing up any horoscope and using only the letters of 
the words used by the visitor to frame his questions, the astrologer 
selected the following letters of the alphabet: Chain, Lam, Be, Ain, Qaf, 
Vow and Alif. which on being put together formed the Arabic words: 
Ghalab Aqua i.e. Thine enemy shall prevail'. On being inverted it 
64. KhafiKhan, 915-16, 897-8, 918. 
65 . For details of the battle of Hasanpur see Khafi Klian II, 921-34. 
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signifies, 'Thine end is come'. Read as chronograms, these words give 
the year of the fall of the Saiyids. Rarely has a prediction been more 
accurate.^^ 
66 . Tabatabai, i, p. 198. 
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CHAPTER - 6 
SOCIO-CULTURAL SCENE 
The Mughal Empire underwent the process of disintegration in 
the 18'^  century accompanied by the collapse of its whole military and 
administrative structure. However the Mughal culture attained its most 
fully developed forms and continued to exercise a tremendous influence 
on the contemporary society for a long time to come. 
The Mughal nobles, governors and local chieftains were 
primarily moved by the ambition of gaining political power, but they 
also combined the life of court and camp with a passion for intellectual 
pursuits for poetry, music, philosophy and science. At the same time 
there emerged religious and mystic movements which contributed to the 
moral transformation of society and growth of a cosmopolitan outlook 
among the people. Nadir shah was so deeply impressed by the elegant 
arts of India that he chose to take with him a number of artists, 
musicians, dancing girls, physicians and architects.' 
The Muslims of India who were assimilated into the vast 
cultural complex of the country, adopted native languages for common 
use in day-to-day life. Though Persian remained the literary and official 
1 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 343. 
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language till such time as it was dethroned by Urdu. They learnt Hindi 
dialects, like Braja Bhasha and Awadhi and their poets, saints and artists 
used them in expressing their ideas and feelings. "The devotional 
character of Hindi songs and the appeal which the language made to the 
Sufis brought Hindus and Muslims closer together than any other 
influence".^ The Msulims also took a prominent part in the development 
of regional languages and literatures such as Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati 
and Sindhi. The growth of Urdu which took place during the long span 
of time from the 13'*^  to the 18'^  centuries represents a process of 
linguistic and cultural synthesis, an admixture of Hindi grammar, 
Persian script and Arabic Persian vocabulary. The language grew into a 
rich and effective medium of expression for values and concepts 
common to both Hindus and Muslims. In the domain of art 
heterogeneous items took a more and more congruous shape, making its 
landscape pleasant and beautiful. Thus, "an endless process of 
absorption, assimilation and adjustment of diverse elements and 
tendencies has gone for centuries giving shape and complexion to the 
cultural tradition of India"."* 
2 . M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, 166, 167, 170, 171. 
3 . Beni Prashad, Hindu-Muslim Question, Allahabad, 1941, p. 11. 
4 . Presidential Address by K.A. Nizami, Proceedings of Indian History Congress, Allahabad, 
1965, 141. 
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In describing the cultural milieu of the period special attention 
may be given to the extravagant and ostentations lifestyle of the elite 
and the position they occupied in society. 
The Mughal nobles imitated their masters in their extravagant 
life of sensuality and pageantry. "When the Mogul government was in 
the plentitude of its power", observed William Hodges, "it was an object 
with the Omrahs or great Lords of the Court, to hold captive in their 
Zananahs (female apartments) even hundreds of females, collected from 
various quarters of empire, and particularly so from cashmire, a country 
famous for the beauty of its women".^ The nobles amassed wealth at the 
expense of the state, especially in times when there was a weak man at 
the helm of affairs. For instance, during the reign of Farrukh Siyar, the 
Saiyid brothers acquired property worth a crore (ten million) rupees.^ 
The literature of the period is replete with references to the 
indulgence by nobles in all manner of sensual pleasure. Even if we make 
due allowance for poetic exaggeration, Mir Taqi Mir's observations on 
the luxurious life of nobles cannot be dismissed lightly. 
Qutb ul Mulk Abdullah Khan is said to have been much 
addicted to the company of women. 'Saiyid Abdullah Khan', remarks 
5 . Travels in India, p. 22. Also see Grose, A voyage to the East Indies, I, pp. 135.7, 138 and 140-
1. 
6 . Maasir ul Umara, I, p. 837; Khafi Khan, II, p. 837; Kamwar, p. 280. 
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Khafi Khan, "had procured innumerable beautiful fairy faced women, 
and concubines.^ He adds: "Abdullah Khan was much attached to the 
women and was a debauche. He included two or three most beautiful 
women belonging to the royal haram in his own female apartments. He 
collected seventy to eighty choicest and most beautiful and fascinating 
women, and in their company he passed most of his time in ratifying his 
animal desires.^ Similarly, Zulfiqar Khan who was Wazir under 
Jahandar shah was plunged deep in dissipation. Earlier, Munim Khan 
Khan-i Khana, noble of the reign of Bahadur Shah I, amassed so much 
wealth that on his demise, goods and cash amounting to three crores of 
rupees were recovered from his house. 
The Majlis-i Yazdahum (the death anniversary of Shaikh Abdul 
Qadir Jilani) organized by Wazir ul Mamalik, Qamaruddin Khan, 
presented a vivid picture of the luxurious life of the nobles. Dargah Quli 
Khan observes as follows : He celebrates the eleventh day of every 
month, and the dancing girls, musicians and mimics are invited to 
entertain the participants by their performances.'^ Amir-ul Umara 
Husain Ali Khan possessed fabulous wealth. Three hundred carts loaded 
7. KhafiKJian, II, pp. 821-22. 
8. KhafiKhan, II, pp. 821-22. 
9 . He was Wazir under Bahadur Shah I. For biographical notice see Maasirul Umara HI, pp. 667-
676. 
10 . Later Mughals, I, pp. 124-25. 
11. Muragqa-i Dehli, pp. \24-25. 
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with gold coins and untold silver coins were recovered from his house 
following his assassination.'^ He used to spend a good deal of money on 
the upkeep of his household and on dancing-girls and music parties; so 
I T 
much so that even his huge income did not suffice. 
The luxurious style of living of the nobles became so serious a 
source of moral degeneration of the rank and file of Muslim society that 
Yahya Khan in sheer despair prayed to God, saying : 
"O God, inspire the Khalifa of the world and the umara (nobles) 
and hukkam (bureaucracy) of the Empire to devote themselves to the 
welfare of the common people and to make the country prosperous. Let 
them keep themselves busy in suppressing the refractory and 
disobedient elements, in supporting the weak and the old, in dispensing 
justice, in restoring the divine laws of Islam, in stamping out infidelity, 
and in reviving the honour of the prophet and his successors".''* 
Not that there were no nobles of a pious and virtuous kind. It is 
said of Nizam-ul Mulk Asafjah'^ for examples that he strictly adhered 
to the awamir-wa-nawahi of Islam (do's and don'ts) and passed some of 
his time in discussion with the ulama and the mashaikh. After his 
12 . Ahwalul Khawaqin, f. 177a. 
J 3 . Maasir-u] Umara, J, p. 320. For a detailed account of the Wealth which he secured from the 
fort of Agra after the fall of Nekusiyar, see Khafi Khan II, p. 387. 
14. TazkiratulMuluk, f 140a. 
15 . For his character, see, Khafi Khan II, pp. 747-50; Masirul Umara III, pp. 837-48. 
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morning prayers he attended to matters of state. In the afternoon, he 
offered his zuhr and asr prayer in company with Muslims, recited the 
Quran, read books on hadis. Thereafter he attended on mystic and pious 
men. 
He was much devoted to the Saiyids, who claimed to be 
members of the families of the Prophet and holy Imams}^ Similarly 
Saadat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk is credited with having been endowed 
with angelic virtues. He was a lover of justice. He was a brave soldier 
and a generous well-wisher of his soldiers. He was also devoted to 
religion. He observed the prescribed fasts, performed namaz and recited 
the Quran. 
The nobles of the period maintained bands of singers and 
dancers. It is reported that Husain Ali Khan spent as enormous amount 
of money on them. Khushhali Ram Jani, a famous dancing girl of 
Delhi, was attached to the court of Qamaruddin Khan.'^ 
The general character of the Mughal nobility of the period was 
complex one, being compressed of both virtues and vices. Religion and 
worldiness went side by side. 
16. Khafi Khan, II, p. 749. 
17 . For details see Maasir ul Umara, I, p. 320. 
18. Muraqqa-i Delhi, p. 77. 
124 
Raushan-ud Daula celebrated the urs of Khwaja Qutbuddin 
Bakhtiyar Kaki with great pomp and splendour. Both sides of the road 
from old Delhi to the shrine (situated at Mehrauli), were illuminated. It 
is said that two lakhs of rupees were spent on the lights and on the food 
for fatiha}"^ Husain Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan too celebrated the 
feasts of Yazdahum and duwazdahum. It is recorded that Husain Ali 
Khan^° used to send large sums of money every month to most of the 
cities for the Niyaz of the Saiyids and the saints. He gave orders to all 
provincial governors, saying that they should spend one hundred and 
eleven rupees on the eleventh day of every month, on the fatiha of Pir 
Dastagir and one hundred twelve rupees on the fatiha of the Holy 
Prophet on the twelfth day of every month. He himself spent a thousand 
and eleven and a thousand twelve rupees on the fatiha of Pir Dastagir 
(Ghaus Pak) and Holy Prophet. An equal amount was set apart for this 
purpose from the Imperial treasury too. The mashaikh, the divines, and 
the ulama were invited. For such recluses as were not in a position to 
come to the feast, they sent conveyances. Also with all humility and 
reverence, they personally served them in the assemblies. They stood 
with fans in their hands to whisk off the flies. 
19 . Muraqqa-i Delhi, pp. 37-39. 
20. Husain Ali Khan reposed great faith in Saiyid Ghuiam Husain Qadiri; a saint poet of 
Aurangabad. 
21 . Khafi Khan, II, pp. 635 and 964; Maasir ul Umara I, pp. 312-38. 
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In the same way, Nawab Alauddaulah Motamanul Mulk Jafar 
Khan Nusairi (Murshid Quh Khan) of Bengal celebrated the feast of 
Rabi-ul Awwal. Ghulam Husain Salim gives a detailed account of the 
festive aspects of the feast.^ ^ By an order, Abdullah Khan supported 
Khadim vakil's position with regard to get the Nazar offered by pilgrims 
in general, and by Jafar Khan Nusairi in particular at the shrine of 
Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti of Ajmer. There are many documents 
relating to the shrine of Khwaja Sahib indicating the devotion of the 
Saiyid Brothers. From one of the documents it comes to light that 
Abdullah Khan earmarked 100 bighas of land at Ajmer for rose 
cultivation for the sake of offering at the shrine regularly and on the 
occasion of urs. Their link with Ajmer shrine appears strong and 
hereditary. Syed Abdullah Mian, F/o Syed Husain Ali Khan laid out a 
garden, founded a quarter (Mohalla) known as Abdullahpura where 
water channel was brought from Ana Sagar lake. His wife tomb of 
beautiful carved marbles is still a monument of class. Hassan Ali 
Mausoleum and grave of others family members of Saiyids in it speaks 
volume of their devotional connection with Ajmer.^ '* 
The nobles at the hnperial court in Delhi and the provincial 
governors ordered celebrations whenever they recovered from an illness. 
22 . For details, see Riyazus Salatin, eng. Trans., p. 280. 
23 . For details see. Dr. S.L.H. Moini, Chisli shrine of Ajmer, Pirs Pilgrims Practice, Jaipur, 2004. 
24 . Har Bilas Sarda, Ajmer, Historical and Descriptive, pp. 173-175. 
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They had a rituahstic bath to mark the occasion. They received nazar 
from officers subordinate to them. They also distributed money in the 
form oiSadaqa and Khairat. The people of the time must have found it 
rather difficult to draw a line between extravagance and generosity. A 
perusal of the records would show that most of the nobles of the period 
were very generous towards the poor, the ulama, the Sufis, students, 
scholars, poets, artists and soldiers. Husain Ali Khan was famous for 
his philanthropy. None of his soldiers, it was said was without gold and 
silver. Leaders of the contingent would go from camp to camp to tell the 
soldiers that they should go to the court of the Nawab and get gold and 
silver according to their needs, and the soldiers would reply that they 
had enough and they had no place for storing their wealth. 
The nobles of this period often generously patronized men of 
letters and scholars. One Husain Ali Khan presented three lakhs of 
rupees and an elephant with a golden chain to Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil. 
Abdulah Khan held Mirza Bedil in his esteem. Twice or three times 
25 . On the authority of Mir Allah Bakhsh, a close companion of Husain Ali Khan, Rustam Ali 
describes the character of the Nawab as follows "he kept vigil day and night, and except for his 
siesta he very rarely slept. He offered his five prayers in congregation and in two or three pas 
(six or nine hours) read the whole of the Quran. He wore a simple dress and had no liking for 
gaudy garments. He strictly adhered to Shariat and never transgressed it. Tarikh-I Hindi, p. 
237a; Cf Maasir ul Umara, I, p. 338. 
26 . Once Abdullah Khan distributed six lakh of rupees among the poor, following the example of 
Farrukh siyar, who had ordered him to distribute the same amount on his behalf Tarikh-i 
Hindi, f 228a. The author of Risale-i Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i Dauran tells us; "Abdullah 
Khan gave away his extensive state to the deserving and opened his treasury for giving daily 
allowances to the necessitous... The people enjoyed affluence due to his generosity". Ibid., f. 
94a. 
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Mirza Bedil went to meet him and the former rose from his chair to 
welcome him. On every occasion, he warmly received him and shook 
hands with him. Similarly both the Saiyid brothers were much devoted 
to Ikhlas Khan Wamiq^^ whom they regarded their murshid. 
Similar was the attitude of Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah. There were 
several poets and scholars attached to his court. He had also bestowed 
grants for the dargah of Ajmer. Zulfiqar Khan was famous for his 
generosity towards poet. It is recorded that once Shaikh Nasir Ali 
Sarhindi a poet, composed a eulogy for him. Zulfiqar Khan rewarded 
him with thirty lakh of rupees together with an elephant. Even then he 
expressed his regret at not being able to reward him adequately for his 
28 
verses. 
Samsam-ud-Din Khan-i-Dauran rewarded a poet called 
Muhammad Rafi of Kashmir with a thousand rupees. Burhan-ul Mulk 
Saaat Khan extended patronage to many scholars and literate of his age, 
so did his son in-law and successor Nawab Wazir Safdar Jung. With a 
view to demonstrating their devotion to religion and the welfare of the 
people and exhibiting their power and wealth, the nobles often 
undertook works of public utility. They constructed, mosques. 
27. Originally a khattari, he was a native of Kalanaur. He was converted to Islam by Maulavi 
Abdullah, who was an eminent alim and the father of Hakim Sialkoti. He was given the name 
of Ikhlas Khan. 
28 . Masirul Umara, II, p. 104. 
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madrasas, havelis, palaces, sarais, and tombs of saints. It is recorded 
that Amir-ul Umara Husain Ali Khan laid the foundations of a reservoir 
at Aurangabad which was subsequently enlarged and completed by Iwaz 
Khan.^ ^ He also built a sarai, a bridge, and other works of public utility 
in his native Barha.^' The elegant marble tomb of their mother and 
mausoleum of Husian Ali Khan at Ajmer reminds people of their 
contribution in architecture. Qulb-ul Mulk Abdullah Khan constructed a 
canal in Patparganj, a suburban town in Delhi because there was acute 
scarcity of water in that area. This canal was connected with the main 
canal which supplied water to Delhi and was dug during the reign of 
Shah Jahan. Nawab Muhammad Khan Bangash laid the foundations of 
several townships at Farukhabad such as Shahpur, Muhammadabad, 
Khuda Ganj, Darya Ganj, Ali Ganj, Yaqub Ganj, Shamsher Ganj, and 
Kashi anj. He founded the town of Farrukhabad in honour of the 
Emperor Muhammad Farrukhsiyar. Imad ul Daula Qamaruddin Khan, 
the Wazir of Muhammad Shah, used personally to supervise the 
construction of his new buildings. 
Nizam-ul Mulk AsaQah rebuilt Gosha-i Mahal, the Chahar 
Mahal, and the Husaini Sagar at Haiderabad. He further rebuilt 
29 . For an account of the general interest of the nobles in erecting buildings and laying gardens, 
see Grose, A voyage to the East Indies, 1, pp. 137-8. 
30 , He constructed a mosque at Aurangabad, in Shah Ganj area, Maasir ul Umara, II, p. 834; and 
Khafi Khan, 11, p. 942. 
31 . Khafi Khan, II, pp. 941 and 942. 
32 . Maasir ul Umara, III, p. 140. 
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Nikamboli, which had been in ruin since the days of Aurangzeb. None 
of the earher governors of the Deccan had even thought of repairing it. 
Nizam-ul Mulk spent considerable sums of money on the repair of old 
buildings. According to Mohammad Qasim Aurangabadi people used to 
•J •? 
say that even during the reign of Abul Hasan , buildings like those 
raised by Nizam-ul Mulk had never been constructed. The city of 
Aurangabad was practically re-founded by him. He also constructed the 
ramparts round the city.^ "* Ghaziuddin Khan Firoz Jung, a son of 
Nizamul Mulk Asaf Jah, constructed a mausoleum, a mosque, and a 
madrasa in Delhi.^^ It is this madrasa that the Zakir Husain college in 
functioning today. Sharaf-ud Daula too built a mosque and a madrasa at 
Delhi.^^ Itmad-ud Daula Mohammad Amin had a madrasa constructed 
outside the Ajmeri Gate in Delhi.^^ At Shah-i Mardan the reputed holy 
foot print of Hazrat Ali is preserved. Nawab Bahadur Jawed Khan had 
•50 
majlis khana and a mosque constructed together with a fountain. Many 
of these nobles were spiritually linked and attached to sufi orders 
33 . Abul hasan was a king of golkunda when Aurangzeb attacked the state and annexed it to his 
Empire. Maasir-i Alamgiri, trans, p. 183. 
34 . Ahwal Khwaqin, ff. 223b-225b. He founded the city of Burhanpur in 1728-29 and Nizamabad 
as well. He also built a mosque, a bridge, and a sarai. He built the ramparts round the city of 
Haiderabad and the canal called Nahr-I Rasul. Maasirul Umara, III, p. 882; Siyarul 
Mutakhhirin, III, p. 871. 
35 . Asarus Sanadid, Syed Ahmad Khan, pp. 293-4 and 300-5. 
36. Ibid., p. 309. 
37 . Tarikh-i-Hindi, f 250a. 
3>& . Asarus Sanadid, pp. 320-1. 
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specially of Chishti sihilah and wished to be buried in the precinct of 
famous dargahs at Delhi and outside. 
In spite of the fact that the Muslim society had fallen into the 
whirlpool of wide spread poverty from top to the bottom there was 
reckless display of wealth and extravagance, waste on the pursuits of 
pleasure, music and dance and observance of ceremonials from those 
having amassed wealth by corrupt practices. The insolvency 
(bankruptcy) of the Central government coffers, and treasuries of the 
nobles, had brought about general state of unemployment for all types of 
professional classes who earned their livelihood by attaching themselves 
to the courts of the kings and the nobles, the loss of peace and 
tranquility, law and order, which had adversely affected trade and 
industry, and thereby thrown the craftsmen and artisans out of 
employment.^^ "The private luxury and vices of the Mussulman princes, 
observes William Hodges, too frequently reduce them to a state of real 
poverty, even with large revenues and too often they delegate to artfijl, 
designing and avaricious characters, the management and the concerns 
of the state, and become virtually the plunderers instead of the parents of 
their subjects. These men, eager after their own private gain, and 
39 . For the insolvency of the state coffers during the reign of Aurangzeb see Niskha-i Dilkusha, ff. 
84b and 141a. However, for the insolvency of the state Coffers at the time of Farrukh Siyar's 
accession (1712-13) see Famtk Siyar Noma, ff. 83-84a. For an account of the general state of 
corruption in the departments of the State, see Siyarul Mutaakhkhirin, II, pp. 826-34 and 840-
42. 
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knowing well that their conduct will not bear the blaze of day, connive 
at any villainy that may be acted by those of inferior degree, many of 
whom are, indeed, their actual agents.'^ " Thus it is that the people at large 
retain no real regard for their governors, and the natural consequence is, 
that the princes are frequently left, in the hour of distress, quite destitute 
of support, and an easy prey of any invader". 
Under these circumstances, the rank and file of Indian society in 
general and the Muslim community in particular, whose livelihood 
depended mainly on state service and service under the nobles, were the 
worst sufferers as a consequence of the extravagance of the emperors 
and the nobles. As such the servants of the state and those attached to 
the courts of the noble in one way or the other were hard hit. 
The trade and industry of the period by and large depended on 
the patronage of the kings and the nobles, for they were the greatest 
consumers of the fine goods which the middle class people could not 
afford to buy. Hence due to the poverty of the kings and nobles, both the 
arts and artisans were directly affected. For instance, the merchants who 
brought horses from Isfahan could not find buyers in Northern India and 
had to go to the Deccan to sell them. The traveling in those days was full 
40 . Ratan Chand, the diM-an of Saiyid Abdullah Khan, collected wealth by hook and crook for his 
master causing great distress to the people. Due to general complaint against the Diwan, 
Farrukh Siyar was compelled to ask Saiyid Abdullah Khan for his dismissal but his order was 
defied. Khafi Khan II, p. 773; Tarikh-i Farrukh Siyar, p. 24. 
41 . William Hodges, Travels in India, p. 103. 
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of danger and involved risk of life and property. In case they sold their 
horses to any noble, the bargaining was made in such a way as if the 
horses were stolen property. Even if the price was settled and letter of 
payment was issued, the amil did not pay the amount saying that he had 
no money to make the payment. On the return from the office of the 
amil, the merchants found both the horses and the money were lost.'*^ 
The peasants were not free from worries. The vagaries of nature 
and the fear of draught haunted their minds all the time and so much so 
there had always been a possibility of their being confiscated due to the 
non-payment of the land revenues, which caused great insecurity to 
them. 
There were many a poet in this period earning their livelihood 
by composing poems and by joining the courts of the kings and nobles. 
On that account they were generally regarded as well off, but infact, as 
Sauda himself records, they too were hard hit owing to the economic 
crisis with which the ruling class suffered. Therefore, the poets like 
other professional classes, had fallen on the thorns of life. The teachers 
had lost their former respect. The Maktabs were deserted as there were 
few students to be taught. The Masnavi recitors were paid barely two 
rupees. The preachers imparted lessons to the students in the day and 
42 . Kulliyat-i-Sauda, I, p. 365. 
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maintained the accounts of someone in the night, as if he was a teacher 
of mathematics. Besides he had to suffer great insuhs and hardships 
from the misbehaviour of the students, who put thorns under the carpet 
on which the teacher sat."*^  
The calligraphers, who at the heyday of the Mughal rule, were 
highly paid for their art of calligraphy, had now fallen into the bad days 
and were compelled by the circumstances to write hundrerd verses 
calligraphy in one paisa. There was none to appreciate such an art/"* 
The profession of the false Shaikhship (saintship) was regarded 
very lucrative and they passed their lives in affluency, as they received 
gifts and presents from their disciples and devoted common people. 
Since the period under study saw the rise of pseudo-saints, therefore this 
profession, too lost its glamour. The literature of the period is replete 
with condemnation of those false saints. The poet ridiculed them and 
compared a saint's turban to a donkey's tail; others compared it to a 
cupola. The shaikhs had thus fallen on evil days and were at a loss to 
earn enough even to keep body and soul together.'*^ Yet real sufi saints 
enjoyed respect of emperors nobles, ruling elites and even of common 
masses. Shah Fakhruddin Delhavi who ushered in a renaissance of 
43 . Ibid., I, p. 366. 
44 . Ibid., I, p. 366. 
45 . Ibid., I, p. 366. 
134 
chistiya order was always held in high esteem by the people and had 
thousands of murid irrespective of caste, colour and creed. He had even 
allowed his non muslim disciple to recile wazaif {latinies). Mirza 
Mazhar Jan-i-Jaban, Khwaja Mir Dard etc. were the other famous sufi 
saints of the time who earned respect from the people. 
Nizam ul Mulk Asaf Jah and his family was closely attached to 
Shah Fakhruddin Dehlavi, while Abdus Samad Khan, Raushan ud Daula 
were the followers of Shah Bhik and Shah Miran. 
Muslim jurists, theologians and scholars were also watching the 
political developments with keen interest and wanted to reform the 
society. Shah Waliullah was one of them who was of the opinion that 
the Muslim nobility should change their standard of moral and ethical 
values so that the common man may or should also imitate them. 
Thus all the professional classes were literally thrown on the 
streets. Not only Mir Taqi Mir but almost all the poets of the period 
have bemoaned neglect of the arts and the artists."*^ 
Hard pressed by penury, many famous poets, scholars and men 
of art of Delhi migrated to the provincial towns in the hope of making 
sure of two square meals a day. Khan Arzu, Sauda, Mir, Insha, Jurat, 
Mushafi, Jafar Ali Hasrat and others left Delhi for Lucknow. In his 
46. Kulliyat-iMir, p. 167. 
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autobiography Zikr-i Mir, and other verses Mir depicts his own 
appalHng and wretched condition. 
In the same way the author of Risala-I Muhammad Shah-wa 
Khan-i Dauran, gives a heart rending account of the thirty six 
professional classes which were more or less in the same plight as the 
poets of the period."*^ Unemployment was widespread at all levels of 
Muslim society. It was the most vital problem which the Muslims of 18 
century had to face without any hope of immediate remedial steps from 
the government, which was bankrupt. 
Enumerating the main causes of the wretched condition of the 
masses. Shah Waliullah says that the foremost cause was heavy taxation. 
Without such taxation the nobles could not have enough money for their 
extravagances. This taxation broke the backbone of the peasantry, as 
well as of the artisans and the merchants. Land revenue and octroi duties 
were the main sources of income for the kings and their nobles. Their 
ever-mounting expenses and spendthrift ways of life led to exorbitant 
exactions.'*^ 
Apart from the general insecurity and virtual paralysis of the 
administrative machinery, blatant injustice, and victimization, the 
47 . Risala-i Muhammad shah wa Khan-i Dauran, ff. 159a-83a. 
48 . Hujjatiullah-ul Baligha, Urdu Trans 1, p. 163. 
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society of the day was pleagued by unprecedented corruption all levels 
of the bureaucracy. Indeed it affected the economic condition of the 
masses. Even in the capital city of Delhi, there was much insecurity of 
life and property; so much so that people could not sleep peacefully 
during the nights. 
Thus one could see the wretched economic condition of the 
people everywhere in the country in general and in the city of Delhi in 
particular, having been subject to attacks and massacres at the hands of 
Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and 
the Rohillas. 
No wonder, when Twining visited the city of Delhi in 1794, he 
too found it in the grip of destruction and poverty. Wherever he went, he 
happened to pass through the ruins of old monuments and mausoleums: 
"The decline of the empire was visible in the tombs as well as in 
the palaces of the Emperors".^° 
The life of the common people in the 18* century was by and 
large replica of the kings and the nobility. As we have already seen both 
the kings and the peerage of the period wallowed in the mud of 
debauchery and dissipation. Naturally their influence filtered down and 
49 . For details, see KuUiyat-l Sauda, I, pp. 378-71; For an account of the widespread practice of 
bribery. See, Siyaru! IVIutaaichhirin, 11, p. 488. 
50 . Twining, Travels in India, pp. 242-55. 
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in the rank and file of Muslim society, even places for off from the 
capital. The streets of Delhi reflected the life of the court and the nobles. 
After giving a detached account of the profligate life of the emperor 
Jahandar Shah, Khafi Khan throws light on the people of the period he 
remarks: 
The unstable and transitory reign of Jahander Shah strengthened 
the foundations of cruelty and prevarication. The vocal and instrumental 
music and the dance of qawwals, the kalawants and the dharis become 
so popular that it became almost impossible that the qazi should turn out 
to be a distiller of spirit or that the mufti should emerge as drunkard.^' 
The cities and towns of North India in general and Delhi, 
Faizabad, Lucknow, Najbabd, Murshidabad and Azimabad in particular 
were dens of vice on the one hand and of piety and religiousness on the 
other hand. In every city there were large number of khanqahs 
(hospices), madrasas and mosques, as also brothels and gambling dens. 
The pimps were active in every nook and corner. There was a great 
contradiction in the attitudes of the people in general. They flocked to 
the khanqahs and the shrines with devotion and visited the brothels too 
51 . Khafi Khan II, p. 689. Nuruddin corroborates the above statement of Khafi Khan. According 
to him the qazis and officers of lower rank spread the carpet of sensual pleasure deeply 
engrossed in listening to music and in witnessing dances. The poplarity of dance and music 
was so great that one heard nothing but the songs of dancing girls and noisy brawls of 
drinkards in every quarter of the city. From the king to the soldiers, from the faqir to the wazir, 
everyone was emboldened enough to indulge. Drinking was popular in every section of 
Muslim society. For the general life of the Muslims of Delhi see, Muraqqa-i Delhi. 
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with enthusiasm. Thus sin and action of religion went side by side, more 
or less in a balanced way. When the situation became very alarming, 
Shah Waliullah in sheer disgust wrote to Ahmad Shah Abdali, saying 
that if the process of sin and inquity could not be checked immediately 
and if its course was not chanelled in other constructive directions, the 
Muslims would soon be unstable to differentiate between Islam and 
kufr. 
Mirza Muhammad Bakhsh Ashab tells us that during the reign 
of Muhammad Shah, the emperor and the Wazir. The young and the old, 
the highest and lowest all became devotees of sensual pleasure. They 
shunned the hard military life and gave themselves over the case and 
comfort after the battle of Hasanpur in 1721. The people too devoted 
themselves to marry making.^ ^ 
Thus, on the whole the period under review presented horrible 
picture of moral degeneration. The manifestations of obscenity crossed 
all reasonable bounds. 
A careful study of Muruqqa-i Delhi and other contemporary 
literature would show that the common people of Delhi hankered for a 
life of sensual pleasure. Opportunities for the pursuit of such pleasures 
52 . Shah Waliullah Key Siyasi Maktubat, p. 52. 
53 . Munshi KhushLal Chand tells us that the people forgot their duty of obedience's of God. They 
switched their allegiance to sensual pleasure. Tarikh-i Muhammad Shahi, f.6a. 
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were afforded by the fairs held annually at Hindu temples or at the 
shrines of Muslim saints. 
Muraqqa-i Delhi also refers to several examples of the 
immorality which had crept into Muslim society. It was as if the 
Msulims of those days had lost their self respect together Dargah Qui 
Khan gives us an eye witness account of the profligate atmosphere that 
obtained on the occasion of the urs at the shrine of Khuld Manzil. 
Kasal Singh, a noble of Muhammad Shah, had founded a whore-
house in Delhi known after his name as Kasalpura. The fascinating 
description of the place as given by Dargah Quli Khan shows how far 
the whole atmosphere had been vitiated by the luxurious life of the kings 
and the nobles.^^ 
Moreover, as a result of prevailing atmosphere of sensual 
pleasure, the people had developed a taste and liking for obscenily and 
obscenate literature. 
Thus, the permeation of such immoral practices and vices had 
eaten into the vitals of the physical and moral strength of the Muslim 
community in general and ruling classes in particular. The nobles who 
54 . Mir Hasan Dehlavi gives a fascinating account of pilgrims on their way to attend the fair and 
urs held at the shrine of Shah Madarat Makanpur. Masnaviyat-i Mir Hasan, pp. 137-8. 
55 . Muraqqa-i Delhi, pp. 17-8. 
56 . Muraqqa-i Delhi, p. 76. 
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were the custodians and strength of the Mughal state, were engrossed in 
sensual pleasure and wasted their physical energies and financial 
resources in such activities, instead of exerting ceaselessly for the 
restoration of the past glory of the declining Mughal Empire and 
countering effectively the rising regional political forces. 
Chapter 7 
ConcCuswfi 
CHAPTER-7 
CONCLUSION 
The Saiyids claimed descent from a family of Mesopotamia. One 
of their ancestors came to India and settled in India in Sarhind long 
before the Mughals appeared in India. They became thoroughly 
indianised, marrying here, founding settlements, and gaining importance 
from the time of Akbar onwards. There is some difference about their 
name, 'Barha' Saiyids. One view is that the family settled as Barha 
between Meerut and Saharanpur in the upper Ganga-Yamuna Doab. The 
other view is that they were the masters of a group of 12 villages in that 
area. Some say as there are Bara Imams, therefore they are described as 
sadat-e-Barah. Though brave fighters and excellent commanders, they 
became notorious for their ambition and unreliability. Aurangzeb had a 
very poor opinion about them. But it was during his reign that Abdullah 
Khan held administrative and military post fighting against the Marathas 
and becoming powerful. Abdullah Khan joined Jahandar Shah, then 
Gvoemor of Multan, while Husain ali was appointed faujdar of 
Ranthambor. At the battle of Jajau (1707), the Saiyids fought well on the 
side of Bahadurshah but they were not satisfied with the rewards given. 
Husain Ali became (1708) deputy of Azim-ush shan governor of Bihar 
and three years after Abdullah Khan was appointed deputy of Azim-us-
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Shan, governor of Allahabad (1711). So both of them were indebted to 
Azim-ush-Shan. But they did not support him when Bahadur Shah died. 
However, when Farrukh Siyar, the second son of Azim-ush Shan and his 
father's deputy in Bengal, who had been recalled to Court, got the news 
of Bahadur Shah's death, he proclaimed his father as king. But this was 
not liked by Husain Ali. When Azim-ush Shan was defeated and killed, 
Husain Ali wanted to drawback. But Farruk Siyar's mother appealed to 
him in espousing the cause of the family. Ultimately Husain agreed to 
join Farrukh Siyar, partly because of his dislike of Jahandar Shah and 
jealously of the position of Zulfiqar Khan and partly in expectation of 
future gain. But this did not mean that the relation between Farrukh Siyar 
and Husain Ali was quite cordial. As a matter of fact there was mutual ill-
will and suspicion between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid Brothers right 
from the day one, as has been mentioned in the previous chapters. Husain 
Ali was afraid of the cunning and deceitful nature of Farrukh Siyar. 
Pressed for money, Farrukh Siyar wanted to levy contributions on all rich 
merchants including Europeans and to plunder the town of Patna. Farrukh 
Siyar offered Husain Ali VA share if he did not oppose the agreement. But 
Husain Ali disagreed. Differences of opinion arose on the other points 
also. Outwardly these were sorted out. But it is difficult to say how far 
these differences were personal or on matters of policy. At the suggestion 
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of Husain Ali Famkh Siyar then in Bihar abolished the Jizyah in 1713. 
Abdullah Khan (at Allahabad) tried to resolve the ill-will between Husain 
Ali and Farrukh Siyar. Between the two brothers, Abdullah Khan, the 
elder was tactful and a better manager of events than Husain Ali, the 
younger. This can be borne out by the fact that, inspite of the break off 
with Farrukh Siyar, Abdullah Khan was in favour of keeping Farrukh 
Siyar on the throne and maintaining the khutbah and saikkah in his name. 
However, events moved very fast and Abdullah Khan was forced to do 
what he never wanted i.e. to finish Farrukh Siyar. 
Abdullah Khan afterwards regretted the deposition of Farrukh 
Siyar and blamed his brother for his haste. In destroying Farrukh Siyar, 
the Saiyids had thus destroyed their most effective shield against the old 
nobles. Irvine had opined that the deposition of Farrukh Siyar was, 
perhaps, unavoidable but the way of doing what had become almost a 
necessity was unduly harsh and taking of the captive's life was an 
extremity entirely uncalled for.' 
The deposition for which Husain Ali seems to bear the primary 
responsibility created apprehensions in the minds of many nobles about 
the ultimate intentions of the Saiyids, and alienated their own supporters 
who were not prepared for such extreme measures. Even men who owed 
1 . Irvine, I, 395. 
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their fortunes to the Saiyids used to pray secretly for their downfall, 
culminating into desertion of commandants of some important forts to the 
side of Nizam-ul Mulk, when he reached Deccan. To the dismay of the 
Saiyids these commandants had owed their positions to the Saiyids. All 
contemporary writers, including those favourable to the Saiyids are 
agreed in condemning the deposition as an act of infancy and disgrace. 
Considering the weakness of their actual position, it was a political 
blunder, for it enabled their rivals, the 'chin' group to appear as the 
champions of the Timurid monarchy and to utilize the public revulsion 
against the Saiyids for their own ends. 
The revolt of the Nizam proved to be the immediate and direct 
cause of the downfall of the Saiyids. But there were some deep-seated 
causes of their failure. An important factor in their downfall was the 
opposition of the old nobles who regarded the Saiyids as upstarts and 
disliked their pro-Hindu policy. The leading part was taken by the small 
powerful Turani Group consisting of capable and ambitious leaders like 
Nizam and Mohammad Amin Khan, who did not want to be 
overshadowed. They interpreted the Saiyid policy of reconciling the 
Hindus and satisfying the Hindu sentiment by abolishing jaziya, as anti-
Islam and anti-monarchial. At the same time they appealed to the narrow 
interests of the small section of the foreign nobles i.e., Mughalia, who 
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were excluded from power. Hence they posed as champions of Islam of 
monarchy and the interests of the Mughal nobles. However, on behalf of 
the Saiyids it may be said that this interpretation of their policy was 
incorrect. The Saiyids did not want to monopolise power. They associated 
various sections in the court, Hindus as well as groups of old nobles with 
the government. But the anti-Saiyid struggle was characterized as a 
struggle between Mughals and Hindsutanis. 
In the meantime, the administration was paralysed by the party 
conflict. Law and order brokedown with the risings of zamidnars and 
discontented elements. Rules of business were not followed. Their 
dependence on their subordinates like Ratanchand showed their 
administrative incompetence, made them unpopular and increased the 
tendency to harmful revenue farming, bribery and oppression by the 
subordinate. Naturally, the Saiyids were blamed for this 
maladministration. Their efforts to maintain law and order failed because 
they could not command the confidence of the people. On the other hand, 
it is not denied even by those writers who are strongly opposed to the 
Saiyids that they strove hard to maintain law and order, and that their 
military reputation and capabilities prevented a final breakdown of the 
administration. Rustam Ali says 'As is well known, this Emperor 
(Muhammad Shah) so long as Amirul Umara Husain Ali Khan lived, 
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strictly observed, by virtue of the efficient management of that great 
Saiyid, all the ancient laws and established rules of his ancestors. The 
achievement of all undertakings, the arrangement of all political affairs, 
and the execution of all wars were carried on in an excellent manner by 
the wisdom of that high nobleman'. Iqbalnama mentions that 
unemployment was rare in the time of the Saiyids and any soldier or 
person who reached their audience, generally secured a job worth Rs. 50 
per month at the lowest. 
As far as Farrukh Siyar was concerned, the Saiyid brothers were 
more sinned against than sinning. The constant intrigues of the Emperor 
turned them to the point of desperation and their safety seemed to lie in 
the end of the emperor. It is interesting to note that Farrukh Siyar had 
been the first to make secret overtures for aid to these powerful chief 
whom the Saiyids later succeeded in turning against him. When the 
emperor dispatched Husain Ali Khan against Ajit Singh, he had also sent 
a dispatch to Ajit Singh to fight against and kill Husain Ali Khan. Again 
he had tried unsuccessfully to induce the Marathas to help Daud BChan 
Panni in his campaign against Husain Ali who was governor of the 
Deccan. In the case of Ajit Singh, the emperor vanity tried to the last to 
win him over. Unfortunately for him, the image which Farrukh Siyar 
2 . Tarikh-i Hindi, Elliot & Dowson, viii, 42, 43. 
3 . Iqbalnamah, p. 128. 
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projected on the popular mind was that of a fickle and ungrateful person 
who could be trusted only at one's own peril. It is, hwoever, to be added 
that in view of Farrukh Siyar's disposition, the course adopted by Husain 
Ali was dictated by the motives of self-defence. His reaction to the 
situation, beset with danger to his own security and position of his group 
can hardly be ascribed to any liberal purpose or enlightened policy, "they 
(the Saiyids) tried their best to put down the Marathas; and Husain Ali, 
during his first two years in the Deccan, made strenuous efforts to prevent 
Maratha inroads in Baglan and Khandesh. But when ultimately they 
found that they stood in great danger to their life and position from their 
master, they were compelled to reverse their policy and seek Maratha 
friendship".'* The financial difficulties of the emperor fiirther accentuated 
his weakness. He could not bear the expenditure of his Wala-shahi troops 
while the wazir, Qutub-ul Mulk Abdullah Khan maintained a strong army 
of 20,000 horse, well equipped and regularly paid, that formed the core of 
Saiyids power. Thus, in the end the Saiyids were able to seize control of 
the fort and the palace without encountering armed resistance. 
The Saiyid brothers, although they had done nothing to destroy or 
supplant the institution of the monarchy and had been at pains to preserve 
the integrity and power of the empire, had nevertheless pushed the 
4 . G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, II, 37. 
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monarch into oblivion. Under their political hegemony, Farrukh Siyar's 
successors would continue to wear the crown, but would be stripped 
completely of the sovereign powers. The Saiyids succeeded in their 
objectivity of reducing the sovereign himself to a nullity but were unable 
to destroy the ties of loyalty that bound all sections of the people to the 
house of Timur. The nobles and the people had been used to the exercise 
of authority by the sovereign and no deep-rooted tradition of allegiance 
bound them to a government in which all authority proceeded from a 
family group. It was the monarch alone who could evoke the affection 
and loyalty of the people. He alone could maintain the balance of power 
among various sections of the upper classes by the judicious distribution 
of royal patronage. 
The significance of the struggle which ended with the overthrow 
of the Saiyids brothers has been reduced by some contemporary 
historians to a mere clash between two vigorous, daring and ambitious 
personalities, namely Nizam-ul Mulk and Husain ali Khan. Interpreted in 
this way the conflict would appear to possess no deeper significance that 
what could be attached to an accidental and passing occurrence. But in 
reality the struggle was momentous in its consequences and the forces 
which produced it were complex and lay deep in the political tensions 
created by the interplay of power politics. 
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Nizam-ul Mulk and Husain Ali Khan represented two opposing 
factions, strong furiously against one another for the control of the state. 
The issue was nothing less than the absolute control of the throne by their 
own faction. The basis of division between the Mughals and Saiyid 
factions although it had no religious understones, was ethnic in the sense 
that the support of the former came chiefly from families who were either 
of more recent foreign origin or which had preserved their ethnic identity, 
while the latter was made up almost entirely of family groups of Indian 
origin or those long settled in the country. Such for example, is the 
position taken up by Khafi Khan and Muhammad Baksh Ashub who 
assert that the final showdown between the factions was precipitated by 
the Saiyid brother's policy that none except the Saiyids of Barha should 
hold supreme power at the centre. Their hatred for the Turani Mughals 
was such that they deliberately planned to destroy the prestige and ruin 
the fortunes of all the Turani and Irani families. Both Khafi Khan and 
Qasim Aurangabadi held the view that at this stage of the proceedings, 
the main motivations behind the struggle of the Mughals against the 
Saiyid brothers were the preservation of the dignity and prestige of the 
Mughal nobles and restoration of the freedom of action of the sovereign. 
Through the story told by Khafi Khan and Qasim Aurangabadi there runs 
the assumption that sectional interests combined with a desire to free 
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Muhammad Shah from the domination of the Saiyids, drew the Irani and 
Turani nobles closer Muhammad Amin Khan's appeal for Mughal 
solidarity was responded by Saadat Khan and Haider Quli Khan although 
both were Iranis. These Irani nobles never flinched from the deliberate 
stand they had taken and the energy and devotion they displayed at the 
battle of Hasanpur amply proved that their support for Muhammad Amin 
Khan and the cause he championed was whole-hearted and sincere. It 
must be remembered that considerations underlying group formation and 
rivalry applied only to the core of the group and its leadership. In actual 
action like the coupd' etat of 1719 by the Saiyids or the palace revolution 
of 1720 carried out by the Mughals, the forces that came into play on 
either side were not homogenous. In each case the elements which 
supported the rival groups were very diverse like the Afghans, Rajputs, 
Marathas and Indian Muslims, each of whom represented a separate 
ethnic tradition and followed its own leader, but were found operating on 
either side. From family groups the Saiyids and Mughals had transformed 
themselves into two rival heterogenous coalition loosely strong together, 
whose leaders strove for the attainment of their aims through court 
intrigue, political manoeuvring and if it came to that through was of 
succession. The coalition formed by the Saiyids included a larger 
proportion of the Afghans, Rajputs and the Marathas, while the Mughals, 
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Shaikhs and Deccani Saiyids predominated in the rival coalition of 
Nizam-ul Mulk; the proportion of the Afghans and the Marathas was very 
much smaller in his army. No Rajput zamindar or mansabdar of not 
seems to have joined the Mughal leader though it is likely that he enlisted 
some Rajput soldiers during his stay in Malwa. Similarly, in the battle of 
Hasanpur the Afghans Rajputs and other Indians fought by the side of the 
Mughals for Muhammad Shah. However, except for Nusrat Yar Khan, 
who was hostile to Abdullah Khan, no other Saiyid of Barha fought on 
the side of Muhammad Shah or served in the army of Nizam-ul Mulk, nor 
were the Mughals employed by the Saiyid brothers in any of their battles. 
Muhammad Shah's victory over Abdullah Khan had freed him 
from the tutelage of the Saiyid brothers who had completely dominated 
the administration, the crown and the court. The centre of gravity now 
shifted from a group formed by the two top ranking ministers to the 
monarch himself who became once again the pivot of all administrative, 
military and fiscal authority. He could once again exercise the right to 
frame policy and choose his own servants and officials. The restoration of 
monarchial authority brought stability in political life and relief to the 
masses from the confusion and tension of civil strife. It engendered the 
hope that the state machinery which had suffered most by the civil 
commotion, would now begin to function smoothly. It was believed that 
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prices would come down, revenues would flow into the royal treasury and 
arrears paid to the servants, and all thus would usher in an era of peace 
and plenty yet this kind of atmosphere bred complacency rather than a 
sense of serious urgency needed to meet the enormous problems of the 
day. 
It would not be out of place at this juncture to have a brief look at 
the policies being pursued by Mohammad Amin Khan and Nizam-ul 
Mulk during their respective terms of Wizarat. The Mughal group had a 
sentimental attachment to the monarch as a person whom the Saiyids had 
reduced to a mere figurehead. The Mughals favoured the dominance of 
the Khanazad and hereditary nobles. Whereas the Saiyids supported the 
cause of new elements in the nobility. The Saiyid party had made 
concessions, in its own interest to the Marathas, Jats and Raja Ajit Singh 
against whom the Mughal leaders advocated a forward and vigorous 
policy. The Mughal wazirs, stood for strong and clean administration 
which they tried to achieve by setting an example of firmness and 
uprightness. Muhammad Amin Kiian infused a spirit of duty and 
discipline among the officials. Nizamul Mulk made proposals for the 
eradication of such patent abuses as bribery, reckless alienation of khalisa 
lands and ijarah. It was when real power lay with the Mughals that 
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Muhammad Shah abolished the jaziya which was a measure in keeping 
with the temper of an age marked by moderation and enlightenment. 
To cut the story short, it must be admitted that the Saiyids 
brothers were the victims of the circumstances and spirit of the age. To a 
large extent they failed because of the party conflicts in that corrupt and 
confused atmosphere of the Court. Concentrating power in themselves 
they tried to save the empire from disintegration. But here also they failed 
because no lasting solution could be made of the various problems, viz. 
the old nobility. Problem of the Hindus, problem of the Deccan. In every 
sphere new problems were created and much of this was due to the bitter 
party strife prevailing in the court. They tried to develop a composite 
ruling aristocracy of religion or race. But the old 'Alamgiri nobles' did 
not want to share power while the Maratha sardars were interested in their 
own domination in the Deccan. Husain All's deputy in the Deccan, Alam 
Ali rejected Baji Rao's plan of carrying on a harassing warfare against the 
Nizam. The Rajputs were more interested than the Marathas in 
maintaining the Mughal empire but neither Ajit Singh nor Jai Singh 
offered military help needed by the Saiyids. The latter could not secure 
the support of the nobles and they could not win the backing of the 
monarchy because of a traditional suspicion between the monarch and all 
powerful Wazir. 
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Last but not the least, in that age of monarchical decadence and 
decline of peerage the only strong agency which could maintain the unity 
of the empire was the wazir. The wazir also failed to give the necessary 
direction in the state. In certain respects the Saiyid tried to follow a 
secular and national approach as pointed out by Satish Chandra, but this 
was not supported by other powerful sections of the nobles or by the 
emperor. 
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Appendix - D 
MANSAB GRANTED TO BARHA SAYYIDS DURING AKBAR'S REIGN 
S.No. 
1 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
9. 
Name 
Sayyid Mahmud Khan Barha 
Sayyid Raju Barha 
Sayyid Qasim Barha s/o 
Mahmud 
Sayyid Bayazid Barha 
Sayyid Lad Barha 
Sayyid Chajju Barha 
Sayyid Ahmad Barha, s/o 
Mahmud 
Sayyid Hasim Barha 
Rank 
200/x 
1000/x 
1500/x 
300/x 
200/x 
500/x 
2000/x 
1000/x 
Sovirce' 
Ain-1224, 2 kh, 34a 
TabaqatTi Akbari, vol. II, 
453. 
Ain-i akbari, vol. 1,225. 
Ain-i Akbari, vol. 1229. 
Ain-i Akbari, vol. 1,237 
Ain-i Akbari, vol. 1,227 
Ain-i Akbari, vol. 224 
Ain-i Akbari, vol. 226. 
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Appendix - E 
MANSAB GRANTED TO BARHA SAYYIDS DURING JAHANGIR'S REIGN 
S.No. 
1 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Above 1( 
1. 
2. 
J . 
4. 
5. 
Above 2C 
1. 
2. 
Name 
Sayyid Izzat Khan Barha 
Sayyid Abdullah Barha 
All Muhammad s/o Saif Khan Barha 
Bahadur Khan s/o Saif Khan Barha 
Sayyid Qasim Barha 
)00 to 2000 
Sayid Abdul Wahab (Diler) 
Sayyid Bahadur 
Sayyid Hazbar Khan Barha 
Sayyid Ali Barha 
Sayyid Saif Khan Barha 
100 to 3000 
Saif Khan Barha 
Sayyid Jamaluddin-500 Ain 
Rank 
1000/800 
700/3000 
300/400 
400/300 
1000/6000 
2000/1200 
2000/1000 
1500/700. 
1500/1000 
— 
3000/1500 
Source 
Tuzuk,246 
Tuzuk, 159 
Tuzuk,159 
Tuzuk, 159 
Tuzuk, 163 
Tuzuk, 336 
Tuzuk 
Tuzuk, 322 
Tuzuk, 138 
Tuzuk, 138 
Tuzuk, 35 
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Appendix - E 
MANSAB GRANTED TO BARHA SAYYIDS DURING SHAHJAHAN'S 
REIGN 
S.No. 
Upto IOC 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 . • 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10.. 
,11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Name Rank 
0 
Sayyid Abdullah 
Sayyid Sulaiman s/o Qasim 
Barha 
Sayyid Khadim Barha 
Sayyid Mansur 
Sayyid Sherzaman 
Sayyid Munawwar 
Sayyid Shaikhan Barha s/o 
Diler Khan 
Sayyid Muhammad s/o Afzal 
Barha 
Sayyid Nurul Ayn, s/o Saif 
Khan 
Sayyid Salar Barha 
S. Ali n/o Khan-I Jahan Barha 
Sayyid Najabat Khan s/o 
Shuja'atKhan 
Sayyid Shams-uddin s/o Jalal 
Barha 
Sayyid alawal s/o Kabir Barha 
Sayyid Shah Ali Barha 
Sayyid Makhan 
Sayyid Zabardast Khan s/o 
Hazbar Khan 
600/400 
600/300 
1000/500 
1000/500 
1000/250 
1000/400 
1000/900 
1000/600 
1000/300 
1000/1000 
800/400 
100/500 
700/200 
1000/700 
900/500 
800/400 
800/400 
Source 
Lahauri, 1, p. 71-379 
Lahauri, 1, pt. I, 320 
Lahauri, II, 232 
Waris, 247(a) . 
Lahauri, II, 474 
Waris 265(a) 
Waris 156(b) . 
Lahauri, 734 
Ama-I Saleh, III, 469 
Waris, 56(b) 
Waris, 266(a) 
Waris, 370 
Waris, 268(a) 
Amal-I Suleh, III, 466 
Amal-I Suleh, III, 470 
Amal-I Suleh, III, 470 
Amal-I Suleh, III, 473 
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18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Sayyid Sher Muhammad Barha 
Sayyid KaramuUah s/o Khan-I 
Jahan 
Sayyid Alam b/o Salar Barha 
Sayyid Qutub, s/o Sayyid 
Maqbool Barha 
500/150 
500/100 
500/100 
500/100 
Above 1000 to 2000 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. . 
5. 
Sayyid Alam Barha 
Sayyid Muzaffar s/o Shuja'at 
Khan Barha 
Sayyid Feroz, n/o Khan-I 
Jahan Barha 
Sayyid Hasan s/o Diler Khan 
Sayyid Salabat Klian 
2000/1000 
2000/1000 
1500/1000 
1500/1500 
2000/1500 
Above 2000 to 3000 
1. . Sayyid Hizbar Khan Barha 3000/1000 
Above 3000 to 4000 
1. 
2. 
Sayyid diler Khan Barha 
Sayyid Shuja'at Khan Barha 
4000/3000 
4000/4000 
Above 4000 
1. Sayyid Muzaffar Khan 6000/6000 
Amal-i suleh, III, 485 
Amal-i suleh, III, 486 
Amal-i suleh, III, 486 
Amal-i suleh. Ill, 487 
Lahauri,II, 199 
Amal-i Suleh, III, 244 
Lahauri, II, 474 
Waris, 262(b) 
Waris, 204(a) 
Lahauri, I, Ptl , 183 
Lahauri, II, 484 
Lahauri, II, 162 
Lahauri, II, 235 
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Appendix - F 
OFFICES HELD BY BARHA SAYYIDS DURING THE REIGN OF SHAH 
JAHAN 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Sayyid Muzaffar Khan 
Barha 
Sayyid Muzaffar Khan 
Barha 
Sayyid Mansur s/o 
Muzaffar Barha 
Sayyid Diler Khan 
Sayyid Shuja'at Khan 
Barha 
Sayyid Khadim Barha 
Sayyid Alam Barha 
Sayyid Sherzaman, s/o 
Muzaffar Khan Barha 
Sayyid Munawwar, s/o 
Muzaffar Khan Barha 
Sayyid Salar Barha 
Sayyid Alam Barha 
Sayyid Sultan (Salabat 
Khan) s/o Bayazid 
Sayyid Shaildian Barha 
s/o Diler Khan 
Sayyid Hasan s/o Diler 
Khan 
Sayyid Shahab Barha 
(SherKhan) 
Salabat BQian Barha 
1628-29 
1634-35 
1628-29 
.1632-33 
1637-38 
1641-42 
1645-46 
1647-48 
1647-48 
1649-50 
1649-50 
1652-53 
1652-53 
1653-54 
1657-58 
1655-56 
Qiladar of Gwalior 
Subedar of Agra 
Dy Qiledar of 
Gwalior 
Faujdar of Barha 
Subedarof 
Allahabad 
Faujdar of 
Mandsore 
Maris of Gwalior 
Qiledar of Irak 
(Lahore) 
Qiledar & Irak 
(Lahore) 
Faujdar of Gwalior 
(A.C.) 
Faujdar of Gwalior 
Dy. Subedar of 
Punjab 
Faujdar of Tarad 
Faujdar of Gurda 
Faujdar of 
Mandsore 
Subedar of 
Allahabad 
Lahauri, vol.1, Pt. 
I,p.24 
Lahauri, vol. Pt. 
II, p.76. 
Qazvini, 170 
Lahauri, vol. I, 
Pt. I, 448 
Lahauri, vol.11, 
201 
Lahauri, vol.11, 
232 
Lahauri, vol.11, 
474 
Lahauri, vol.11, 
736 
Lahauri, vol.11, 
737 
Waris, 56(b) 
Waris, 56(b) 
Waris, 103(b) 
Waris, 156(b) 
180(b) 
Amal-i saleh. III, 
272 
Waris, 240(a) 
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